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Executive Summary  
Objective, scope 
This study's objective is to provide an update on disinformation in the period of 2019–2020, and the first 
month of 2021. An overview and analysis of the disinformation actions and campaigns in this time span 
serves as a basis for assessing the tendencies of changing disinformation practices, and the social and 
political background against which they take place.  
The study focuses on disinformation actions, many of them foreign influence operations; its scope does 
not extend to misinformation and cyber operations. The mapping of disinformation actions extends to 
global events, but the legal assessment focuses more on the European Union and its Member States, 
adding three third states for comparison. 
State of play 
Mapping of disinformation actions and campaigns has identified increasing difficulty in attributing 
disinformation sources to foreign state actors. Disinformation campaigns rely on domestic resources to 
a greater extent, aiming to create the impression of organic news sources. Potemkin personas, for 
example, are inauthentic users who build a credible online presence across multiple platforms and mix 
their political messaging with banal posts about their supposed daily life. Identifying the inauthenticity of 
these accounts is complicated, even for professional investigators. Disinformation agencies create entire 
networks of inauthentic actors, or combine both authentic and fake contributors. They also build on radical 
voices from within EU Member States and amplify them through a foreign instructed ‘troll’ network within 
those states. Opinions from both ends of the political spectrum are utilised to increase polarisation.  
Within the European context, issues of genuine insecurity, such as the COVID-19 vaccine and other aspects 
of the pandemic, or controversial political issues, have been addressed and amplified by disinformation 
agents without needing to state factual falsities.  
Recent legislative actions 
The draft regulations for a Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) provide a promising 
regulatory scheme; however, the scope of compulsory, sanctionable regulations extends to only a subset 
of the rules that would be necessary to tackle disinformation. The rest of the measures are referred for co-
regulation, where the Commission, and in one case the Board of Digital Coordinators, would have a 
facilitating role in creating three Codes (a general Code of Conduct, a Code of Conduct for online 
advertising, and a Crisis Protocol). Compliance with these Codes would be regularly supervised by 
independent audit organisations, however, non-compliance or negative audit does not appear to entail 
any consequences. Therefore, it is recommended that if an independent audit finds that a platform does 
not fulfil its commitments under the Code of Conduct, the Digital Services Coordinator should decide 
whether attempts from the platform to justify departure from the Code are acceptable or not. In the latter 
case, it should have the right to impose an order.  
This study provides case studies from countries in which policies and measures are tackling disinformation 
directly, including by increasing citizens' resilience to them through citizens’ initiatives and sharing of best 
practices. The jurisdictions covered include Germany, France, Finland, and Estonia (and shorter 
descriptions from other Member States such as Hungary, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden) within the EU, as 
well as Taiwan, Australia, and the US as third countries. The selected states represent different and 
creative approaches to disinformation and platform regulation.  
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Assessment of self-regulation 
Platforms' activities and self-regulation are presented and evaluated based on the Commission and ERGA's 
assessments of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, as well as the platforms' self-assessment reports. 
The study identifies three categories of platform's proactive measures: content moderation, contributions 
to balance the informational ecosystem (donations, grants, and technical supports), and prioritisation or 
verification, which combines elements of the first two categories. The self-regulatory measures of 
platforms are briefly summarised and evaluated, including the suspension of then-US President Donald 
Trump's account. Major techniques, like fact-checking and verification, are extensively analysed and 
evaluated, revealing that the practice of fact-checking itself struggles with inherent problems. The primary 
problems relate to credibility; whether independent, NGO, industry-financed, official, or institutionalised, 
all these circumstances may question the credibility of the fact-checking body in the eye of various groups. 
Moreover, the label of ‘fact-checking’ has been abused by disinformation agencies to deny true facts and 
to accuse independent and trustworthy news sources of what they themselves are guilty of. Besides, most 
fact-checker organisations do not have a model for reaching audiences, and this includes the EUvsDisinfo 
service. As a result, the reached audiences are limited in size and do not correspond with the groups that 
are exposed to disinformation.  
Psychological mechanisms 
Even the most current literature on psychological manipulation lacks conclusive answers, in terms of the 
effect mechanism of manipulation and persuasion, but a number of factors could be identified: an 
entertaining story; the trustworthiness of the source; repetition; personal characteristics; and trust levels. 
The research results conclude that among the various instruments to prevent the effects of 
disinformation, the most robust is critical media literacy. People who are able to process information in 
an analytically reflective and ethically judgmental way can see through manipulation attempts. There is 
wide professional agreement on the necessity of compulsory media literacy education in schools and 
beyond. This needs to be a transnational project, offering target group-specific education for people across 
all age groups (see below).  
The psychological mechanisms of counter-narratives may themselves function similarly to disinformation; 
good storytelling, authentic and personal stories, credible and trustworthy protagonists, attractive and 
target group-specific presentation (especially through video), empathy with a character, and longer 
exposition have all been identified as key aspects of successful persuasion, while information overload has 
the opposite effect. Nevertheless, the personal and situational characteristics of recipients have been 
found to be more decisive; or at least, they give more solid research results. Thus, strategic communicators 
must understand their audience in order to build credibility and be persuasive. This underlines the 
importance of micro-targeted, issue-based advertising, anecdotally called the ‘nuke’ of persuasion 
(referring to its effectiveness). To keep election advertising fair and inclusive, it is strongly recommended 
that micro-targeting is not used for political and issue-based advertising. 
Impacts on democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights 
Among the impacts of disinformation on democracy and the rule of law, special weight needs to be given 
to the role of political authority. In the past five years, the effects of disinformation disseminated by 
official authorities and credible political figures have been observable. Words expressed by individuals 
of authority should be regarded as impactful on their audience, and have an effect on policies as well. This 
power is extended to disinformation disseminated by them, which penetrates societies faster and more 
deeply, having more robust effects. Moreover, it becomes futile to fight against such disinformation with 
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national policies, as the policymakers themselves would be affected by countermeasures. In this situation, 
only a few options are left open: 
(1) Applying the general rule of law mechanism, in which the systematic dissemination of 
disinformation and propaganda by politicians or state authorities is considered as an anti-
democratic behaviour, which violates the rule of law. 
(2) Relying on transnational networks to foster civil society cooperation to promote journalism, 
investigative journalism and media literacy. 
(3) Reacting immediately and unambiguously to those disinformation actions which reach the 
threshold of hate speech, incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence.  
Compared to pre-2019, recent disinformation campaigns have had a direct effect on individual 
fundamental rights, demonstrating meaningful change. Along with political disinformation, the 
‘infodemic’ has endangered people's health and livelihoods, including creating discrimination and hostility 
towards various minority groups, such as Asians, migrants, refugees, and elderly people. In January 2021, 
manipulation and conspiracy theories led to an unprecedented attack on the Capitol building in 
Washington, which claimed the lives of five people and caused several others injuries. This event is a 
notable example of the impact that disinformation and incitement to violence can have when 
disseminated by prominent political figures.  
How much 'laundered disinformation' has influenced European democracy and trust in Europe cannot be 
measured, especially when such manipulation campaigns address real controversies and pressing 
insecurities among citizens; even if opinion polls would show decline in the trust, cause and effect between 
disinformation events and any changes in opinion could not be proven. Importantly, the official statistics 
do not show a significant change among European citizens in relation to their trust in European 
integration. 
Recommendations to protect democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights 
Analysis shows that in the future, a lack of restrictions might represent a bigger threat to democracy, the 
rule of law, and fundamental rights than over-regulation. One of the reasons for this is that platforms' 
activism has already resulted in an intensive interference with users' freedoms, without legal safeguards, 
limits, or remedies. The role of legislation should be to make platform regulation calculable, and protect 
individual rights against the power of large online platforms. In this sense, it is recommended that the DSA 
obliges online platforms to act expediently in order to pay full respect to fundamental rights, in particular 
the right to freedom of expression, freedom of information, equality and non-discrimination, privacy, and 
dignity – especially in their content moderation decisions. To help enable this process, it is recommended 
that at least the dominant social media platforms employ Freedom of Expression Officers, professional 
experts in international, European, and national standards for freedom of expression, who can be expected 
to make responsible decisions on content removal and labelling.  
With this logic – and to ensure a healthy informational ecosystem – the DSA should oblige online platforms 
to maintain ideologically neutral services by ensuring that their algorithms do not systematically favour 
any political, ideological, or religious opinions, or give preference to content that is their own or by an 
affiliated company. It should also ensure that algorithms do not discriminate between users or users' 
content based on protected characteristics, such as race, gender, or political opinion. Beyond what has 
already been provided by the DSA (Article 29), content recommendation algorithms should offer at least 
one further option aimed at increasing diversity, and at least one further option to prioritise content that 
is found to be trustworthy by independent news organisations. 
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Platforms should not pursue experiments that involve humans. Algorithms that affect a very large number 
of users should be transparent and tested, even if this means that the pace of innovation must slow down. 
To minimise the impact of disinformation on European democracy, political and issue-based advertising 
should be regulated at the European level, and should not involve the use of micro-targeting. The 
European Court of Auditors and European Anti-Fraud Office should supervise campaign finances, including 
sponsorship of social media advertisements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Social media platforms should actively monitor political and issue-based advertising during election 
campaigns or crisis situations, and it is recommended that ‘election war-rooms’, comprising of teams of 
interdisciplinary experts, are established. 
Very large social media platforms should maintain the requirement for verification of identity for party 
politicians, while users who regularly reach large audiences with public issue content (including NGOs, 
media actors, and politicians) should be labelled with an ‘influencer’ tag (without compulsory 
identification). Content provided by such users should enjoy a specific public interest privilege and 
should not be removed for violating terms and conditions, such as occasional vulgarity. However, in cases 
of incitement to hatred or violence, or repeated events of imparting disinformation, prompt removal of 
the content and – if appropriate – suspension of the account should be applied. 
Design a better informational ecosystem 
In this post-truth era, the previously known hierarchies and entry-barriers of the traditional media system 
have vanished. The resulting new communicative structure must now be developed, and this has been 
actively formed by platforms and advertisers. it is now high time that the state, representing citizens, also 
establishes relevant principles. 
Two related packages of instruments are recommended to design a better informational system, and 
increase critical media literacy. 
A better informational ecosystem is one in which networks of trustworthy, quality information are easily 
accessible. Instead of individual actors, regulation should think in terms of networks; this includes 
communication networks, education networks, value chains, and technology-neutral, as well as content-
neutral, solutions. 
The lucrative value chain of generating disinformation should be interrupted, and all actors involved in the 
value chain should bear responsibility for participating. Providers of personal data, creative designers, PR 
companies, and political consultants should all face legal restrictions, or even sanctions. 
Public service media  
Public service media is a natural pillar of trust in the post-truth era; however, its capture and abuse to 
spread illiberal propaganda should not be tolerated.  
The Communication from the Commission on State aid to public service broadcasting (2009) should be 
transformed into hard law, and rule out abuse of public financial resources by captured public media. 
New models to generate public service content with the help of information technology must be 
actively sought, including mobile phone applications and video channels with short videos to help inform 
and educate citizens of all ages.  
Models for supranational European public service media should be developed to address citizens across 
all Member States and to provide information about the operation of the common Europe (whether by a 
transnational European Online News Agency, which generates a pool of public service content in all 
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languages of the EU, or by a joint public service media provider), and should consider the application of a 
content quota to news related to supranational European issues. 
Affirmative information 
To effectively fight disinformation, a multi-layered network of affirmative information systems is 
recommended. Affirmative information is halfway between fact-checking and counter-narratives, 
addressing a public matter which might be subject to disinformation. Ideally, it should precede 
disinformation and cover the same issue with accurate, relevant, and engaging information. The 
network should consist of a central node, which represents trustworthiness, and is able to rapidly and 
professionally uncover disinformation actions; the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) is a good 
candidate for this. The decentralised network nodes should be local organisations which enjoy the trust of 
the local population, whether that is the local authorities, scientific institutions (including as CDCs), the 
police, or NGOs. The central node's raw information should be processed into short messages according to 
various target audiences (e.g. memes, videos, intellectual news content, etc.). Dissemination is key. Social 
media, television, or other appropriate means (dependent on the locality) should be used to reach wide 
population segments.  
Networks of trusted media, science communication, and critical media literacy 
Beyond strategic affirmative actions, quality media organisations should be encouraged and supported to 
create voluntary cooperative networks, combining hierarchical and horizontal network structures. They 
should develop protocols of trust (based on both technological and professional methods) to verify the 
authenticity and trustworthiness of content throughout the product distribution chain, including sharing. 
As the traditional architectures of trusted knowledge have evaporated, these need to be replaced with 
the help of new communication structures. The pandemic and the related ‘infodemic’ have demonstrated 
that organisation of science communication is an inevitable part of the new, ‘post-truth’ era of 
information. 
Specific EU scientific communication agencies should be established and supported to share 
information about scientific discovery in an accessible and engaging way – through short videos, for 
example. These should be disseminated in local languages and through appropriate channels. Dedicated 
scientific communication hubs should be established, and these should enjoy prioritised social media 
status. The hubs should maintain an interactive media presence, with the capacity to respond to inquiries. 
Among the diversity of scientific topics, those relevant for democratic values should also be represented, 
in order to provide scientific, factual evidence in questions which polarise society, and which are regular 
topics of disinformation (e.g. the climate crisis, vaccination, homosexuality, etc.). 
Education in critical media literacy should be a massive programme for the whole population of all 
European Member States across all age groups, from compulsory school education, to travelling buses and 
social media apps. ‘Superspreaders’ of information, such as influencers, teachers, priests, and 
governmental officials must be educated, as well as the elderly generation, who are vulnerable targets of 
disinformation and an active voter cohort. 
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1 Introduction 
This study aims to provide an update on disinformation and propaganda (including legislative, industry, 
and civilian responses to these phenomena) in the years 2019–2020, and to give recommendations that 
reflect on achievements in countering disinformation actions and the tendencies of the phenomenon. In 
particular, it builds on the 2019 study, ‘Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the 
rule of law and in democratic processes in EU and its Member States’.1 
The specific objectives of this study are to provide an overview of disinformation actions in the target 
period, taking COVID-19 related ‘infodemics’ into consideration; to analyse and assess European and 
national legislative and policy responses; and to review the achievements of industry self-regulation. 
The study provides an analysis of the psychological mechanisms of susceptibility to manipulation, and 
offers in-depth review of civil society responses (which address, in particular, awareness-raising and media 
literacy). The current and relevant legislative drafts of the European Union, particularly the draft DSA, are 
also analysed and evaluated in detail. The suggestions for improvement propose slight but meaningful 
changes.  
1.1 Scope of the study 
The study's research scope is limited to the years 2019 and 2020, including the first month of 2021. 
Mapping exercises focus on the events that influenced operations; the legislative and policy response to 
them; civil society initiatives; as well as self-regulative measures and good practices covering several 
European Member States and three third states (Australia, Taiwan, the USA).  
The definition of ‘disinformation’ has crystallised in recent years. It was described in 2017 by Wardle and 
Derakshan as 'information that is deliberately false, with the intention to harm people as a social group or 
society’. In contrast, ‘misinformation’ was defined as ‘organically-created and unintentionally-spread false 
information’, while 'malinformation' was defined as ‘information that is based on reality, but is used to 
inflict harm on people through its manipulative nature (leaks, harassment or hate speech)’.2 
A study commissioned by the EEAS added two more categories: 'influence operations' by third countries, 
and 'foreign interference'. ‘Influence operations’ refers to ‘coordinated efforts to influence a target 
audience using a range of illegitimate and deceptive means, in support of the objectives of an adversary’, 
while ‘foreign interference’ is ‘a range of coercive, deceptive, and/or non-transparent efforts by a foreign 
state actor or its agents to disrupt the free formation and expression of political will’ (during elections, for 
example).3 This study focuses on disinformation, some of which is part of foreign influence operations, 
while in other cases it cannot be attributed to foreign actors. As will be discussed below, the latter is the 
type which has had the most impact in the EU. 
  
 
1 Judit Bayer, et al., ‘Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States’, 
Study for the Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2019.  
2 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, ‘Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy 
making’, Council of Europe, report DGI(2017)09, 2017,  p. 20. 
3 J. Pamment, ‘The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2020, p. 16-17.  
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1.2 Outline of the study 
Chapter 3 of the study provides a summary of the trends in disinformation actions and events, highlighting 
relevant cases.  
Chapter 4 introduces the most relevant recent disinformation actions within and outside the European 
Union.  
Chapter 5 gives a brief overview of how freedom of expression standards could apply to the restriction of 
disinformation and assesses legal and policy developments in eight Member States of the European Union 
and three third states, as well as some good practices.  
Chapter 6 describes policies and measures, as well as civil society responses, aimed at increasing citizens’ 
resilience to disinformation. 
Chapter 7 discusses the role of media platforms by addressing platforms’ self-regulatory actions, reviewing 
their reports, and categorising their initiatives.  
Chapter 8 provides in-depth analysis of current knowledge on the psychological mechanisms of 
manipulation, as well as the resilience-building potential of education.   
Chapter 9 analyses the impacts of recent disinformation events on democracy, the rule of law, and 
fundamental rights, with particular regard to future threats.  
Chapter 10 summarises findings and concludes with suggestions. 
Chapter 11 contains policy recommendations for the design of a new, democratic information ecosystem.   
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2 Methodology 
The primary objectives of this study were to provide: 
i) an overview of effective measures to counter disinformation and best practices implemented, 
both in the EU Member States and in the third countries;  
ii) recommendations on how to counter disinformation more effectively – departing from the 
2019 report on ‘Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law 
in the EU and its Member States’, the research focused on disinformation campaigns in light of 
recent developments, such as the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ or European Elections (February 2019–
January 2021). 
The main focus of the study is mirrored in the following research questions: 
i) What is the (potential) impact of disinformation on democracy, the rule of law, and 
fundamental rights? 
ii) How can disinformation be effectively combatted? 
The design of the methodology was guided by a utilisation-focused approach, with the study intended to 
serve as a ‘ready reference’ for European Parliament (EP) and EU officials. The methodological concept 
aimed to utilise the best mix of data gathering tools to yield the most reliable and valid answers to the 
research questions, and generate maximum learning within the constraints of timeline and data 
availability. In order to serve this purpose, the study followed a mixed-methods approach and applied 
triangulation of findings to ensure their relevance. The data collection tools selected were qualitative and 
included in-depth desk research, mapping exercises, and case studies.  
In the first phase of the study, two desk research-based mapping exercises were conducted, on the subject 
of:  
i) foreign-originated disinformation campaigns;  
ii) civil society efforts to fight disinformation.  
During the mapping of foreign-originated disinformation, action entries in the EUvsDisinfo database were 
reviewed, as well as academic and grey literature, relevant reports produced by the EUvsDisinfo team, and 
newspaper and magazine articles. Reports written by intelligence firms and investigative groups were also 
consulted.  During the mapping of civil society initiatives, over 200 civic initiatives and organisations active 
in the EU to fight disinformation were identified. Alongside existing databases on civil society efforts, 
initiatives discussed in previous research from the period 2019–2021 and reported in the news media were 
consulted. The mapping also used the ‘snowball’ sampling method; once an organisation was identified, 
its partners and other projects were also explored. A full list of the databases that were consulted during 
the mapping exercises is included in Appendix 1. 
During the second phase, a series of original case studies have been conducted in order to analyse the best 
counter-disinformation practices implemented in EU Member States and third countries. The countries 
that have been chosen as exemplary are Germany, Estonia, Finland, the United States of America, Australia, 
and Taiwan. They were chosen based on the following criteria: 
• equitable geographical distribution (North–South, East–West); 
• potential risk to the rule of law and system of democracy based on election results and societal 
phenomena; 
• strength of foreign influences; 
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• whether the country had developed efficient and effective approaches to counter-disinformation 
activities (which was decided based on whether these approaches brought results, had 
transferability potential, were located within a wider strategy, and reached a large audience); 
• the pandemic situation and government’s response with respect to COVID-19. 
Limitations of the study 
While the study followed a rigorous and tailor-made approach to maximise the validity and reliability of 
findings, it is important to acknowledge the following limitations: 
• Temporal scope: As the study is an update to a previous study (2019), it only covers events and 
disinformation campaigns that occurred between February 2019 and January 2021. 
• Type of disinformation actions covered by the mapping: The study covered the most impactful 
disinformation campaigns that met the following criteria: 
i) they originated outside of the EU (though conclusively proving the origins of 
disinformation campaigns is often impossible as they are covert operations, while the 
research can only rely on publicly available assessments as to their origins); 
ii) they were conducted between February 2019 and January 2021; 
iii) they targeted the EU as a whole, or its Member States; 
iv) they aimed to interfere with elections or referenda, discredit the EU or its Member States, 
or target individuals in public positions in the EU, or if they were related to the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
• Definition of the disinformation ‘impact’: The study aimed to establish the impact of 
disinformation and propaganda on democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law. Measuring 
impact and attributing causality with certainty under non-laboratory circumstances is near-
impossible, however. The data collected were analysed for best evidence of impact, yet definitive 
conclusions in this regard are difficult to draw. 
• Limitations in terms of civil society mapping: The data collection focused on civil initiatives that 
are currently active, and that are either based in an EU Member State, or target the EU/a Member 
State. This means that large-scale global efforts operated or funded by US organisations were not 
included. In addition, due to the nature of the methodology and time limits of the study, the 
resulting list of civic responses is treated as indicative, rather than exhaustive. 
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3 State of play 
This chapter will review recent developments that have taken place in the field of information 
manipulation. In many disinformation campaigns today, the true/false dichotomy is simply irrelevant. 
A significant portion of the EUvsDisinfo database’s4 entries reviewed for this study contain no ‘verifiably 
false or misleading’ information. Stories such as, ‘The EU will split in half within five years and Latvia will 
want to join Russia’5, targeting the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia, are not verifiable. The goal of many 
of these campaigns is not to convince their target audiences of alternative narratives; rather, they aim to 
create or deepen social division, as the example above shows. Many campaigns aim to pit social groups 
against each other by disseminating highly polarised content, often on both sides of an issue. In such cases, 
they usually rely on pre-existing social tensions and fears. They also often aim to ‘muddy the waters’, 
creating confusion and distrust by putting forward ‘alternative facts’. The resulting erosion of trust can 
have far-reaching consequences for democratic societies, reducing civic participation in the political 
process and decreasing the legitimacy of institutions in the eyes of citizens. 
3.1 Old techniques updated 
‘Troll farms’ or ‘cyber troops’, such as Russia’s ‘Internet Research Agency’6, China’s ‘50 Cent Army’7, or 
Turkey’s ‘AK Trolls’8, have been around for years, aiming to manipulate public discourse. Such ‘trolls’ spread 
messages to achieve a particular goal while masquerading as authentic users or commentators. In the early 
days of this phenomenon, researchers were able to spot foreign trolls with relative ease.9 In the years since, 
however, foreign trolls have become much more sophisticated.10   
Potemkin personas 
Research and journalistic investigations, often highly technical in nature and carried out mostly in the US, 
have, in recent years, identified a large number of ‘Potemkin personas’, faux newsrooms, pseudo-think 
tanks and fake grassroots organisations11. ‘Potemkin personas’ are foreign, and in this context, typically 
Russian trolls who build a credible online presence across multiple platforms, and mix their political 
messaging with banal posts about their supposed daily life, much like an authentic user would do.12 
Nowadays, they are much more difficult to identify as inauthentic than in previous years. At a level higher 
than this, fake personas are created to pose as experts, writers, or journalists, authoring articles either for 
 
4 European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, EUvsDisinfo.  
5 EU vs DISINFORMATION, ‘The EU Will Split in Half within Five Years’, December 30, 2020. 
6 Andrew Dawson and Martin Innes, ‘How Russia’s Internet Research Agency Built Its Disinformation Campaign’, The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2019, pp. 245–256. 
7 Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, ‘How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic 
Distraction, Not Engaged Argument’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 111, No. 3, August 2017, pp. 484–501. 
8 Ergin Bulut and Erdem Yörük, ‘Mediatized Populisms | Digital Populism: Trolls and Political Polarization of Twitter in Turkey’, 
International Journal of Communication, Vol. 11, 2017, p. 25. 
9 Aric Toler, ‘How (Not) To Report On Russian Disinformation’, Bellingcat, April 15, 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/ 
how-tos/2020/04/15/how-not-to-report-on-russian-disinformation/.  
10 Darren L. Linvill and Patrick Warren, ‘Russian Trolls Can Be Surprisingly Subtle, and Often Fun to Read’, Washington Post, March 
8, 2019, sec. Perspective. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/russian-trolls-can-be-surprisingly-subtle-and-often-fun-to-
read/2019/03/08/677f8ec2-413c-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html. 
11 Renée Diresta and Shelby Grossman, ‘Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014-2019’, White paper, 
Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, Stanford, 2019. 
12 A particularly successful example is a Twitter handle @PoliteMelanie, whose snarky post about then-US President Donald Trump 
won a Chicago Tribune’s Tweet of the Week contest in 2019. Some of the persona’s posts went viral, and at one point it had 25 000 
followers. See, Zorn, Eric, ‘What Are You Going to Do? A Russian Troll Won My Tweet of the Week Poll’, Chicago Tribune, August 2, 
2019, sec. Column. 
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faux media outlets set up for this purpose, or for unsuspecting genuine media sites.13 These articles are 
shared by lower-level (‘shell’) trolls to amplify the message and give it the appearance of legitimacy. 
Likewise, front media outlets and organisations posing as independent think tanks or grassroots groups14 
have been found to be established by the Russian military intelligence service G.U. (previously GRU) as ‘a 
home for original content […] and primary affiliation for sock puppet personas.’15 Two recent and striking 
examples of front operations paid for by the Internet Research Agency16 are an entity named ‘Peace Data’, 
which posed as a left-leaning independent news site and hired unsuspecting journalists in Europe17, and 
another called ‘NAEBC’, a pro-Trump news site purportedly based in Hungary, which solicited articles from 
unwitting American journalists.18 The journalists writing for these publications were unaware that they 
were being paid for by the Internet Research Agency. The mechanism of legitimising disinformation 
content through intermediaries and obscuring its origin is known as ‘information laundering’, an old KGB 
tactic that has been updated for today’s digital age.19 In the most successful cases, the manipulated content 
makes its way to mainstream news media and is spread by authentic social media users. 
Russian information laundering has been studied in the European context by the NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence, which recently published reports on the phenomenon in the 
Nordic-Baltic region20 and Germany.21 Both reports found the method to be prevalent, and conducted 
through a large number of state-funded Russian media outlets, pro-Kremlin actors, and proxies. In some 
countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, ‘accidental’ actors also played an important role. Such ‘accidental’ 
actors (mainstream news media outlets, for example) may not know that they are participants in the 
process, but amplify disinformation content nonetheless.  
A report by the Warsaw Institute points out why this kind of information manipulation tactic can be 
particularly effective.22 For historical reasons, many people in Poland are fairly resilient to overt pro-Russian 
propaganda and view openly pro-Russian media with suspicion. Mainstream media also seem ‘immune’ to 
overt Russian propaganda.23 Laundered through other media outlets, however, Russia-aligned ‘patriotic’ 
disinformation (for example, against Ukraine) does find its way to the Polish audience.  
Troll farms for hire 
Another way fake personas are utilised are for-profit ‘troll farms’, which seem to be an increasingly 
prevalent phenomenon worldwide.24 These businesses have adopted methods from the Internet Research 
 
13 Adam Entous, ‘The Rise and Fall of a Kremlin Troll’, The New Yorker, July 19, 2018. 
14 In February 2021, Twitter removed two networks of Russian disinformation operations. Several of the accounts were for pseudo-
think tanks and media fronts. Renée Diresta and Shelby Grossman,  ‘Fronts & Friends: An Investigation into Two Twitter Networks 
Linked to Russian Actors’, Stanford Internet Observatory, February 23, 2021.  
15 Diresta and Grossman, 2019, op. cit., p. 26. 
16 Max Seddon and Hannah Murphy, ‘Russian Troll Farm Makes US Comeback’, Financial Times, September 4, 2020. 
17 Jack Stubbs, ‘Duped by Russia, Freelancers Ensnared in Disinformation Campaign by Promise of Easy Money’, Reuters, September 
3, 2020.  
18 Jack Stubbs, ‘Exclusive: Russian Operation Masqueraded as Right-Wing News Site to Target U.S. Voters – Sources’, Reuters, 
October 1, 2020. 
19 Diresta and Grossman, 2019, op. cit., p. 5. 
20 Belén Carrasco Rodríguez, ‘Information Laundering in the Nordic-Baltic Region | StratCom', NATO Strategic Communications 
Centre of Excellence, Riga, November 2020. 
21 Belén Carrasco Rodríguez, 'Information Laundering in Germany | StratCom', NATO Strategic Communications Centre of 
Excellence, Riga, October 2020. 
22 Małgorzata Zawadzka, 'Today’s Potemkin Village: Kremlin Disinformation and Propaganda in Poland', The Warsaw Institute 
Review, May 15, 2018.  
23 Łukasz Wenerski and Michal Kacewicz, Russian Soft Power in Poland, Political Capital, Budapest, 2017. 
24 A journalistic investigation in 2020 found sporadic cases of publicly revealed operations since 2011, with the figure jumping to 
19 in 2019. How much of the jump is due to increased prevalence and how much to increased attention and efforts to reveal the 
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Agency’s playbook, relying on fabricated personas to spread seemingly authentic agreed-upon messages 
on social media. One such disinformation operation, named ‘Cat@Net’, was exposed in Poland. The 
operation was part of services provided by a marketing agency whose customers included Polish public 
television, as well as politicians; it is unclear whether they knew about the covert practices used on their 
behalf. The firm’s employees cultivated hundreds of leftist and rightist personas, who built up a follower 
base, then trolled social media, spreading pre-defined talking points, as instructed by managers. The 
personas conducted heated conversations, often with each other, to attract and provoke authentic users, 
sometimes even politicians, to join the discussion and generate engagement.25  
Similar operations have been exposed worldwide. A US intelligence firm, for research purposes, hired a 
Russian troll service to build up the reputation of a company, and another one to destroy it.26 A Google 
subsidiary also conducted a similar experiment.27 Journalists found widespread use of such inauthentic 
networks in Ukraine ahead of the 2019 parliamentary elections.28 In the Philippines, the practice has grown 
into an industry.29 A similar operation was identified in the 2020 US Presidential elections campaign, when 
a troll farm based in Arizona was hired to create and spread content for political figures on Facebook and 
Twitter.30 Many of its operatives were teenagers who used their own accounts to spread the paid-for 
messages.31 An example of both information laundering and hiring trolls involved the Internet Research 
Agency ‘outsourcing’ some of its US-focused operations to organisations in Ghana and Nigeria in 2020.32 
Importantly, unlike earlier-identified influence operations, most of these trolling enterprises were local 
companies, aimed at influencing the public discourse in inauthentic ways domestically. This is in line with 
the finding discussed in Chapter 4 that disinformation in the European parliamentary elections appeared 
to be a mostly home-grown affair, rather than a result of foreign influence operations. Research into the 
2020 US presidential elections identified similar trends. In addition to the existence of local troll farms, 
an analysis of the disinformation that questioned the results of the elections on Twitter found that highly-
placed American politicians, rather than foreign trolls, were the disinformation ‘superspreaders’. Then-US 
President Donald Trump, his two older sons, and other prominent political figures were the most prolific 
producers and disseminators of election-related disinformation.33 Video sharing app TikTok also found that 
disinformation in the US 2020 elections was ‘driven by domestic users’ rather than foreign actors. In most 
of these cases, any potential connection to foreign actors is not possible to prove with open-source data. 
Local activists, politicians, or simply voters whose conviction aligns with foreign interests, may act as ‘useful 
idiots’ for foreign actors without any link to such actors.34 
  
 
operations is, however, impossible to know. Craig Silverman, Jane Lytvynenko, and William Kung, 'Disinformation For Hire: How A 
New Breed Of PR Firms Is Selling Lies Online',  BuzzFeed News, January 6, 2020. 
25 Katarzyna Pruszkiewicz, Wojciech Cieśla and Konrad Szczygiel, 'Undercover at a Troll Farm', Investigate Europe, November 1, 
2019.  
26 Recorded Future, ‘The Price of Influence: Disinformation in the Private Sector’, Insikt Group, September 30, 2019.  
27 Andy Greenberg, ‘Jigsaw Bought a Russian Twitter Troll Campaign as an Experiment’, Wired, June 12, 2019.  
28 Yevheniia Motorevska, Dmytro Replianchuk and Vasyl Bidun, 'Inside a Ukrainian Troll Farm', Organised Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, September 20, 2019. 
29 Shibani Mahtani and Regine Cabato, 'Why "Crafty Internet Trolls in the Philippines May Be Coming to a Website near You', 
Washington Post, n.d. 
30 DFRLab, 'Op-Ed: In the United States, the Threat of Election Disinfo Is Mostly Home-Grown', Medium, October 27, 2020. 
31 Isaac Stanley-Becker, 'Pro-Trump Youth Group Enlists Teens in Secretive Campaign Likened to a ‘Troll Farm,’ Prompting Rebuke 
by Facebook and Twitter' , Washington Post, September 16, 2020..  
32 Taylor Hatmaker, 'Russian Trolls Are Outsourcing to Africa to Stoke US Racial Tensions', TechCrunch, March 12, 2020.  
33 Stanford Digital Repository, "The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election", Stanford Digital Repository: Election 
Integrity Partnership. v1.2.0, Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet 
Observatory, 2021. 
34 TikTok, 'TikTok Global Transparency Report', 2020, n.d. 
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3.2 New technology utilised 
Private spaces 
A trend that started before 2018, but has since accelerated, is the shift to more private forms of discussions, 
away from public Facebook pages towards messaging apps including WhatsApp and Telegram, as well as 
private Facebook groups. Discussions that take place in these spaces are unchecked and un-researchable. 
From the perspective of disinformation, this is worrisome; as fact-checkers in Spain highlighted before the 
2019 elections, lots of disinformation in Spain originated from, and was spread through, WhatsApp35, not 
necessarily making its way into ‘fact-checkable’ media. The Reuters Digital Institute found that an 
increasing number of people turn to these messaging apps for news, even for information about COVID-
19.36 Intelligence investigators studying a network exposed as a Russian influence operation on Facebook 
noted that the accounts had minimal engagement publicly, but may have been active in private messaging 
and private groups, not visible to researchers.37 In a similar manner, while many arguments can be made 
to de-platform radical voices, as Twitter did with then-US President Donald Trump in January 2021, one of 
the dangers of this is that they move to less open, more underground networks, such as ‘Parler’, beyond 
the reach of checked information. 
Audio messaging 
Although they are not particularly popular in Europe yet, disinformation experts are already warning 
against audio-based messaging apps as the next disinformation frontier. ‘Clubhouse’, the most popular of 
such apps, works as a kind of live talk radio, allowing users to live-stream audio feeds to a maximum of 
5 000 people at a time. The streams are not recorded. The ephemeral nature of the content created in the 
app makes it difficult to monitor. This is exacerbated by the fact that audio messages are ‘nearly impossible 
to trace, attribute, and counter’.38 Yet the structure of the app, and the lack of a ‘share’ or retweet button 
limits the virality of the content, which works against the dissemination of disinformation.39 
Artificial intelligence and deepfakes 
The disinformation potential of artificial intelligence and deepfakes – deep machine-learning technology 
used to fabricate realistic media, primarily audio or video – has received much public attention, but so far 
these technologies have not lived up to the hype. Fabricated personas now generally use AI-generated 
profile pictures on social media40 and on the front companies’ websites, making them impossible to detect 
with reverse image searches; experts, however, can still recognise the pictures as inauthentic.41 
Additionally, there are now efforts to deploy AI in the fight against disinformation, for example in the 
Horizon 2020-funded ‘FANDANGO’ project.42 As for deepfakes, to date, no politically malignant use of 
deepfake videos has been exposed43, however the techniques are increasingly normalised by the 
 
35 Rory Smith, ‘Venezuelan Bots, WhatsApp and Disinformation in Spain’, First Draft, May 21, 2019.  
36 Reuters Institute ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report’, Digital News Report, n.d.  
37 Graphika, ‘From Russia With Blogs: GRU Operators Leveraged Blogs, Social Media Accounts and Private Messaging to Reach 
Audiences Across Europe’, February 12, 2020.  
38 Roberto Braga, ‘Op-Ed: The next Big Wave of Disinformation Will Be Heard, Not Seen’, Medium, March 3, 2021. 
39 Alicia Cohn, ‘Clubhouse’s Rising Popularity Raises Misinformation Concerns’, Text, The Hill, February 21, 2021.  
40 Raphael Satter, ‘Experts: Spy Used AI-Generated Face to Connect with Targets’, AP NEWS, June 13, 2019, sec. Technology. 
41 Graphika, ‘Fake Cluster Boosts Huawei. Accounts with GAN Faces Attack Belgium over 5G Restrictions’, January 2021.  
42  FANDANGO, ‘FANDAGO: Fake News discovery and propagation from big Data Analysis and artificial IntelliGence Operations’.  
43 In April 2020, environmentalist group Extinction Rebellion Belgium posted a deepfake video of then-Belgian Prime Minister 
Sophie Wilmes making a speech in which she links COVID-19 to the climate crisis, but the video made it clear that it was fictitious. 
Gabriela Galindo, ‘XR Belgium Posts Deepfake of Belgian Premier Linking Covid-19 with Climate Crisis', The Brussels Times, April 
14, 2020.  
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commercial sector in the form of automated customer service chats and call systems.44 Additionally, the 
first AI-generated news anchors have been introduced in China. For disinformation operation, the most 
imminent danger may be posed by deepfake text; ‘algorithmically-generated messages flooding recipients 
to give a false impression of political consensus’.45 Russia experimented with such automated texts in the 
2010s, but found them inadequate; this may not be the case for much longer.46  
While deepfakes may not be a practical problem of information manipulation yet, on a more abstract level, 
they present a significant challenge for democracies. Using an experimental method, researchers have 
found that ‘political deepfakes may not necessarily deceive individuals, but they may sow uncertainty 
which may, in turn, reduce trust in news on social media’.47 The researchers argue this would hinder civic 
participation in online debates. Taken a step further, deepfakes may produce a feeling of general distrust, 
contributing to an information environment where the veracity of information feels impossible to know. 
This lack of trust may have far-reaching consequences for democracies. 
  
 
44 Brad Birnbaum, ‘The Rise of Human Agents: AI-Powered Customer Service Automation', Forbes, June 19, 2019.  
45 Keir Giles, Kim Harmtann and Mustaffa Munira, ‘The Role of Deepfakes in Malign Influence Campaigns | StratCom’ NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2019, p. 22. 
46 Giles et al., op. cit., p. 11. 
47 Cristian Vaccari and Andrew Chadwick, ‘Deepfakes and Disinformation: Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on 
Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in News’, Social Media + Society, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1, 2020, p. 2056305120903408.  
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4 Recent disinformation actions: selected examples 
As an update to the 2019 paper, this chapter will review the most important publicly identified foreign-
initiated disinformation actions that have been launched against the EU and its Member States since 
February 2019. The list is not exhaustive, but the cases signal important trends.  
4.1 Issue-based operations 
4.1.1 The Notre-Dame de Paris fire 
On 15 April 2019, a fire broke out in the Notre-Dame de Paris cathedral in Paris that destroyed most of the 
building. Within hours, social media was flooded with a vast range of false information about the fire. 
Researchers found that in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, far-right activists instrumentalised the incident 
to spread anti-Muslim hate.48 Official and pro-Russian media outlets were also prolific in their contribution; 
the EUvsDisinfo database contains 26 disinformation articles blaming the fire on terrorists, the Yellow Vest 
movement, Ukraine, the intelligence services, or even aliens or divine intervention (as punishment for gay 
marriage in Europe).49 No information was found about any potential overlap between the content 
produced by the two groups. 
4.1.2 Germany ‘stealing’ Russian children 
Reminiscent of the ‘Lisa case’ from 2016, the pro-Kremlin Russian-language media in Russia and Germany 
have been running stories since February 2021 about three young children removed from their Russian 
parents in Berlin by German authorities, in which their father claims to have been beaten up by the police 
and their mother claims the police officers yelled “This is for Navalny!” when taking the children. The 
German authorities say the children had been taken into state care because they were in danger. The police 
deny both the violence and the yell.50 Nonetheless, a Russian lawmaker, Duma Deputy Speaker Pyotr 
Tolstoy, has asked the Russian embassy to intervene.51  
4.1.3 The Navalny-case 
According to a report compiled by NATO, disinformation stories around Russian politician Aleksei Navalny 
combine three ‘traditional’ narrative elements of Russian disinformation: the NordStream 2 pipeline, 
Russophobia, and EU sanctions.52 The EUvsDisinfo database contains 262 entries about Navalny in the time 
period studied, 124 of them linked to Germany. The database identifies some recurrent narratives in the 
news stories about Navalny, including a deflection of responsibility from Russian authorities in his 
poisoning, and portraying Navalny as a western puppet. The stories also claim that Navalny was not 
poisoned at all, or that he was poisoned at the request of the west, to serve as a pretext to attack Russia.53  
  
 
48 Chloe Colliver, 'Click Here for Outrage: Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections 2019', Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, London, June 26, 2020.  
49 EU vs DISINFORMATION 'Building Blocks of Disinformation: Case of Notre Dame', April 18, 2019. 
50 TASS, 'Lawmaker Calls on Diplomats to Protect Russians Whose Kids Were Taken Away in Germany', n.d.. 
51 EU vs DISINFORMATION, ‘Vilifying Germany; Wooing Germany’, March 9, 2021. 
52 Rodríguez, Belén Carrasco, Information Laundering in Germany | StratCom, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 
Riga, October 2020. https://www.stratcomcoe.org/information-laundering-germany, p. 30. 
53 EU vs DISINFORMATION, ‘The German Statement Follows Goebbel’s Laws on Propaganda’ The Kremlin, the Navalny Case and 
the Art of Denial', September 4, 2020.  
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4.1.4 Belgium’s 5G plans 
In late 2020, in response to the Belgian government’s plans to restrict the access of ‘high-risk’ providers to 
the country's 5G network, a coordinated network of inauthentic Twitter accounts amplified and created 
news stories that attacked this decision. Some of the stories were retweeted by the official European 
Huawei account, but network analysis firm Graphika found no evidence definitively linking the fake Twitter 
accounts to any entity.54 
4.1.5 Bonanza Media, the Netherlands 
Investigative journalism collective Bellingcat claims that Dutch ‘alternative’ media outlet Bonanza Media 
has close ties with the Russian military intelligence service GRU.55 Bonanza Media, operating since 2019, 
describes itself as ‘a platform for independent journalists’. It focuses on the crash of Malaysian Airlines 
Flight MH370 in 2014, questioning the findings of the five-country Joint Investigation Team that implicate 
Russia. Bellingcat found evidence that Bonanza Media were in close contact with a senior official of the 
Russian army, and sent articles to the GRU before publishing them. Bonanza Media content has been 
amplified by Russian state media, and even Russian officials56, and has been introduced as evidence in the 
defence team of Oleg Pulatov in the ongoing trial of the plane crash in the Hague.57 Bellingcat claims that 
Bonanza Media is a ‘disinformation project run by the GRU’, although it is unclear whether the outlet was 
set up by the GRU. The people involved with Bonanza Media and implicated by Bellingcat deny the charges, 
claiming to be victims of a smear campaign by Bellingcat and the Dutch mainstream media.58 
4.2 Long-term operations 
4.2.1 Ghostwriter influence campaign 
An intelligence firm uncovered influence operations in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland that had been running 
since 2017, and were ‘aligned with Russian security interests; it named it Ghostwriter’.59The campaign 
primarily spreads NATO-related disinformation, often relying on forged documents attributed to political 
and military figures, which are reported on in ‘news’ articles written by made-up personas masquerading 
as journalists. The articles are disseminated via spoofed email chains as well as by hacking genuine news 
sites’ content management systems and planting the pieces there. Examples include a fabricated story in 
September 2019, with a manipulated photo, reporting that German soldiers desecrated a Jewish cemetery 
in Lithuania; or a report, complete with a made-up quote, that claims Lithuania’s first COVID-19 case was a 
NATO soldier. In Poland, the operation involved hacking the website of the Polish War Studies Academy in 
April 2020 and posting a forged letter there attributed to Brigadier General Ryszard Parafianowicz. 
The document urged Poles to reject the ‘American occupation’ of Poland. Shortly after, three news sites 
ran identical articles about the document, which were widely shared on Facebook first by fake personas, 
then by genuine users. Two of the three news sites plausibly claim they were hacked and did not post the 
articles. On the same day, an English version also appeared on a Russia-affiliated website. By the time the 
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articles were removed, they received over 8,500 Facebook shares, likes and comments.60 The Polish 
intelligence services claimed the operation ‘correspond[ed] to Russian actions’. 
4.2.2 Operation Secondary Infektion61 
Investigators uncovered a large-scale Russian operation, which had been running since at least 2014, 
targeting primarily (in order of frequency) Ukraine, the US, and the EU. Its operators posted on at least 
300 platforms and forums in numerous languages, from English to Spanish to Swedish. The operation often 
relied on forged documents, impersonating Western leaders. For example, it forged a letter in which 
European Commissioner Johannes Hahn called Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny ‘an odious 
nationalist’. One of the central themes of the operation was the EU’s weakness and internal division; it also 
tried to increase tension between Member States. For example, it published articles saying that Sweden 
could have prevented the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016, or that the EU was making Germany pay 
reparations to Poland for the Nazi occupation. It launched attacks on German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
then-Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, Polish leader Jarosław Kaczyński, and then-presidential 
candidate in France, Emmanuel Macron. Of the Member States, Poland, Germany, the UK (which was still a 
member), and Sweden were the most often targeted, followed by Lithuania, Latvia, and France. 
Investigators concluded that the campaign was run by a Russian operator, but not by the GRU or the 
Internet Research Agency. Despite the persistence and effort, the operation had minimal reach and 
impact62 in the investigators’ assessment. 
4.2.3 Operation Pinball 
In April 2020, an intelligence firm uncovered a ‘covert intelligence operation’ in Estonia, and another in 
Georgia, that bore striking similarities to Operation Secondary Infektion. In November 2019, this involved 
a forged letter by Estonian Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure, Taavi Aas, purportedly 
addressed to then-European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, which was reported on in an article63. 
Similar to Operation Secondary Infektion, it appears unlikely that the disinformation action had any impact. 
4.3 COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the surrounding infodemic have provided foreign actors with fertile grounds 
to plant their own narratives about the crisis. Both Russia and China have taken this opportunity, with China 
taking the leading role64. The disinformation campaigns prompted the European Commission to publicly 
identify the two countries as the main perpetrators of online disinformation. This was the first time the 
Commission had explicitly named China as being engaged in influence operations targeting the EU.  
COVID-related disinformation linked to foreign influencers has been identified everywhere in the EU, from 
Italy to the Baltics. The main message was the same: the EU and its Member States failed to manage the 
crisis, the EU’s credibility is questionable, while Russia and China were successful. Moreover, Russia and 
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China were also benevolent – the only true hope of Member States let down by the lack of European 
solidarity. In the campaigns in Italy, Russia became ‘Italy’s trustful ally’65, while China was depicted as the 
recipient of an outpouring of gratitude under the #grazieCina hashtag. Researchers uncovered that at least 
some of this grateful reaction to the ‘mask diplomacy’ was inauthentic66. Russia also planted and 
disseminated disinformation claiming that not only was the EU refusing to help Italy, but Poland would not 
let a Russian plane carrying medical aid to Italy through its airspace. Polish denial did little to curb the 
spread of the story.67 
Moreover, within the larger campaign of ‘discrediting the EU’, Russia also constructs smaller narratives. In 
March and April 2020, for example, pro-Russian media in at least 7 countries and on at least 11 channels 
reported the ‘end of the Schengen zone’ as a sign of the imminent collapse of the EU.  
Both Russia and China updated their information operation strategies. Throughout the first several months 
of the pandemic, China’s main goal was to shift the blame away from itself. As if it had learned from Russia, 
China spread conflicting conspiracy theories about the origins of the virus. The goal was not necessarily to 
put the responsibility on the US, but to muddy the waters. For this aim, a ‘global PR campaign’ was started, 
utilising the state media, social media, and diplomatic tools. State-controlled publications run articles 
blaming the US for the virus. The Chinese state engaged in an undercover operation on Twitter68, an overt 
campaign on Facebook69, and also utilised Instagram.70 It engaged in highly assertive diplomacy, not 
shying away from high-profile diplomatic rows (in France, for example71), not typical of Europe. An analysis 
of China’s disinformation campaigns in the Visegrád countries found that Chinese efforts in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland have increased since the pandemic hit, but their effectiveness is doubtful.72 
Russia started its virus-related information operation against the US earlier than China; it began sowing 
disinformation about the virus being a US-made weapon in January 202073. On Twitter, Russia changed its 
earlier strategy. Instead of creating content to sow discord, it now simply relied on existing conspiracy 
theories by retweeting US users, amplifying them.74  
More recently, the virus origin stories have been replaced by ‘vaccine diplomacy’. China is trying to depict 
itself as a ‘responsible great power’ with no geopolitical or economic interest linked to its vaccine 
distribution.75 As far as Russia is concerned, it is ‘busy leveraging diplomatic channels, state-controlled 
media, and networks of supportive and alternative media outlets to support its narrative of Sputnik V 
vaccine supremacy’.76 The main narrative is that the ‘west’ rejects the Sputnik V vaccine for political 
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reasons.77 It includes criticism of the EU’s slower vaccine roll-out, as well as significant efforts in Russian 
state media, Russia-aligned media, and fringe media outlets to discredit the ‘western’ vaccines. Most of the 
articles focus on adverse effects reported about the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines, and these are 
not disinformation in the sense that they are not usually fabricated or manipulated. Instead, they are 
subject to highly selective reporting. In the pro-Russian media, Sputnik V has no undesirable side effects, 
while all cases of adverse reactions or death after a Pfizer shot are reported. Researchers found that many 
of these articles are picked up by anti-vaccination groups.78 
In addition to Russia and China, in the context of COVID-19, disinformation targeting the EU originating in 
Iran has also been implicated. Iran’s long-running influence operator, the International Union of Virtual 
Media (IUVM), has been active since at least 2018, and subject to numerous take-downs by Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter. Its primary targets are the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In 2020, it expanded 
its operation to cover COVID-19, and featured stories about Italy being abandoned by the EU and helped 
by Russia and China on some of its inauthentic Facebook pages.79 In April 2020, the European External 
Action Services said it found ’trilateral convergence of disinformation narratives’ promoted and amplified 
by China, Iran, and Russia.80 The US State Department came to the same conclusion.81 
4.4 Electoral interventions 
4.4.1 The 2019 European elections 
Although this chapter is about the main disinformation actions identified against the EU or Member States, 
the 2019 European Parliamentary elections are important due to the lack of significant foreign 
disinformation action observed. Before the elections, experts82, politicians83, and the public84 alike were 
concerned about foreign electoral interference through disinformation. Yet no large-scale coordinated 
action comparable to the 2016 US Presidential elections was identified. The European External Action 
Service’s East StratCom Task Force EUvsDisinfo project documented only 32 Kremlin-originated news 
stories from 1 February to 26 May 2019 concerned explicitly with the elections, although it did record a 
significant increase in manipulative news stories linked to Russia compared to the same period a year 
earlier.85 While a Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shortly after the election stated that ‘continued and sustained 
disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming to suppress turnout and influence voter preferences’ was 
revealed, even this Communication admitted that no ‘distinct cross-border disinformation campaign from 
external sources’ was identified in the context of the elections.86 One isolated example of this was a 
 
77 EU vs DISINFORMATION, 'The Culture of Resentment Revisited', March 11, 2021. 
78 @DFRLab, 'How Pro-Kremlin Outlets and Blogs Undermine Trust in Foreign-Made COVID Vaccines', Medium, January 27, 2021. 
79 Ben Nimmo, Camille François, C. Shawn Eib,  Léa Ronzaud, 'Iran’s IUVM Turns To Coronavirus: Long-Running Iranian Influence 
Operation Returns to Social Media with Anti-US and Pro-China Messaging', Graphika, April 15, 2020.  
80 Rikard Jozwiak, 'EU Monitors See Coordinated COVID-19 Disinformation Effort By Iran, Russia, China', 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, April 22, 2020.  
81 Betsy Woodruff Swan, ‘State Report: Russian, Chinese and Iranian Disinformation Narratives Echo One Another' , POLITICO, April 
4, 2020.  
82 Hannah Illing, 'The Likelihood of Disinformation Campaigns during the European Elections Is High',The New Federalist, March 
12, 2021.  
83 European Parliament News, 'Propaganda: ‘The Weapons Used against Us Are Continuously Evolving.’, Interview with MEP Anna 
Fotyga', May 2, 2019.  
84 ‘Special Eurobarometer 477: Democracy and Elections’, European Union, September 2018. 
85 This, however, may be a question of sampling. 
86 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to 
the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions. 
Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation”, June 14, 2019,  p. 3. 
 Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law and  
democratic processes in the EU and its Member States: 2021 update 
31 
suspected, but not definite, link to Russia and two ‘murky’ Berlin-based anti-fascists websites. These shared 
a server used by Russian hackers, but this is not used by Russians exclusively.87 Another one was a forged 
letter attributed to Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, then-MEP, from Sweden, calling for cooperation against far-
right candidates.88 
Yet the vast majority of influence operations uncovered in the research that the Joint Communication 
referred to was linked to far-right European activists, rather than foreign state or non-state actors.89 These 
local activists may or may not have links to foreign actors. While in some cases clear financial and personal 
ties have been established between far-right parties and Russia90, in other cases it appears that local parties’ 
ideological congruence with Russia leads them to spread pro-Kremlin disinformation. Other researchers 
also found that ‘homegrown’, hyper-partisan actors, rather than Russia, dominated the disinformation 
landscape in the electoral campaign period.91 Others found no evidence of coordinated disinformation 
networks92, or very limited reach.93 This does not mean that Europeans did not encounter information 
manipulation during the elections campaign. In fact, a large-scale investigation of Facebook pages and 
groups by US-based activist group Avaaz found that Europe was ‘flooded’ with disinformation. 
The 500 manipulative pages uncovered by Avaaz had altogether 32 million followers; the disinformation 
content posted by these pages was viewed nearly 6 million times a day in the three months leading to the 
elections.94 The difference is that these pages were not linked to Russia or other foreign actors.  
Experts have put forward a number of possible factors that may have affected why Russia appears to have 
refrained from interfering with the European elections in a significant way. It has been argued that the 
European elections are of relatively low significance for Russia compared to national elections, since 
European decision-making is much easier to influence through pro-Russian Member State governments 
than through political groups in the Parliament.95 National elections are also much simpler to manipulate 
than decentralised European elections; the European elections in 2019 were, in reality, 28 simultaneous 
elections, each with its own distinct local topics, rather than one election with a common theme.96 It has 
also been suggested that with the generally low turnout, the European elections are simply not interesting 
enough for Russia.97 Some suggest that the political transparency tool introduced by Facebook, Google, 
and Twitter against secretive targeted advertising played an important role in cutting back foreign 
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disinformation98, although journalists found that political groups on Facebook managed to circumvent it99. 
Finally, it is also possible that Russia has simply changed its strategy from ‘visibly foreign-led campaigns to 
more discrete, domestic operations’.100 Some researchers believe that most of these local operations are 
run by ‘useful idiots’, rather than Russian agents, even though they ‘play a much more important role in 
spreading pro-Russian narratives in the EU than the Kremlin itself’.101  
4.4.2 Member State elections 
In the time period covered, 22 Member States held general, municipal, or presidential elections. While data 
are not readily available in most cases, some of these Member States, such as Denmark and Finland, are 
reported to have prepared for potential electoral interference from a foreign power. These countries, as 
well as Lithuania, experienced no major attempt to influence their elections.102  
This was not the case everywhere. The Slovak presidential elections were held in March 2019. Research on 
Russia-aligned disinformation outlets’ Facebook activity found that the liberal candidate, Zuzana 
Čaputová, was the target of an intense character assassination campaign. Moreover, disinformation was 
used to undermine voters’ trust in electoral integrity.103  
Spain held general elections on 28 April 2019. In ‘the grey zones of foreign and domestic disinformation 
activities’104, researchers found a Twitter network of 2 882 accounts managed by non-state activists in 
Venezuela in an attempt to influence the Spanish elections. The network had a very large output, averaging 
nearly 153 000 tweets a day, which suggests automation. The accounts posted tweets in support of far-
right party Vox, as well as anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Soros content. They regularly shared links 
of Vox-supporting Telegram channels.105 Some of the falsified content shared by the network, such as a 
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Table 1 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, foreign information operators have become increasingly sophisticated. They 
often operate through elaborate pseudo-organisations and fronts, with carefully cultivated personas. They 
fully take advantage of the ever more diverse media landscape. The traditional newsroom is being replaced 
with freelancers, citizen journalists, and independent investigative groups. Innovative forms of 
cooperation are developed, often partly motivated by fiscal pressure, or in order to adapt to the changing 
environment. While some of these changes are a welcome development, the dynamic landscape makes it 
difficult to spot inauthentic figures and groups. This is especially true for cases when the lines are 
deliberately blurred and media fronts or pseudo-think tanks hire real journalists or experts, whether witting 
or unwitting, and when unsuspecting media outlets collaborate with fake personas. Of the examples 
mentioned above, Bonanza Media may be particularly sophisticated. Another intra-EU example is French 
news site ‘France Libre 24’, which was a covert operation of Polish far-right activists.107 The instances 
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mentioned also show that disinformation campaigns that rely on ‘old-school’ methods, such as ‘burner’ 
(i.e. one-time) accounts rather than properly made-up personas, see only very limited success (e.g. 
Operation ‘Secondary Infektion’ and ‘Pinball’).  
In Europe, Russia still appears to be the major foreign state actor behind disinformation campaigns. China’s 
intensive participation in the European context is a new development. Iran has not been a key actor. The 
participation of non-state actors (activists) from Venezuela appears to be an isolated incident and not part 
of a major trend, at least as far as foreign actors are identified in publicly available sources. 
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5 Legal and policy developments since February 2019 
5.1 Update of existing legal framework with regard to freedom of 
expression and its limitations 
When scrutinising the available legal tools to tackle disinformation, we should start with the question of 
definition. As has been clarified above, disinformation is used for strategically disseminated, intentionally 
forged, or distorted allegations. Some of these information actions would exhaust the conditions for other 
traditionally-existing speech restrictions, such as defamation or libel, incitement to hatred, or holocaust 
denial (or denial of genocide). If this is the case, then the respective disinformation action can be countered 
on the basis of existing legal rules, for which a wide legal practice has already been developed. Fox News 
and Donald Trump's lawyers, for example, were sued by voter technology companies manufacturing the 
voting machines for defamation, after they disseminated disinformation alleging that the voting machines 
were rigged.108 However, more typically, disinformation does not violate the rights of one specific natural 
or legal person, and would not reach the threshold of illegal hate speech. Below, we will focus on those 
types of disinformation, which fall outside of the ‘traditional’ restrictions on speech, and see whether the 
restriction of disinformation per se can be justified within the human rights logic.  
Tackling disinformation by way of new legal rules faces challenges primarily because of the difficulties of 
defining what the subject of prohibition is. Let's analyse the elements of disinformation to see an entry 
point for regulation.  
Definitional elements are inappropriate anchors for regulation:   
1) The emblematic element, falsity of the allegation alone, is an insufficient basis for prohibition, as 
verification of truth is not a pre-condition of exercising the right to freedom of expression. Content-
based restrictions almost always require an inquiry into the context and the speaker. While journalistic 
ethics require that all reasonable efforts are made to double-check public information, this is not a legal 
obligation. Especially when writing about matters of public interest, good faith of the writer alone 
should be sufficient to relieve the journalist from liability, and no objective truth is required.109 Besides, 
ordinary users are not subject to journalistic codes of ethics. In the new information environment, there 
is a blurred line between journalists, bloggers, activists, and ordinary users, as even the latter may reach 
masses of people. Moreover, speech with political opinion enjoys the highest privilege among 
protected expressions. Finally, not all disinformation is objectively false information; sometimes, true 
information is presented in a false light, or in a manipulative context.  
2) The second element of disinformation, the intention to strategic manipulation, is an elusive criterion 
as well. It requires one to inquire into the state of mind of the perpetrator, which may entail a complex 
evidentiary procedure.  
3) The third element would be the impact on society, namely the deception of a significant number of 
individuals in a manner which harms democracy, individual rights, and group rights (e.g. minorities) or 
public health (in the case of COVID-19-related disinformation). Protection of these values can be 
regarded as a legitimate aim for legislative restriction of disinformation, which would also be necessary 
for a democratic society to achieve its goal, where necessity would include the promise of efficiency. At 
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this point, it is the fragility of the cause-and-effect relationship between a particular piece of 
disinformation and its social effect which becomes an obstacle for regulation. On the one side, there is 
growing evidence about the impact of disinformation on human behaviour in general.110 On the other, 
the cause-and-effect relationship between disinformation consumption and electoral behaviour or 
political opinion is contested.111 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has accepted restriction 
of freedom of expression based on allegation of false facts without regard to its context in just one very 
specific matter: holocaust denial. This has been the only cause when the Court has found the objective 
historical facts so well-proven, and the implications of negation so wide and harmful to the rights of 
others, that it denies protection of such speech without examination of the context, and has usually112 
rejected these claims on the basis of Article 17, abuse of rights.113 The Armenian Genocide has not been 
found to be as equally straightforwardly-proven, and is not so widely accepted as historical fact; the 
restriction of its negations was regarded as a violation of Article 10.114 
In sum, the current protective system of freedom of expression, with pillars such as Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights115, Article 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, protects speech, even if false, 
and restrictions must therefore be so narrowly-defined that the currently accepted definition of 
disinformation is not applicable.116 However, potential entry points for regulation can be identified 
by: 
a) addressing contextual elements, leaving the content element untouched; 
b) relying on another human right as a balance.  
Addressing contextual elements: The typically aggressive methods of online dissemination (e.g. micro-
targeting and bots) may be restricted in certain cases. Even though the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) protects not only the content of information, but also the means of dissemination117, 
restriction of the micro-targeting technique would theoretically not be contrary to the ECHR's practice.118 
For example, as restricting the dissemination of political advertisements on television was not considered 
a violation of Article 10 (TV Vest v. Norway), restricting the application of micro-targeting, of bots, or of 
other aggressive dissemination techniques for political advertising may be similarly proportionate. Along 
 
110 Bastick, Zach, 'Would you notice if fake news changed your behavior? An experiment on the unconscious effects of 
disinformation', Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 116, 2021. 
111 Curini, Lugi and Pizzimenti, Eugenio, 'Searching for a Unicorn: Fake News and Electoral Behaviour', Democracy and Fake News: 
Information Manipulation and Post-Truth Politics, 2020; see also: Cantarella, Michele, Fraccaroli, Nicolo and Volpe, Roberto, 'Does 
Fake News Affect Voting Behaviour?', CEIS Working Paper No. 493, 2020. 
112 The court practice is not entirely consistent, for example it can be used either at the admissibility stage (direct application, 
European Court of Human Rights, 'Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v The Netherlands, Judgement of 11 October 1979, nos. 8348/78, 
8406/78') or in the balancing phase (indirect application, European Court of Human Rights, 'Féret v. Belgium', 15615/07, 
16/07/2009).  
113 See more in: Bayer, Judit, Bárd, Petra, 'Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online content regulation 
approaches', Study for the European Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights And Constitutional Affairs, 2020. 
114 See more in Bayer et al., 2019. 
115 Katsirea, Irini, ‘“Fake news”: reconsidering the value of untruthful expression in the face of regulatory uncertainty’, Journal of 
Media Law, Vol.10 No. 2, 2018, pp. 159-188.  
116 Katsirea, op. cit.  
117 ECtHR, ‘Autronic AG v. Switzerland’, 12726/87, 22.05.1990; ECtHR, ‘Öztürk v. Turkey’, 22479/93, 28.09.1999;  ECtHR,  
Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey’, 3111/10, 18.12.2012. 
118 See in more detail: Bayer, J., ‘Double harm to voters: data-driven micro-targeting and democratic public discourse’, Internet 
Policy Review, Vol. 9 No.1, 2020; in particular: VgT v. Switzerland, 2001; Vest v. Norway, 2008; Animal Defenders v. UK, 2013.                                                                                                                        
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the same logic, restricting the application of deep fakes for purposes other than artistic may be 
proportionate (especially if restricting is limited to labelling).  
From another viewpoint, but still remaining within the context of addressing contextual elements, the role 
of the speaker may be decisive, in terms of the impact of speech. There appears to be substantially wide 
agreement that the expressions of public figures with political power – in the context of hate speech – 
have an impact on society, public opinion, and the behaviour of others. The ECtHR applied such an 
argument119, as well as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance’s (ECRI) Declaration on 
the use of racist, anti-semitic, and xenophobic elements in political discourse120, the ECRI's no. 15. 
Recommendation on combatting hate speech121, and the Rabat Plan of Action122. Consequently, if a person 
of authority disseminates disinformation, it should be presumed without further evidence that it will have 
a social effect123. 
Balancing with other human rights:  Article 8 of the ECHR on the Right to respect for private life, Article 
8 of the Charter on the Protection of personal data, and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the Protection of private life could be invoked against data-driven 
dissemination methods of persuasive content, in the absence of opt-out systems. (see discussion of the 
DSA below.) In addition, Article 25 of the ICCPR, and Article 39 of the Charter, as well as Article 3 of Protocol 
no. 1. of the ECHR on the Right to free elections, could also by relied on.124 The most specific of these is the 
last, which adds that free elections should be held ‘under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’. According to the ECtHR's practice, preceding 
elections it is particularly important that opinions and a variety of information circulate freely125 and that 
the information on candidates is accurate, to enable voters to make an informed choice.126   
To conclude, while it does not seem possible to impose a legal restriction on disinformation solely on the 
basis of its content, there are other, objective criteria which may serve as anchors of regulation. This would, 
in particular, allow for the restriction of disinformation preceding political elections, by restricting 
aggressive dissemination techniques and imposing higher standards for speakers of authority. 
5.2 Policies and measures at the EU level  
Overview 
Since the beginning of 2019, several European legal and policy instruments have addressed the 
information ecosystem, and each made mention of disinformation. Evaluation of the Code of Practice 
against Disinformation found that self-regulation is insufficient to deal with this complex issue efficiently 
 
119 ECtHR, ‘Féret v. Belgium’; ECtHR, ‘Seurot v. France’, Application no.: 57383/00, 18 May 2004; even a famous football player was 
considered as an influencer in this respect: ECtHR , ‘Šimunić v. Croatia’, Application no.: 20373/17, 22.01.2019. 
120 ECRI, ‘Declaration on the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic elements in political discourse’, 17.03.2005.  
121 ECRI, ‘ECRI General Policy Recommendation N. 15 on Combating Hate Speech’, 8.12.2015. 
122 ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence’, in: United Nations, Human Rights Council, ‘Annex to the Annual report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’, 11.01.2013 See more in 2.5.2. Political hate speech in: Bayer, Judit, Bárd, Petra ‘Hate 
speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online content regulation approaches’, Study for the European 
Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights And Constitutional Affairs, 2020. 
123 Barendt, Eric, ’What Is the Harm of Hate Speech?’, Ethic Theory Moral Practice, No. 22, 2019, pp. 539-553. 
124 See also: Pamment, James, ‘The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2020. 
125 ECtHR, 'Bowman v. the United Kingdom'141/1996/760/961, § 42, 19.02.1998,  
126 ECtHR, ‘Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia’, 17864/04, 19.07.2007.  
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(see below in 5.3). The European Democracy Action Plan127 defined various types of disinformation, and 
identified certain strategies to be applied. These include further developing the 'toolbox' by sanctioning 
against opportunities for foreign interference, increasing awareness of the commonly used techniques, 
reinforcing existing cooperation structures, and investing in a robust media and information ecosystem. It 
set out a more robust approach towards platform providers, envisaging the Digital Services Act (see below 
in more detail), a more robust co-regulation framework, and its recurrent monitoring (European 
Democracy Action Plan).128 Important elements of this envisaged framework include Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) and their regular control,129 as well as access for researchers to data.130 Some very 
promising elements set out by the EDAP have not been addressed by the DSA. These currently form parts 
of self-regulatory policies, including adequate visibility of reliable information of public interest and 
plurality of views; reducing the monetisation of disinformation; measures to limit the artificial 
amplification of disinformation campaigns; and collaboration between fact-checkers and platforms. This 
contradicts the evaluation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, which found self-regulation 
insufficient as a tool to fight disinformation, and for the ambitions of the EDAP.  
The EDAP also foresees the issuing of guidance to revise and strengthen the Code of Practice on 
Disinformation, as well as the establishment of a permanent framework for monitoring of the code.  
The EDAP's strategy to build upon civil society, the education sector, research and media actors is an 
appropriate approach to achieve this goal. The Commission's various Action Plans to support media 
literacy and quality journalism can all contribute to a healthy informational environment, and a lively and 
flourishing democratic discourse within the European Union. 
Based on the EDAP131, the Commission Work Programme 2021132 has envisaged issuing a proposal on 
greater transparency in paid political advertising, and revision of the statute and funding of European 
political parties and European political foundations, for the third quarter of 2021.133 Greater transparency 
of political advertising is a key factor in tackling disinformation and propaganda, which often appears as 
sponsored, targeted content.  
Earlier in 2020, the Joint Communication to tackle COVID-19 was issued.134 This reinforced the consistent 
auditing of compliance with the Code of Practice against disinformation, by requesting monthly reports 
 
127 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic and Social Commitee of The Regions on the European democracy action plan (EDAP) COM/2020/790 final' Chapter 4, 
3.12.2020. 
128 European Commission, On the European Democracy Action Plan, COM(2020) 790 final, p. 22.  
129 European Commission, On the European Democracy Action Plan, COM(2020) 790 final, p. 23, European Commission, “Proposal 
for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services 
Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC”, COM(2020) 825 final, Article 35. 
130 European Commission, “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Single Market 
For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC”, COM(2020) 825 final, Article 31. 
131 Ibid.., 2.1. and 2.2., and EDAP, 2.1., ‘Transparency of political advertising and communication’, and 2.2., ‘Clearer rules on the 
financing of European political parties’ 
132 European Commission, ANNEXES to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Commission Work 
Programme 2021, A Union of vitality in a world of fragility. 
133 See also: ’European Parliament Legislative Train 02.2021, A New Push For European Democracy’. 
134 European Commission, JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, ‘Tackling COVID-19 disinformation 
- Getting the facts right. JOIN/2020/8 final.’, 10.06.2020. 
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on several commitments in the Code.135 Inclusion of new platforms as signatories, such as WhatsApp and 
TikTok, were also decided.136 The Joint Communication held that Member States should use the Rapid Alert 
System more extensively. This has not been 'triggered'137, but has been used in relation to the COVD-19 
pandemic to share knowledge between Member States138. It also states that this should be extended with 
a special section to exchange COVID-19-related communication materials.  
Proposals on the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act  
The proposal on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) establishes a framework to ensure fair competition in the 
market of digital services. It does so by first providing a legal definition of 'gatekeepers', and then, by 
ordering gatekeeper platform services to refrain from using codes or technological solutions which would 
limit the freedom of other market actors or the flexibility of market actions. It also orders them to allow 
business users access to their platforms to use as a vehicle for their transactions. 
These requirements respond to a growing need and reflect an expanding opinion among academia that 
the services of the dominant platforms should be regarded as core infrastructure and should be treated 
somewhat as ‘commons’139. Of course, DMA's move in this direction is very cautious and gradual. 
For example, it does not foresee obliging platforms to ensure neutrality and non-discrimination between 
users, or to have the same obligations towards non-business users, in order to create and maintain a fair 
marketplace of information and ideas.  
While caution and forethought are desirable qualities in market regulation, taking too few steps may result 
in the Regulation being weightless by the time it enters into effect, which is expected to be at least a couple 
of years from the draft's publication.    
The DSA Proposal focuses more specifically on the services of social media platforms. Its hard provisions 
are mainly reserved for dealing with illegal content, and disinformation is referred to self- and co-
regulation. Nevertheless, some disinformation content may be also illegal (defamation or incitement to 
hatred), and thus may be tackled under Article 14 of the DSA. Removal or disabling access to content based 
on its alleged incompatibility with the terms and conditions of the provider is also subject to transparency 
requirements and redress possibilities (Articles 15 and 17).   
Articles 24 and 30 provide for more transparency in advertising, but do not rule out aggressive or 
manipulative advertising techniques, nor do they make micro-targeting conditional on user opt-in, or 
exclude its applicability for issue-based advertisements. Mere transparency cannot be expected to achieve 
meaningful changes in the fight against disinformation and propaganda, even if it is coupled with 
investment into media literacy programmes, as aggressive advertising practices (as well as manipulative 
propaganda) are designed to surpass users' rationality.140 As the General Data Protection Regulation’s 
 
135 The first COVID-related baseline reports were published in August 2020. European Commission, ’First baseline reports – Fighting 
COVID-19 disinformation Monitoring Programme’, the second in September, European Commission, ’Second set of reports – 
Fighting COVID-19 disinformation Monitoring Programme’. 
136 European Commission, JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, ‘Tackling COVID-19 disinformation 
- Getting the facts right. JOIN/2020/8 final.’, p. 8-9, 10.6.2020. 
137 Stolton, Samuel, ‘EU mulls disinformation regulation but admits alert system has “never been triggered”’, EURACTIV SERVICES, 
2019. 
138 Stolton, Samuel, ’EU Rapid Alert System used amid coronavirus disinformation campaign’, EURACTIV SERVICES, 2020. 
139 Lalíková, Laura Federica, ’DSA, DMA and „Access to...”’, Utrecht University, 2021. 
140 Morozovaite, Viktorija, ’Setting the dark on fire’, Utrecht University, 2021. 
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(GDPR) has shown, in practice, making users aware of the process does not result in a change in their 
behaviour.141   
The DSA's main novelties are the co-regulative framework that it provides in Articles 26 and 27 on online 
platforms' obligations to identify and mitigate systemic risks, including disinformation; in Article 35 on the 
code of conduct addressing these systemic risks; in Article 36 on the code of conduct for online advertising; 
and in Article 37 on a crisis protocol. The crisis protocol appears to be the most invasive interference with 
(very large) online platforms' sovereignty as conveyors of information, and makes a step towards 
recognising them as public utilities. The DSA's Explanatory Memorandum mentions a revised and 
strengthened Code of practice on disinformation, which is foreseen for the spring of 2021.142 It is not yet 
entirely clear whether the Code of Practice Against Disinformation and the envisaged Code of Conduct 
Addressing Systemic Risks will relate to each other as a general and a specific rule, but this interpretation 
sounds reasonable. According to DSA, adherence to and compliance with a given code of conduct by a 
very large online platform may be considered as an appropriate risk-mitigating measure.  
Thus, the content of the Codes of Conduct is key, as this will define the actual rules that platforms will have 
to abide by. These documents will regulate platform behaviour in relation to the systemic risks posed by 
disinformation, among other things. The revised Code of Practice against Disinformation would certainly 
incorporate the critical findings and suggestions of the Assessment of the Code of Practice.143 The co-
regulatory features ensure transparency and dialogue; in its current form, however, it may still lack ‘teeth’. 
More transparency will be granted, as an independent yearly audit must be organised at the expense of 
the platforms (Article 28), and if the report is not positive, platforms are required to undertake operational 
measures to comply with the recommendations and give account of these within a month. This 
arrangement lacks ‘teeth’, however, because there are no sanctions foreseen if compliance is not ensured.  
The crisis protocol might be a more invasive measure, potentially providing tools for the Commission to 
push out 'corrective' information in cases of natural catastrophes or other serious 'cross-border threats to 
public health, war, and acts of terrorism'. However, it is not defined what the 'rapid, collective and cross-
border response' could be. It can be assumed that the intervention would include dissemination of public 
service information, and might also include restriction or removal of false or illegal information (see 
Article 37).  
The clear advantage of the co-regulatory system is that it can be more flexibly adjusted to the changing 
technological and social environment than legal regulation, and that rules can be developed in 
cooperation with the stakeholders. This convenience would make it all the more expected that compliance 
with the negotiated and voluntarily accepted rules is obligatory. The foreseen co-regulatory process is 
almost like a contract between the state and the (very large online) platforms. Regarding their function, a 
contextual analogy may be observed between this negotiation and the theoretical social contract 
concluded between the people and the state, considering the public function that very large online 
platforms fulfil. While they are privately owned companies, 80–98 % of their revenues comes from 
 
141 Also called 'consenting fatigue', users consent to providing their data. No research shows the level of consciousness with 
which the 'OK' buttons are pushed in the course of pursuing online information. Besides, the options offered to users when 
deciding about consenting to give their data or not, are not equal choices, but effective nudges towards resigning of their data 
protection rights. 
Yeung, K., ‘”Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design’, Taylor & Francis Online, 2016. 
142 European Commission, ‘Digital Services Act Explanatory Memorandum’, point 1, third bullet point: ‘Consistency with other 
Union policies’, p. 5. 15.12.2020.  
143 European Commission Staff Working Document, ’Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation - Achievements and 
areas for further improvement’, SWD(2020) 180 final. 
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advertising, which monetises personal data. Users pay with their data in every move of theirs, similar to 
paying VAT to a state.   
Defending democratic elections 
In January 2019, the Commission created the European Cooperation Network on Elections, which consists 
of the Member States' authorities with competence in electoral matters. Its aim is to strengthen the 
protection of democratic elections, safeguard fairness and transparency, and to exchange information 
about disinformation campaigns and hate speech.144 The diversity of the members' list leaves questions as 
regards its professionalism and efficiency, however, as not all Member States have delegated their 
authorities (or official bodies) which are responsible for election supervision.145 Nevertheless, this network 
is supposed to collaborate with the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group and the EU’s 
Rapid Alert System (established in March 2019) to support resilient electoral processes by joint expert 
teams and joint efforts in cybersecurity.146 The European Commission has suggested that, in relation to the 
‘infodemic’, exchange of practices on issues such as micro-targeting should also take place.147 
Developing the media ecosystem 
A complex set of measures and initiatives have been established with a view to develop and foster a more 
healthy and lively media and information environment, which is a cornerstone of democracy. This includes 
the Digital Education Action Plan,148 the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan149, the Media Literacy Expert 
Group, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)150, and other initiatives in civil society and 
academia.151 The revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive also requires Member States to promote the 
development of media literacy skills, and video-sharing platforms to set up effective media literacy tools 
and raise user awareness. The Digital Education Action Plan will include the development of common 
guidelines for teachers and educational staff to foster digital literacy and tackle disinformation through 
education and training.  
To spread authentic information, it was recommended that EU institutions strengthen strategic 
communications and cooperation between the diplomatic network of Member States and of EU 
Delegations, in particular, and that Commission Representations play a more active role in national 
debates, including through social media.152 The European Commission and the EEAS have developed their 
 
144 European Cooperation Network, "Terms of Reference, European cooperation network on elections".  
145 Overview of membership: For example, Ireland's member is the Department of Housing, Hungary's member is the Prime 
Minister's Office.  
146 See also 2.3. EDAP. and European Commission, ’JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling 
COVID-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right’. JOIN/2020/8 final p.6. 10.6.2020.  
147 European Commission, ‘JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - 
Getting the facts right’. JOIN/2020/8 final p.6. 10.6.2020. 
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150 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO): A hub for fact-checkers, academics and other relevant stakeholders to collaborate 
with each other and actively link with media organisations, media literacy experts, and provide support to policymakers. 
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activities to work against disinformation in the form of staff training and strategic communications. The 
European Parliament (EP) has improved analysis and assessment of disinformation risks, and engaged in 
awareness-raising and resilience building, including through its news site153, which has provided 
transparent reporting on the actions of the EU in response to COVID-19.154 The EP also operates a Science-
Media Hub, which is present on a wide range of social media platforms. The scope for improvement of this 
lies in growing its reach – Chapter 11 offers recommendations for this purpose.  
5.3 Policies and measures at Member State level 
5.3.1 Germany 
In Germany, disinformation and misinformation are regarded as a serious problem.155 Blogs, web pages, or 
other press-like online offerings often make statements that are not properly researched according to 
journalistic standards; the rules on the separation of facts and opinions are disregarded, for example.156 
The trust of the user community that such offerings’ reporting is correct and truthful is shaken. The COVID-
19 pandemic has shown that misinformation can also endanger health, for example when ineffective 
‘therapies’ are reported.157   
The Media Services Agreement from 2021 addressed the fight against disinformation and misinformation 
with one section. According to Section 19 (1) sentence 2, existing journalistic due diligence obligations will 
be extended to all commercially offered, journalistic-editorial telemedia that regularly contain news or 
political information,.158 State media authorities recently initiated 13 proceedings in this matter, against 
KenFM and the AfD-affiliated ‘Deutschlandkurier’, among others.159    
Recently, political, ideological, and religious advertising content in telemedia and content or messages 
created automatically by means of a computer program (social bots) must also be marked. (Sections 18 (3), 
22 (1) sentence 3 MStV).160 Accordingly, political microtargeting also falls within the scope of advertising 
subject to labelling requirements. In addition, advertisers or clients must be clearly indicated in an 
appropriate manner.161 Platform operators have a duty of care to encourage providers of social blogs to 
comply with this regulation. 
From a constitutional perspective, public service broadcasting also has the task on the Internet of forming 
a ‘counterweight’ to the advertising-financed offerings, which provides guidance and should ensure 
diversity. They must provide ‘authentic, carefully researched information that distinguishes between facts 
 
153 ‘Disinformation: how to recognise and tackle COVID-19 myths’, European Parliament, 30, March, 2021.   
154 ‘Coronavirus: a timeline of EU action in 2021’, European Parliament, 19, March 2021.  
155 See the EUvsDisinfo study on Germany: ‘Vilifying Germany; Wooing Germany’, March 2021. For an overview of the legal 
instruments see Ferreau, “Desinformation aus rechtwissenschaftlicher Perspektive” in: Möller, Hameleers, Ferreau, “Typen von 
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156 Bader, ‘Einleitung’, in: Steinbach, Bader, Rinsdorf, Krämer, Roßnagel, (Eds.), ‘Desinformation aufdecken und bekämpfen’, 15, 27,  
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and opinions, does not distort reality, and does not focus on the sensational’.162 To ensure that these 
offerings do not get lost in today's flood of information, they must be made easy to find in the user 
interfaces.163 The prerequisite is that the apps of the privileged offers are preinstalled on smart TVs, 
streaming sticks, and voice assistants, such as Alexa.164  
5.3.2 France 
While there is no specific legal act to prohibit the dissemination of fake news per se, the law on Freedom 
of the Press has been in place since 1881 to prohibit the spreading of fake news that ‘could disturb public 
peace’.165 Besides, some parts of the Electoral Code can provide protection against disinformation that may 
influence election results. However, it has become more and more obvious that these earlier laws cannot 
fully contain the dissemination of manipulative information on the internet.166 
In 2018 a law was passed to combat the manipulation of information, which aimed to tackle disinformation 
in campaign periods before elections.167 In these campaign periods (three months before elections), 
a judge should make a decision about the falseness of a piece of content within 48 hours.168 In addition, 
this law orders online platforms to take measures to avoid the spreading of disinformation that could 
otherwise alter the validity of an election. Serious debates marked the consultations before passing the 
law as the high chamber ‘had doubts on the efficiency of these proposals and feared possible further risks 
to the freedom of communication’.169 There were concerns about the possible overload of judges and the 
poor definition of disinformation. Since its entry into force, no overload has been reported and the judicial 
system has not been blocked –however, the real test of the law will come at the next presidential elections 
in 2022. The law was also criticised for risking harm to and restricting freedom of expression, and some 
have claimed that it cannot keep up with the extremely fast pace that fake news goes viral.170 Similarly to 
in Germany, this law requires social media platforms to submit a report on their activities in fighting against 
fake news on a yearly basis to a government authority.171 An important role was given to users themselves, 
as platforms are required to make it possible for users to flag content if they consider it manipulative 
disinformation. The main aim of this bill is to make algorithms more transparent, fight against entities that 
disseminate false information, and make people more aware of online information. A particularly 
important new regulation was also introduced by a law on education: ‘French public schools should teach 
students how to navigate online information including the skills for 'critical analysis of available 
information', and how to evaluate the reliability of information.’172 
Twitter informed the French Government in Spring 2019 before the European Parliament elections that it 
would not allow the presence of advertisements from the Interior Ministry to raise awareness among 
people to vote. The basis for this decision was Twitter’s policy of dismissing all sponsored content by 
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political entities. The French Government argued, however, that it was a public information campaign and 
not one sponsored by a political party.173 
In 2020, the online hatred bill ordered online platforms to delete illegal contents, publish regular 
transparency reports, and to appoint accountable representatives. The Constitutional Council of France 
annulled a large part of this bill considering it a threat to free speech.174  
5.3.3 Estonia 
In February 2021, the procedure for amendment of the ‘Media Services Act’ was initiated in Estonia. The 
goal of this amendment is to enable the transposition of Directive 2018/1808 amending the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive175 into Estonian legislation.176 The ‘Media Services Act’ is one of two pieces of 
legislation that regulate the broadcasting sector in Estonia (the other being the ‘Estonian Public 
Broadcasting Act’).177 According to the February 2021 draft178, the amended bill will extend beyond the 
scope of the original Media Services Act and will also regulate video-sharing platforms, such as YouTube, 
Vimeo, and Dailymotion, thus taking into consideration the changes in the media and technology markets 
from the past ten years.179 The draft bill is also looking at promoting media literacy and equipping 
consumers with skills to critically evaluate media content. According to the draft, the Ministry of Education 
and Research will be responsible for promoting media literacy in national education policy planning and 
related areas.180  
No specific legislation was identified related to countering online disinformation181, but when it comes to 
digitalisation and information, Estonia also relies on the ‘Cybersecurity Act’ (adopted in May 2018)182 and 
the ‘Information Society Services Act’183, passed in 2004. 
According to experts’ opinions, the existing legislation provides a strong base for media activities in the 
country, however, there might still be unregulated issues that could be exploited by disinformation 
campaigns.184  
During the COVID-19 health emergency, Estonia declared a state of emergency on 13 March 2020, which 
ended on 17 May 2020.185 In a period when several countries were passing legislation related to spreading 
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misinformation, no such changes in legislation were identified in Estonia.186 However, at the time of writing 
of the report, the situation is very much ongoing and dynamic, with Estonia having entered a new 
lockdown on 11 March 2021.187 
5.3.4 Hungary 
Hungary is one of the few Member States where disinformation is very prevalent, but it cannot be 
attributed to external interference. The reason for this is that Russian propaganda is taken over by the 
domestic mainstream media, including the public service media, and featured as organic content. This 
phenomenon has been observed in other countries as well. At the same time, independent news 
organisations accuse the Hungarian government of disseminating disinformation, especially during 
election campaigns.188 During the last municipal elections in October 2019, the government-controlled 
media started a broad disinformation campaign against the opposition, and it was successful in the sense 
that they mobilised pro-government voters. While Russian influence is notable in Hungary, the main 
disseminator of fake news is the government-friendly media, with the aim of gaining popular support and 
discrediting opposition parties.189 This process is also evident in communication about suspected threats 
from the EU to Hungary, especially when it comes to the rule of law criteria in connection with EU funds. 
The disinformation was about ‘the left-liberal network [that] launched an attack in Brussels directed against 
the Poles and Hungarians who were willing to protect their nation’s sovereignty’.190 
A demonstrative amendment in Hungarian legislation affected the Criminal Code in 2020, when Article 337 
on ‘fearmongering’ was broadened to ‘a person who, during the period of a special legal order and in front 
of a large audience, states or disseminates any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact that is capable 
of hindering or preventing the efficiency of protection, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
imprisonment for one to five years.’191 The new regulation gives room to arbitrary interpretation of 
‘fearmongering’ and dissemination of disinformation. That leads to a ‘chilling effect’ and self-censorship 
on media platforms.192 
5.3.5 Other states 
Finland has not specifically targeted disinformation with legal regulation, despite the fact that foreign 
disinformation came to be seen as a significant problem by the Finnish government after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2016, the head of the government’s communication department said they 
had identified 20 disinformation campaigns targeting Finland that originated from Russia, and 30 that were 
very likely to be Russian disinformation operations.193 In 2017, the Finnish government adopted a cyber-
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security strategy for 2017–2020.194 In 2018, they decided on a national media policy programme, with a 
timeframe ending in 2023.195 According to this policy, the state does not interfere with media content, and 
media outlets and journalists in Finland self-regulate. The document calls for measures to increase media 
literacy as an effective way to prepare for hybrid threats, and to raise awareness and counter the spread of 
disinformation, hate speech, and illegal content. It also emphasises fact-checking, and calls for the 
development of a fact-checking service in cooperation with industry.196 The document states that the goal 
is to respond to disinformation with reliable information, which is grounded in media self-regulation, 
reliable news delivery practices, and the provision of services in different languages. The policy document 
also expresses the expectation that many issues regarding the regulation of online platforms will be 
resolved at the European level.  
The new Slovakian government was elected in March 2020 and put the fight against disinformation and 
hybrid threats high on the agenda. The government named ‘the fight against disinformation’ as ‘a priority 
in foreign politics, defence, education and the media’ and stated that Slovakia ‘will prepare an action plan 
for coordinating the fight against hybrid threats and spreading of disinformation and build adequate 
centralised capacities to carry it out’.197 However, concrete steps or actions have not yet been taken. 
Nonetheless, a good practice emerged in Slovakia in 2020 when the Slovak police force’s Facebook page 
was heavily dedicated to dispelling fake news, hoaxes, and disinformation of any kind. The page has 85 000 
followers and shares verified information on topics related to fake news.198  
Spain has put emphasis on cybersecurity and fact-checking. In 2018, a committee recommended that the 
government tackled misinformation online, although in November that year Spain signed an agreement 
with Russia ‘to create a joint cybersecurity group aimed at preventing misinformation from affecting 
diplomatic relations between the two.’199 The agreement was signed after Spain accused ‘Russian-based 
groups’ of ‘trying to affect the outcome of a Catalan referendum for independence by spreading 
disinformation on social media platforms’. Russia refused to accept these accusations and proactively 
initiated the cooperation with Spain so as to avoid diplomatic damage.200 
In the spring of 2019, before the general elections, a 100-strong official team was set up to monitor 
social media platforms and search for potentially misleading political posts.201 The last major attempt in 
Spain to tackle disinformation online happened in November 2020, when the National Security Council 
adopted a regulation on preventing the dissemination of disinformation. The document allows the 
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government to launch communication campaigns to fight fake news, but it has raised controversies, since 
decision about what ‘fake news’ is rests exclusively with the government.202 
In Sweden, civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, enjoy high priority, and legal steps have 
always been taken in this spirit. Disinformation and dissemination of fake news regarded as a global threat 
played a considerable role in casting light on the importance of civil liberties during the 2018 Swedish 
national election period. Private entities are free to block any content considered misleading or deceptive 
on social media platforms, but only content, and not fake accounts. Nevertheless, dissemination of false 
information has been criminalised. It is essential that while some forms of publication of contents are 
criminalised and prohibited on different platforms, the state and its authorities are not allowed to block 
media content, which would be seen as a violation of freedom of expression. Sweden has historically taken 
a stance against blocking or limiting internet access, arguing that 'crimes should be prosecuted, not 
hidden.’203 Disinformation attempts have not been able to achieve the intended results and, in Sweden, 
successful disinformation campaigns were not present at the 2019 EP elections, either.204 
5.4 Policies and measures in third states 
5.4.1 Taiwan 
Taiwan’s legislative framework relates to foreign interference and disinformation targeting elections and 
democratic processes. 
According to Swedish democracy watchdog V-Dem’s 2019 global report, Taiwan is the world’s most 
targeted place for disinformation tactics.205 In recent years, numerous disinformation campaigns have 
been spread, mostly as a means to influence Taiwan elections.206 The approach adopted by Taiwan to fight 
disinformation, alongside the use of new innovative digital tools and creating a robust and healthy civil 
society, involved strengthening legal regulations. 
Although spreading rumours has been penalised in Taiwan since 1991207, recent years have seen significant 
development of the legal framework regarding disinformation and foreign interference. One of the most 
significant acts is the Anti-infiltration Law208, passed on 31 December 2019 by Taiwanese Legislative 
Yuan.209 Although the proposal of this legal measure came two days after confessed former Chinese spy 
William Wang Liqiang openly accused China of infiltrating Taiwanese politics by paying three major news 
networks (CitiTV, China Television and Eastern Broadcasting Co) to broadcast news designed to discredit 
pro-independence party ahead of 2020 elections210, the legislation was part of a years-long effort to 
combat Chinese propaganda aimed at influencing Taiwanese politics and democratic process through 
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illicit funding of politicians and the media, and the spreading of disinformation.211 The Anti-Infiltration Act 
prohibits and punishes the following activities, provided that they are directed, funded, or supervised by 
or on behalf of a foreign principal: political canvassing or campaigning; lobbying; making donations to a 
political party; disrupting rallies and assemblies; undermining social order; and spreading disinformation 
related to elections212. The new law empowers government agencies to investigate an individual, group, 
or organisation suspected of engaging in the above-mentioned activities. If found guilty, they face a 
penalty of a maximum five-year imprisonment and a fine up to NT$ 10 million (approx. EUR 300 000).213 
Importantly, the Anti-Infiltration Act does not regulate the distribution of information since the authorities 
impose sanctions only after the interference of foreign powers is found and investigated. This allows for 
fighting disinformation without disproportionately limiting freedom of expression and hence, can be a 
type of regulation suitable for countries where the right to freedom of expression is paramount. Such a 
solution, however, also has its downsides – identifying and attributing the activity to foreign forces is 
required in order for it to be applicable, which is increasingly difficult.214 It is yet to be seen how successful 
the regulation is. However, its initial impact was visible. Immediately after it became law, Master Chain (大
師鏈), the only Taiwanese media that had an office in China, criticised the law, closed its Taiwan operations, 
and relocated to Beijing.215  
The new law in the form of the Anti-Infiltration Act is accompanied by two already existing acts – the Civil 
Servants Election and Recall Act, and the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election and Recall Act.216 Under 
Article 104 of the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, ‘those who cause others or the public at large to 
suffer losses by disseminating false information through text, images, videos, audio, or speeches shall be 
punished by up to five years in prison’.217 Under Article 90 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election 
and Recall Act, ‘anyone who spreads rumours or false sayings by text, picture, audio tape, video tape, 
speech, or other method for the purpose of influencing the election or recall prospects of a particular 
candidate, and thus causing damages to the public or others, shall be condemned to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than five years.’218 
In parallel, Taiwan’s National Communications Commission more strictly enforced already existing laws on 
reporting for television and radio. For example, CTi TV, a prominent television channel suspected to be 
under Chinese influence and a member of the Want Want Group, was fined more than NT$ 5.63 million 
(approx. EUR 165 000) in 2019, mostly for broadcasting and disseminating falsehoods.219 
Policies implemented as a response to disinformation 
In May 2019, Taiwan’s Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of Defence and its National Security Bureau 
delivered a report to the Legislative Yuan entitled ‘Countermeasures Against Chinese Disinformation 
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Psychological Warfare’.220 According to the report, the People’s Republic of China is utilising the freedom 
of Taiwan’s democratic society and information networks to disseminate ‘disputed information’ and 
conduct ‘cognitive warfare’, with the aim of splitting Taiwan’s military strength and consuming the energy 
of Taiwan’s government and national security teams.221 As part of the strategy described in the report, a 
‘rapid handling team for false information’ was established, guided by the principle of ‘fighting every false 
message’ and ‘clarifying every false message’. The report included five potential countermeasures to be 
implemented by Taiwan, such as utilising big data systems analysis to understand and analyse Chinese 
disinformation tactics in real time.222 
Table 2 - Counter-disinformation measures to be implemented by Taiwan 
Adhere to principles of 
law 
Leverage human rights, freedom of speech, and administrative 
neutrality. 
Increase network defence 
Enlist the aid of defence and tech industries; educate the public on 
disinformation awareness; launch real-time counter-messages to 
dispel fake news. 
Learn adversary’s tactics 
Understand the China Communist Party’s (CCP) disinformation 
tool kit. 
Form global coalition 
Establish an alliance of open democracies to fight against false 
information and cyber-warfare. 
Develop offensive 
strategy 
Leverage big data technology to monitor internet activity of CCP-
backed disinformation agents and proactively strike. 
Also, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) created a cross-government communication group 
that searches for propaganda and disinformation around the clock.223 This social media group analyses 
trends in online political discussions and studies how information is disseminated and consumed on the 
internet. Once someone finds a fake news story, top officials determine its validity and harm, and decide 
whether to respond. The two must-respond criteria are if the fake news is reported on television and if 
there are many online engagements with that story.224 
Taiwan’s efforts to ensure the quick dissemination of authoritative content is not limited to the digital 
space. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan’s Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) held daily 
briefings between January and June (and weekly from June onwards) to keep the public informed and 
respond to disinformation. These daily press conferences allow the government to consolidate its public 
messaging around one official source. 
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COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ 
As COVID-19 evolved into a global pandemic, Taiwan witnessed a steady increase in disinformation efforts 
centred around the disease.225 These, however, have been successfully addressed, mostly due to Taiwan’s 
previous epidemiological experience. After being hard-hit by the SARS epidemic in 2003, Taiwan revised 
its legal framework in terms of preparedness to respond to public health emergencies.226 It has developed 
a framework for detecting and reporting epidemics in accordance with the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), the global legal architecture for infectious disease control.227 The core elements of this 
legal framework are the Communicable Disease Control Act (CDC Act) and Disaster Prevention and 
Protection Act (DPP Act). According to Article 63 of the CDC Act, ‘persons who disseminate rumours or 
incorrect information concerning epidemic conditions of communicable diseases, resulting in damages to 
the public or others, shall be fined up to NT$ 3 000 000’228 (approx. EUR 89 000). Similar provisions are 
included in the DPP Act. Under Article 41 of the DPP Act, ‘anyone who spreads rumours or untrue 
information about disasters and thus causes damage to the public or other people shall be subject to 
imprisonment for not more than three years, detention or a fine not more than NT$ 1 000 000’229 (approx. 
EUR 29 700). Moreover, Article 251 of the Criminal Code penalises disseminating false information with the 
intention of affecting the transaction price of products declared as necessities by the Executive Yuan.230 
In addition to already existing laws, a new ‘Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures 
for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens’ was enacted in February 2020. Under Article 14 of the Act, 
‘anyone spreading misinformation regarding the epidemic is punishable by imprisonment for up to three 
years, a fine of up to NT$ 3 000 000 (approx. EUR 89 000), or both.’ 
5.4.2 Australia 
Australia has an advanced stance in the fight against disinformation and enhancing media literacy. 
The freedom of political expression has been recognised as an implied part of the Constitution by the High 
Court of Australia, as it is not explicitly declared in any law or the Constitution.231 
The government started to step up against disinformation in 2017 when the ‘Electoral and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill’ was introduced, and the amendments came into force in March 2018. The 
main points of the bill, among others, were to address ‘modern communication channels’ and the 
requirement of all paid electoral advertising to be authorised, regardless of the source.232 The process of 
authorisation is detailed in part XXA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) and the 
Commonwealth Electoral (Authorisation of Voter Communication) Determination 2018 (Cth), and also in 
part IX of the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Cth). The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) 
prepared a document in which they explain the requirements, which also concern social media, and among 
others, they require social media posts to show the required details at the end of the message, in an image 
in the post, or on a website accessed through a URL in the post.233 
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In 2018, amendments to the laws on national security and foreign interference were passed to address 
foreign influence operations. New secrecy provisions to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) were passed, 
aimed at curtailing harmful actions that ‘damage the security or defence of Australia’ through foreign 
interventions, and at defending political or governmental processes from influence that is directed or 
funded by a foreign principal.234 The ‘Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018’ (Cth) was also 
adopted in June 2018, and this established a ‘new system that introduces registration obligations for 
persons and entities who have arrangements with, and undertake, certain activities on behalf of foreign 
principals.’235 Besides, certain disclosure requirements were introduced to entities that ‘undertake 
communications activity in Australia on behalf of the foreign principal for the purpose of political or 
governmental influence, or produce information or material on behalf of a foreign principal for the purpose 
of being communicated or distributed to the public.’236 These provisions concern the distribution of 
information in any form, including communication through social media platforms. Although then-Prime 
Minister Malcolm Turnbull denied allegations that the new laws preventing foreign interference were 
aimed at China, diplomatic relations deteriorated between the two countries in 2018.237  
In 2018, the government set up a task force to identify potential cyberattacks and foreign influence 
campaigns targeting upcoming Australian elections, and to defend against malicious cyberactivity, 
physical means, electoral fraud, foreign interference, and disinformation238 – the ‘Electoral Integrity 
Assurance Task Force’ (EIATF)239. The EIATF works under the guidance of the Department of Home Affairs 
together with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP).240 
In 2019, the AEC ordered Facebook and Twitter to mark and notify illegal advertisements on their 
platforms, while social media platforms were notified about possible legal steps, like court injunctions, in 
cases where they do not comply. According to a document sent by Facebook and Twitter to the AEC, both 
companies sufficiently fulfilled the obligations stipulated before the elections. Facebook claimed that it 
banned electoral advertising financed from outside Australia during the campaign period before the 2019 
federal elections. A fact-checking provider was also involved that rated and labelled false stories as ‘false’. 
In addition, Twitter requested political campaign advertisers to apply for certification and comply with 
specific requirements on profiles and, similarly to Facebook, it prohibited financing political ads from 
foreign payment sources.241 
John Zhang, a political staffer who worked for NSW Labor MP Shaoquett Moselmane, claimed in court the 
cancellation of search warrants used by the Australian federal police against his property, arguing that 
foreign interference laws violated the freedom of political communication.242 The federal states of New 
South Wales and South Australia intervened, claiming that the laws promoted transparency in politics. This 
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Another local initiative was a new law introduced in 2020 in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT – Canberra 
and its direct surroundings) that banned false political advertising. The law stipulates that, from July 2021, 
‘an individual could be fined up to AUD 8 000, and a corporation up to AUD 40 500, for false political 
advertising.’244 This legislation also enables people ‘to complain about political material to the ACT 
Electoral Commission, which will have powers to investigate and ask for the removal of the 
advertisement.’245 
5.4.3 USA 
In the United States, media regulation is delegated to the states, as the First Amendment prevents federal 
media regulation.246 Since 1996, Section 230 of the ‘Communications Decency Act’ grants social media 
platforms immunity for third-party content.247 Section 230 states that ‘no provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.’248 However, Section 230 also lets these platforms ‘remove or moderate 
content deemed obscene or offensive, as long as it is done in good faith (the Good Samaritan provision).’249 
Possible reform of Section 230 has been on the agenda for a while now. In 2018, social platforms were 
called to apply measures against online sex trafficking.250  
As a response to the disinformation crisis prior to the 2016 presidential election, Congress announced a bill 
that orders ‘online platforms, such as Facebook and Google, to keep copies of ads, make them public, and 
keep tabs on who is paying – and how much’.251 The ‘Honest Ads Act’ (S.1989) was a landmark bill on the 
road to a more transparent online world. In the absence of its rules, only television and radio 
advertisements were subject to strict disclosure measures (since 2002). The Honest Ads Act also ordered 
websites with at least 50 million monthly viewers (such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter )  to maintain a 
public list of any organisation or person who spends at least USD 500 in election-related ads.252 Opponents 
of the law found the disclosure obligations excessive and feared a chilling effect on free speech.253 It is 
noteworthy that the bill has been supported openly and directly by Facebook and Twitter.254 
In 2019, the Digital Citizenship and Media Literacy Act was passed by Congress, with the view to fight 
disinformation. It is a vital law that stipulates that the Department of Education can ‘award grants to state 
and local educational agencies to promote media literacy and digital citizenship’.255 It was the first legal 
document to define digital citizenship as ‘the ability to safely, responsibly, and ethically use 
communication technologies and to participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of 
life related to technology and the digital world.’256 
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The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Social Media Data and Threat 
Analysis Center to combat fake news, responding to scandalous events before, during, and after the 
presidential election of 2016.  The Cognitive Security Intelligence Center (CSIC) was set up in the spirit of 
the NDAA, however, it has not yet been working at its full potential to address disinformation. A National 
Commission for Countering Influence Operations (NCCIO) has also been recommended, to support the 
work of the CSIC.257 
5.5 Good practices in the EU and third states 
This chapter discusses the best practices that have been encountered through our research. The examples 
have been ordered according to their novelty. 
5.5.1 Taiwan 
Taiwan’s response to disinformation attacks is perceived as unprecedented and highly innovative, as the 
country managed to introduce successful counter-disinformation measures without restricting free speech 
of individuals or the media.258 Many of the central 
problems relating to disinformation stem from the 
existence of powerful new distribution tools that 
serve as a vehicle for misinformation. Taiwan 
decided to use this as a weapon for its advantage. 
‘Meme engineering’259 
The government of Taiwan decided to utilise the 
language of the modern internet to craft their 
response.260 Firstly, Taiwan’s administration has 
developed several new and innovative techniques 
to push back false information with equally 
engaging content, by creating true information 
‘packaged in such a way that you can’t help but 
want to share it.’261 In December 2019 during a 
speech at Pingtung University, Taiwan’s digital 
minister, Audrey Tang, noted that Taiwan had 
installed ‘meme engineering’ teams in each 
government department to quickly respond to 
disinformation efforts within 60 minutes with 
‘easily digestible’ messages, which are true, but 
light in form. For example, in the first days of the 
pandemic, people were panic-buying toilet paper 
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Picture 1  
In this meme, Taiwanese Premier Su Tseng-chang 
debunks fake news about the Anti-Infiltration Act.  
Source: The Prime Minister's official Facebook page. 
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because of a rumour that it was being used to manufacture face masks and supplies were running out. In 
response, Taiwanese premier, Su Tseng-chang, released a cartoon of him wiggling his bum, with a caption 
saying: ‘We only have one pair of buttocks’262, which went viral in the media and turned out to be far more 
effective than serious fact-checking. 
Minister Tang has labelled this ‘the humour over rumour’ approach263 and explained that each department 
had adopted a ‘2-2-2’ system to respond to rumours trending on social ministry. According to Tang, within 
an hour, each department should create a clarifying meme with no more than 20 words in its title, utilising 
less than 200 characters in its text, and containing only two images.264 In Tang’s own words: 
‘We have evidence to show that everybody who have seen this clarification through the community will 
never share the original disinformation again. In a sense, it acts as an inoculation, as a memetic vaccine, 
so that when we phrase something as very funny instead of correcting people’s mistakes, then people 
would actually, naturally, voluntarily share our counter-disinformation clarification message.’265 
Another reason for the choice of humour is that it attracts young citizens, who can then share the meme 
with their less media-literate family members. This is particularly important due to the fact that, according 
to the trusted messenger theory, people tend to accept clarifications more from those they trust.266 
Moreover, memes have the potential to overcome the problem of closed social media groups where a lot 
of disinformation is disseminated (such as alumni groups). Such a solution helps to bridge the gap between 
privacy protections and policy responses. 
Rapid response system 
As time is crucial when fighting disinformation, Taiwanese authorities have set a time limit of two hours for 
debunking fake news. This system of rapid response, combined with the constant monitoring of media 
space, allows the government’s clarification to precede false news. This has several positive implications: 
• the government's clarification is reported by traditional media, such as TV or newspapers, because 
it falls within the news cycle; 
• early timing helps to overcome the so-called ‘familiarity bias trap’ (i.e. repeating a false claim 
strengthens the claim), because people hear the facts before they are exposed to the falsehoods. 
In other words, the rapid response weakens the power of fake news and strengthens the position 
of true information. 
The response system is a multi-layered one. First, the government releases a press statement providing the 
accurate information. Second, it uploads a debunking meme on its social media pages. Following that, it 
requests its online followers and supporters to share the meme as broadly as possible. If the fake news is 
severe, the appropriate Minister will host a high-level press conference to draw on traditional media’s 
attention and debunk the falsehood. The goal of these steps is to make facts dominate the information 
space before falsehoods do.267 
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How effective is the government in these efforts? Taiwanese journalists report that they generally do not 
hear about a fake news story until they see the government’s response; Facebook stated that the 
government’s debunking responses spread more broadly on the platform than fake news.268 
Limiting the binary dimension 
The Taiwanese government has designed its method of raising public awareness of propaganda and 
disinformation by applying a specific narrative, which strives to avoid further polarisation. The idea is to 
create a public mindset that fake news is simply a virus, which can be caught by anyone. People who 
believe in it and share it are not bad people; rather, they simply caught the virus.269 Similarly to combating 
COVID-19, a disease that can be caught and spread by anyone, combating disinformation requires the joint 
effort of the whole society to detect and prevent its spread.270 As stated by Aaron Huang, author of a report 
on ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation; A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 
Elections’, this framing takes away the good-bad binary from fake news and thereby removes fake news’ 
polarisation effect. There is no shame or blame for being tricked by fake news, or for spreading it, because 
anyone can be a victim.’271 
5.5.2 Germany 
In their comparative study on ‘Resilience to Online Disinformation’, Humprecht et al. identify factors that 
significantly influence resilience to political disinformation: polarisation of society; populist 
communication; low trust in news; weak public service media; fragmented audience; large advertising 
market; and high use of social media. The legal framework of communication can be aligned to address 
some of these in order to minimise the impact of disinformation. First and foremost is the importance of 
public service media. Empirical surveys show that the credibility of the news offerings of ARD272 and ZDF273 
have increased significantly since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic274. The public service media 
also have high trust ratings overall. At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that around 15% of 
respondents are no longer attracted by their offerings and are in alternative media ecosystems. It is positive 
for the Federal Republic that the regulatory authorities are making intensive efforts to strictly enforce the 
requirements of journalistic diligence in news and information services on the Internet. With regard to the 
labelling requirements for social bots and political advertising, no empirical values are yet available. 
Educational institutions in particular are trying to counter the effects of populist communication and 
polarisation by means of education, based on a broad consensus in German society. Civil society is also 
making efforts here to promote rational discourse with fact checks or educational campaigns. Noteworthy 
here in Germany are the initiatives of civil society, such as publications by the Federal Agency for Civic 
Education, state media institutions, and some NGOs (see above). Considerable research efforts are funded 
by ministries or even private foundations.275  
An important insight of the economic analysis is that a large advertising market strongly favours the 
emergence of disinformation. This is because attention can be achieved, in particular, through the 
dissemination of radical views and scandalisation. It is critical to note that in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, no instruments are yet being used to intervene in this business model. However, this may be 
remedied by the Digital Services Act, which provides for a risk analysis and corresponding 
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countermeasures, and also with regard to the dangers of disinformation for the democratic will-forming 
process. It would be desirable if the Digital Services Act would provide that such measures could also be 
taken ex ante. 
5.5.3 Finland 
Finland has been touted as the poster child for resilience to disinformation, but the potential for 
transferability of the Finnish examples is, unfortunately, doubtful. Finland is a small, largely homogenous 
country, and a stable democracy.276 It has one of the highest levels of press readership in the EU, with an 
outstandingly high level of trust in the news media.277 The public service broadcaster ’Yle’ enjoys a high 
reach in the population and remains the most trusted media brand. At the same time, trust in news on 
social media is only 16%. Finland is also world-leader in media literacy.278 These factors significantly 
contribute to Finnish resilience to disinformation.  
That said, some of the practices could be emulated in other Member Sates, most notably its educational 
approach. As discussed above, Finland ranked top in media literacy, and in a study measuring critical 
thinking skills, Finnish secondary school students clearly outperformed American students. The scientists 
running the study explained the ‘drastic differences’ between the performance of the two groups with 
differences in the school curricula. They argued Finnish pupils performed better because the Finnish 
system ‘explicitly facilitates critical thinking skills as a separate course while embedding [it] into subject 
coursework’, whereas pupils in the US learned critical thinking skills only implicitly in subject coursework.279 
The researchers recommend the introduction of coursework on critical thinking as a separate and 
mandatory part of the school curricula. At the same time, the Finnish system has been widely praised for 
integrating critical thinking skills as ‘a core, cross-subject component of the curriculum’280 from 
kindergarten onwards.  
The Finnish government’s campaign before the 2019 elections to raise awareness about disinformation 
may also be an example to be followed. The media campaign featured public figures and celebrities, urging 
citizens to recognise ‘information operations’.281 Although its effect is difficult to measure, in a 
questionnaire-based survey of voters after the 2019 Parliamentary elections, which was conducted by 
researchers and published by the Ministry of Justice282, the vast majority of respondents said they had not 
observed any electoral interference, but they were aware of the possibility of it.283 In another survey 
conducted by the Newspaper Association and the Prime Minister’s Office, 11 % of respondents said they 
had detected efforts by an outside party to try and influence voting behaviour.284 At the same time, 
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respondents’ assessment of the risk of electoral interference was high, which can be seen as a sign of 
awareness.285 
Enlisting social media influencers in the fight against disinformation can also be implemented in other 
national contexts. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Netherlands286, the UK, Indonesia287, and 
Québec have already enrolled influencers, and there were reports about the Irish government having 
similar plans288. Most recently, the US city of Minneapolis decided to enter into paid partnership with 
six local influencers to spread ‘city-generated and approved messages’ during the trial of the police officers 
charged in the killing of George Floyd.289 The initiative, however, was quickly dismissed as ‘propaganda’ by 
local activists, prompting the city to abandon the plan.290 The Dutch efforts also backfired when some of 
the said influencers abandoned the official message and started supporting dubious groups.291 
Additionally, there is no empirical evidence of the efficacy of these campaigns. 
5.5.4 Slovakia 
The Slovakian Health Ministry appointed a journalist, Jakub Goda, to set up long-term communication 
strategies to debunk hoaxes. His main task is to shed light on the way fake news is generated in Slovakia, 
and to mitigate the risk of disinformation concerning COVID-19. Goda finds that social media is the main 
platform for spreading disinformation, and advises the ministry to ‘broaden and deepen its communication 
with the public, monitoring disinformation on health matters and debunking it as it is disseminated’.292 
5.5.5 Estonia 
Estonia’s gains in its fight against disinformation seem to be based in its interinstitutional and 
intergovernmental cooperation, giving the fight against disinformation a whole-of-society aspect. 
Network thinking 
In 2017, prior to local elections, the State Electoral Office set up an election communication task force, 
composed of representatives of the Government Office, the Information System Authority, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.293 The State Electoral Office adopted a network 
approach294, where it engaged partners from other institutions and government agencies, which in turn 
engaged with tech and social media platforms (established a working level direct ‘hot line’), journalists 
and citizens.  
As part of their engagement with citizens and journalists, the Government Office produced an online 
Disinformation Handbook (‘A Guide to Dealing with Information Attacks’), which had the purpose of 
providing basic tips for recognising disinformation and how to respond to it, if necessary.295 It was 
purposely kept brief and written in a language than could reach a broad audience. The handbook had 
 
285 Borg et al, 2020, , pp.376-377 (in Finnish) 
286 van Dijck, José, and Donya Alinejad, ‘Social Media and Trust in Scientific Expertise: Debating the COVID-19 Pandemic in The 
Netherlands’, Social Media + Society, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 2020, p. 2056305120981057. 
287 Abidin et al., 2021 
288 ‘Best COVID-19 ‘influencers’ will avoid hectoring’, 2020. 
289 Levenson, Michael, ‘Minneapolis Will Pay Influencers to Fight Misinformation During Officers’ Trials’, The New York Times, 
February 27, 2021, sec. U.S.  
290 Vigdor, Neil, ‘Minneapolis Abandons Plan to Pay Influencers During Officers’ Trials’ The New York Times, March 1, 2021, sec. U.S. 
291 van Dijck and Alinejad, 2020. 
292 Hrabovska Francelova, N,,’Jakub Goda: The Faker-in-Chief Exposing Disinformation in Slovakia’, Balkan Insight, 8 October 2020. 
293 Tyler McBrien, op. cit., p. 6. 
294 Ibid, p. 1.  
295 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
 Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law and  
democratic processes in the EU and its Member States: 2021 update 
59 
several parts, including preparation for disinformation attacks, common methods of influence, and 
identification of bots. The handbook also had a section on responding to unfamiliar journalists. 
The election communication task force also organised frequent meetings with journalists in order to 
share information, but also to prepare a rebuttal if false information arose. This cooperation with journalists 
during election period would give the task force the opportunity to have their message reach a wide 
audience.296  
Cooperation between representatives of civil society and journalists is common as well, with ‘Propastop’ 
often collaborating with investigative journalists for investigation pieces, but also with newspapers to have 
the result of their analyses published. 
Inter-ministerial cooperation is also in a place when it comes to the media literacy education of young 
people of the country. According to the national legislation, the Ministry of Education and Research is 
tasked with promoting media literacy in national education policy planning. This includes designing a 
curriculum that will support pupils in developing their digital competences and give them the capacity to 
think critically about what they read online. But media literacy is also supported by efforts from other 
governmental bodies and civil society. For example, the election communication task force developed 
a 35-hour course on Media and Manipulation297 for high school students to increase their ability to 
separate fact from fiction.298 The Estonian Defence League (EDL, see below in 5.1.8) is also known for 
offering courses on topics such as the use of information as a weapon, part of their wider lessons in the 
curriculum dedicated to hybrid threats.299 
International cooperation 
When it comes to the online disinformation handbook produced by the task force, it was partially based 
on a guide from an existing handbook written by experts at Lund University and the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency.300 The original handbook301 was written for a narrower public – communication 
specialists. The task force found an example in it, but decided they should produce a shorter, simpler 
version, dedicated to a wider audience, by limiting the handbook to its essentials. 
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6 The role of citizens and civil society - Civic responses to 
disinformation: Design of the informational ecosystem 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of how civil society has responded to the ‘information disorder’ 
and what some of the existing ways to improve societal resilience to disinformation are. The data collection 
involved a desk research-based mapping exercise, which identified over 200 civic initiatives and 
organisations currently active in the EU to fight disinformation. Due to the nature of the methodology, the 
resulting list of civic responses is indicative, rather than exhaustive.  
It is clear from our data that there is no shortage of organisations and initiatives in the EU that aim to tackle 
the problem of disinformation. They range from one-person operations to large-scale EU-wide projects, 
and show a wide variety in terms of approaches, organisational forms, and funding. Although the 
methodology does not allow for sweeping generalisations, some trends have been identified. 
6.1 Assessment of most prominent instruments to correct distortions of 
the informational ecosystem 
6.1.1 Fact-checking 
Once simply a part of the legwork of journalists, fact-checking (or the practice of assessing the accuracy of 
public statements) has become one of the most salient methods to fight disinformation. According to the 
most recent count, there are more than 300 fact-checking initiatives in 84 countries in the world.302 
Originating in the United States in the early 2000s303, the ‘new democratic institution [of] the independent 
political fact-checker’304 has clearly become a global phenomenon. This is evident in our non-
representative data pool, in which nearly 70 of the 200 initiatives identified are either fact-checking 
projects and organisations, or are involved in fact-checking as part of their activities.305  
Fact-checking in the United States was spearheaded by journalists and established media outlets306, and 
there are examples in Europe, too, of legacy media-operated fact-checking initiatives. One of them is ‘Les 
Décodeurs’, the fact-checking blog of French newspaper Le Monde, or ‘Konkret24’, run by Polish television 
network TVN. In several countries, the public service media have also launched fact-checking projects, such 
as ‘ARD-Faktenfinder’ in Germany, ‘Melu detektors’ run by the Latvian public broadcaster LSM, or ‘Verifica 
RTVE’ of the Spanish public broadcaster. Yet another type of fact-checking as a journalism-related 
enterprise is the initiatives of investigative journalism groups, such as ‘Re:check’ by the Baltic Centre for 
Investigative Journalism Re:Baltica, or the project run by ‘Oštro’, a Ljubljana-based investigative journalism 
centre for the Adriatic region. 
Yet the fact-checking landscape in Europe features many civic organisations that are not in the journalism 
business. For example, the Greek ‘Ellinika Hoaxes’, the Romanian ‘Factual’, and ‘Faktograf’ in Croatia, which 
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are all run by independent NGOs specialising in fact-checking. Many of these NGOs operate under grants, 
while in some cases, such as Italy’s ‘Pagella Politica’, fact-checking is partially financed through the 
provision of services and content for third parties. Likewise, Spanish start-up ‘Newtral’ produces content to 
generate revenue.  
Many of the initiatives appear to be temporary, popping up around elections and focusing on verifying or 
debunking the claims or campaign promises of political parties and candidates. This is how the fact-
checking page of Irish ‘TheJournal.ie’ started.307 The now-defunct Swedish Faktiskt fact-checked the 2018 
Swedish elections. This approach is taken a step further by the French ‘Luipresident’, which tracks the 
fulfilment, or lack thereof, of French President Emmanuel Macron’s campaign promises, and the Spanish 
‘Polétika’, which analyses the fulfilment of claims made in the 2015 and 2019 Spanish elections. The largest 
scale of such electoral initiatives to date is a project of 19 European fact-checking groups from 13 Member 
States that teamed up under the name of ‘FactCheckEU’ before the 2019 European Parliamentary elections 
in order to effectively debunk disinformation Europe-wide.308 The anti-disinformation coalition First Draft 
has also facilitated a number of such temporary collaborations around elections, though not all of them 
have been a resounding success.309 
Fact-checking started out as a method to counter political disinformation, and politics and politicians 
remain the focus of many organisations. Yet some of them debunk non-political statements either 
exclusively, such as Italy’s ‘Facta’, or in addition to political claims (for example, the Polish ‘Fake News’).  
The traditional focus on politics has been upset by the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19-related 
‘infodemic’ has motivated the majority of fact-checkers to cover claims made about the pandemic. Some 
do so only in so far as politicians’ claims about the pandemic go, but most fact-checkers have taken up the 
task of debunking any type of COVID-19 disinformation, dedicating extra resources to it.310 Several fact-
checking websites, such as the Portuguese ‘Poligrafo’, or the Austrian ‘Mimikama’ added a special section 
on their website on pandemic-related disinformation. Additionally, in ‘the largest collaborative project of 
the fact-checking world’, 100 fact-checkers in 74 countries joined forces and created the ‘CoronavirusFacts 
Alliance’311 to fight the ‘infodemic’. The alliance publishes weekly reports on the most common claims fact-
checked by its members globally. For example, in January–February 2021, the disinformation scene was 
dominated by vaccine-related claims, which made up a third of the false news items the fact-checkers 
encountered.312 In a smaller-scale European collaboration, a report by fact-checking groups in five Member 
States on COVID-19 disinformation in March–April 2020 also found that several common themes of 
disinformation emerged in all participating Member States.313 
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visualisations on how particular hoaxes spread in the world.   
312 Harrison Mantas, ‘Vaccine Gaslighting, Mask Falsehoods and Fake Cures Dominate Recent Claims Added to the 
CoronaVirusFacts Alliance Database’, Poynter, March 2, 2021, available at https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2021/vaccine-
gaslighting-mask-falsehoods-and-fake-cures-dominate-recent-claims-added-to-the-coronavirusfacts-alliance-database/. 
313 These include, among others, unsubstantiated claims about cures and prevention, software billionaire Bill Gates’ alleged 
connection to the virus, and 5G technology. Some themes were country-specific, such as untrue claims in Germany about migrants 
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Below, some inherent problems of fact-checking are explained. 
Credibility of fact-checking 
While the organisations and initiatives mapped have honourable goals, such as ‘cultivating public 
debate’314 or ‘strengthening the democratic dialogue’315, there are a number of problems inherent in fact-
checking. The most important problem is the credibility of fact-checkers. In a survey of 30 fact-checking 
groups globally, only three said credibility is not really an issue for them316. Yet credibility is what 
‘distinguishes [fact-checkers] from yet another voice in the information landscape’317. This is a problem 
particularly in polarised societies, where the independence and trustworthiness of fact-checkers are often 
questioned. As a large-scale meta-analysis in the American context puts it, ‘it seems that the quality of 
objectivity often ascribed to fact-checking organisations does not transcend political and ideological 
divides’.318 In the ‘post-truth’ era of politics, where the concept of ‘fake news’ has been regularly 
weaponised by politicians, fact-checkers face an increasing credibility problem. Fact-checkers, operating 
online, are also part of an ecosystem plagued by an ‘information disbelief’; that is, people feeling scepticism 
towards any online content319, which exacerbates the problem. 
Most organisations try to overcome the credibility issue by meticulously stating their finances, 
methodology, and correction policies. Additionally, and as a sign of institutionalisation of the ‘fact-check 
industry’320, international standards and norms have been developed,321 and some organisations on our 
list have committed to adhere to them.  
Yet several fact-checking groups have ties to social media platforms, and some receive government 
funding or grants that can be seen as problematic. ‘There is now a sector of fact-checking philanthropy, 
fuelled by Google, Facebook, and non-profit foundations’322, an observer remarked. Many organisations 
mapped participate in Facebook’s ‘Third-Party Fact-Checking Program’323, which provides them with a 
steady stream of revenue. Such income streams and links may be seen as undermining the independence 
of fact-checkers. This is part of the reason why fact-checkers were wary of EU support when it was offered 
before the 2019 elections.324  
 
being secretly brought into the country under the cover of lockdown. Spain and Germany also had unverified claims not seen 
elsewhere about criminals using chemically treated masks to incapacitate people. See, FP, CORRECTIV, Pagella Politica/Facta,Full 
Fact and Maldita.es, ‘Infodemic COVID-19 in Europe: A Visual Analysis of Disinformation. A Fact-Checking Report’, 2020, available 
at https://covidinfodemiceurope.com/report/covid_report.pdf. Last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
314 Demagog (Czech Republic). 
315 Tjekdet (Denmark). 
316 Róbert Németh, Marius Dragomir, and Mihaela Groza, ‘What Keeps Fact-Checking Organizations up at Night’, Center for Media, 
Data and Society, Central European University, Budapest, 2021.  
317 Németh et al. p. 7. 
318 Nathan Walter, Jonathan Cohen, R. Lance Holbert, and Yasmin Morag, ‘Fact-Checking: A Meta-Analysis of What Works and for 
Whom’, Political Communication, Vol. 37, No. 3, May 3, 2020, pp. 350–375. 
319 Petter Bae Brandtzaeg, Asbjørn Følstad, and María Ángeles Chaparro Domínguez, ‘How Journalists and Social Media Users 
Perceive Online Fact-Checking and Verification Services’, Journalism Practice, Vol. 12, No. 9, October 21, 2018, pp. 1109–1129. 
320 Emily Bell, ‘The Fact-Check Industry’, Columbia Journalism Review, Fall 2019, available at: 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/fact-check-industry-twitter.php/.  
321 Poynter, ‘International Fact-Checking Network’s Code of Principles’, available at https://www.ifcncodeofprinciples. 
poynter.org/, Last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
322 Bell, op. cit.  
323 Facebook Journalism Project, ‘Facebook’s Third-Party Fact-Checking Program’, available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
324 Poynter, ‘The EU Wants to Support Fact-Checking- but Fact-Checkers Aren’t Sure They Want It’, October 26, 2018, 
https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/the-eu-wants-to-support-fact-checking-—-but-fact-checkers-arent-sure-they-
want-it/, Last accessed 16 March. 
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Institutional ties, and more generally, institutionalisation, works against fact-checkers’ credibility, 
particularly in an important target group; people with anti-elite views.325 A study conducted in six Member 
States concluded that anti-elite attitude was a strong predictor of viewing fact-checking unfavourably.326 
It is possible, the researchers hypothesised, that people with anti-establishment attitudes view the 
increasingly well-established fact-check industry as part of the media, which they generally distrust. 327 
This credibility problem is further complicated by the fact that label of ‘fact-checking’ has, inevitably, been 
hijacked. For example, Russian state-affiliated RT has a gamified ‘Fakecheck’ on its website, while its self-
proclaimed ‘sister agency’328, Ruptly, has a Verification Unit, offering guides and fact-checking. In an even 
more obvious example, China’s official state-run news agency Xinhua occasionally publishes articles under 
the ‘Fact Check’ label, most recently on how ‘anti-China forces in the West, […] have concocted […] false 
information about China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region’329. These cases exemplify the age-old 
manipulation technique of accusing others of what one is guilty of. They also point to the ‘reverse’ nature 
of illiberal regimes, where the meaning of concepts is turned upside down.330 
Efficacy of fact-checking 
Another related challenge is fact-checking’s efficacy. This issue has been thoroughly researched, and the 
results are mixed at best.331 Studying over two dozen fact-checking groups in five Member States for a 
three-month period before the 2019 EU elections, big data firm Alto Data Analytics found that fact-
checkers had minimal reach online. Moreover, the audience they did reach was not one that was inclined 
to believe disinformation; the communities that shared the debunked content proved rather impenetrable 
for fact-checkers.332 Another study on fact-checking claims by French extreme right candidate Marine Le 
Pen in 2017 has found that, even when fact-checking reaches people and informs them that a political 
candidate has not been truthful, it may not have a significant effect on their support for that 
candidate.333 Two experiments on the effect of fact-checks of then-US presidential candidate Donald 
Trump also found that the fact-checks reduced factual misperceptions, even among his supporters, yet 
they ‘had no measurable effect on attitudes toward Trump’.334 A meta-analysis of previous research has 
concluded that the more the study design resembles real-life rather than experimental circumstances, the 
less effect fact-checking seems to have.335 
Moreover, a journalistic investigation by the Washington Post found that those tweets of former US 
President Donald Trump that Twitter marked as disputed in November 2020 were shared longer and more 
 
325 Ben Lyons, Vittorio Mérola, Jason Reifler, and Florian Stoeckel, ‘How Politics Shape Views Toward Fact-Checking: Evidence from 
Six European Countries’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1, 2020, pp. 469–492.  
326 Lyons et al. 
327 In a similar manner, EU efforts to address disinformation may easily backfire, particularly among Eurosceptic groups.  
328 Ruptly, ‘About | Ruptly’, available at: https://www.ruptly.tv/en/about-ruptly. Last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
329 Xinhua Net, ‘Fact Check: Lies on Xinjiang-Related Issues versus the Truth’, February 5, 2021, available at: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/05/c_139723816.htm. 
330 Judit Bayer, Petra Bárd, ‘Hate Speech and Hate Crime in the EU and the Evaluation of  Online Content Regulation Approaches’, 
European Parliament, Brussels, 2020.  
331 For a summary, see  Sakari Nieminen and Lauri Rapeli, ‘Fighting Misperceptions and Doubting Journalists’ Objectivity: A Review 
of Fact-Checking Literature’, Political Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, August 1, 2019, pp. 296–309. 
332 Alissa de Carbonnel, ‘Exclusive: Echo Chambers - Fake News Fact-Checks Hobbled by Low Reach, Study Shows’, Reuters, July 11, 
2019. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-disinformation-exclusive-idUKKCN1U60PL.  
333 Oscar Barrera, Sergei Guriev, Emeric Henry, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, ‘Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of 
Post-Truth Politics’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 182, February 1, 2020, p. 104-123. 
334 Brendan Nyhan, Ethan Porter, Jason Reifler, and Thomas J. Wood, ‘Taking Fact-Checks Literally But Not Seriously? The Effects of 
Journalistic Fact-Checking on Factual Beliefs and Candidate Favorability’, Political Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2020, pp. 
939–960. 
335 Barrera et al. 
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widely than those that received no label.336 A ‘backfire effect’ of correcting disinformation has long been 
documented in the scientific literature on fact-checking337, but its existence has also been questioned by 
many researchers’338. A recent review of the extensive literature on the phenomenon concluded that it is 
highly unlikely for fact-checking to backfire, but it is of high importance that the false claim is ‘clearly and 
saliently paired with’ the fact-checker’s correction.339 
The EU has embraced fact-checking as an effective weapon against disinformation. EUvsDisinfo, ‘the 
flagship project of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force’, is a fact-checking 
enterprise refuting claims linked to the pro-Kremlin media. The Social Observatory for Disinformation 
(SOMA) was set up at the end of 2018 with the explicit goal of supporting fact-checkers. In mid-2020, 
another project, the European Digital Media Observatory, was launched with the goal of becoming a hub 
for European fact-checkers. Yet, as is clear from what has been argued above, institutional support for fact-
checking, and particularly institutional fact-checking (as in the case of EUvsDisinfo), are rather problematic. 
Institutional support threatens fact-checkers’ credibility and, consequently, their impact. Moreover, being 
a part of a strategic communication task force makes EUvsDisinfo vulnerable to charges of being (counter-
)propaganda, so its fact-checking efforts may easily backfire.  
6.1.2 Verification 
A second group of initiatives identified during the mapping to address disinformation relate to verification, 
which is closely related to fact-checking. While fact-checking may be conceptualised as groups or 
individuals evaluating the veracity of claims, verification services are tools ‘that support the authentication 
of online items’.340 Instead of assessing the truthfulness of a particular claim, these tools generally aim to 
provide information that can help in the assessment. They usually rely on algorithmic solutions, machine 
learning, or Artificial Intelligence, and the services they offer range from the fairly basic to the extremely 
complex. One German company’s ‘Metadata2Go’ service, for example, simply extracts the metadata of files 
for users, which can reveal where and when a photo was taken, or a document was created. On the other 
end of the spectrum, one finds projects such as the Horizon 2020-funded ‘WeVerify’, which is working on 
‘collaborative, decentralised content verification, tracking, and debunking’ tools, including a Deepfake 
Detector, Visual Location Estimation and Near Duplicate Detection for videos, currently still under 
development. What is available now for the general public is an extension for the Chrome and Firefox 
browsers, ‘a Swiss army knife’ to verify information. Utilising the ‘InVid’ algorithm developed in an earlier 
Horizon 2020 project, the plug-in can, among other things, provide forensic data of images and videos, 
perform reverse image searches, extract the metadata of images, and provide contextual information for 
videos. As is very often the case with these types of tools, the InVid extension is not easy to use, and the 
results require specialist knowledge to interpret.  
  
 
336 Megan A. Brown, Zeve Sanderson, Jonathan Nagler, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua Tucker, ‘Twitter Put Warning Labels on 
Hundreds of Thousands of Tweets. Our Research Examined Which Worked Best’, Washington Post, n.d., available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/twitter-put-warning-labels-hundreds-thousands-tweets-our-research-
examined-which-worked-best/.   
337 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, ‘When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions’, Political Behavior, Vol. 32, 
No. 2, June 1, 2010, pp. 303–330.  
338 Thomas Wood and Ethan Porter, ‘The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence’, Political Behavior, Vol. 
41, No. 1, March 1, 2019, pp. 135–163. 
339 Briony Swire-Thompson Joseph DeGutis, and David Lazer, ‘Searching for the Backfire Effect: Measurement and Design 
Considerations’, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1, 2020, pp. 286–299. 
340 Brandtzaeg et al.; other conceptualisations are also used. 
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6.1.3 Science communication 
The mapping exercise revealed the long-standing traditions of science communication in Europe. 
Associations of science journalists exist in numerous Member States, from Italy to Hungary. Many of them, 
such as one Dutch organisation, offers grants to their members; some, such as an association in France and 
the European umbrella group, recognise outstanding achievements in the field with awards. Many of them 
also organise conferences, seminars, and workshops to disseminate best practices and promote innovation 
in science communication.  
The mapping has also found a number of business ventures active in the science communication field. For 
example, the French ‘Agent Majeur’ offers communication services to scientists, while ‘Science 
Communication Lab’ in Germany can help with the visualisation of scientific results. Several EU-funded 
projects are also running to improve science communication.  
While scientists have long argued for the importance of effective science communication, the public 
discourse about climate change341, and more recently, the ‘infodemic’ surrounding the COVID-19 
pandemic, have attracted considerable attention from the general public, too. Under the new spotlight, 
the goals of science communication have shifted. Whereas a seminal paper in 2003 named goals such as 
raising awareness, and generating enjoyment, interest, opinion, and understanding of science, as the 
aims342. Today, science communication is often seen as crucial for democracy and considered to have a key 
role in the fight against misinformation.343 
There is little doubt that profound technological changes that have transformed the media environment 
have also greatly impacted science communication. Some argue that the growing distrust in science and 
‘misperceptions of scientific knowledge increasingly stem less from problems of communication and more 
from the widespread dissemination of misleading and biased information’.344 This dissemination of biased 
information has mostly been unleashed by the internet, and it has led to an environment in which science 
claims compete with ‘alternative facts’. As extensively documented by research, the inherent features of 
online communication (and particularly of social media) favour emotionally charged, sensationalised 
messages over nuanced communication, putting science at a clear disadvantage.  
 
341 For an overview, see Max Boykoff and Dyson Perrins, ‘Media and Scientific Communication: A Case of Climate Change’, 
Geological Society, London, Special Publications, Vol. 305, January 1, 2008, pp. 11–18. 
342 T. W. Burns, D. J. O’Connor, and S. M. Stocklmayer, ‘Science Communication: A Contemporary Definition’, Public Understanding 
of Science, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 1, 2003, pp. 183–202. 
343 As a Horizon 2020 project description states, ‘science communication is more than ever a key factor in facilitating democratic 
deliberation and in fighting misinformation’, Engagement and Journalism Innovation for Outstanding Open Science 
Communication | ENJOI Project | H2020 | CORDIS | European Commission, n.d. Available at: 
https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101006407.  
344 Shanto Iyengar and Douglas S. Massey, ‘Scientific Communication in a Post-Truth Society’, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, Vol. 116, No. 16, April 16, 2019, pp. 7656–7661. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic hit this rather chaotic field of science communication and introduced yet another 
radical transformation: the rise of the pre-print publication345 rapidly disseminated on social media. 
This has demonstrably contributed to the spread of conspiracy theories and false scientific information.346 
Science communication has an ambivalent relation to social media. On the one hand, social media 
platforms play a significant role in spreading disinformation, including scientific and COVID-19-related 
disinformation. On the other hand, scientific institutions and scientists are increasingly reliant on social 
media to disseminate research results.347 Yet, ‘for public institutions to become dependent on […] channels 
whose technological features and business models are squarely at odds with their own institutional 
processes’ is inherently risky.348 Their engagement is also used by platforms to enhance their own public 
image.349  
Science communication has proved clearly insufficient in the disinformation crisis, and especially during 
the infodemic. New ways of advancing the communication between the rapidly growing body of scientific 
knowledge and the diminishing attention capacity of the audience should be found.   
6.1.4 Investigative journalism 
Experts have been sounding the alarm bell over independent journalism for years;350 and there is 
consensus in the field that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating effect on journalism. This impact 
is not yet visible in our data; we found a large number of investigative journalism projects and 
organisations all over Europe. Investigative journalism centres operate in nearly every Member State, from 
Hungary’s ‘Átlátszó’ to France’s ‘Disclose’ or Austria’s ‘Dossier’. Regional co-operation is also common; for 
example, ‘Re:Baltica’ covers the Baltics, the Slovenian ‘Oštro’ wants to ‘fill in a void in the Adriatic region’, 
and ‘Vsquare’ is a collaboration of investigative journalists in the Visegrád countries. In addition to 
collaborating on investigative projects, many of the NGOs (or in some cases, academic institutions) offer 
support to investigative journalists, whether through lobbying and advocacy, networking, or training 
opportunities. Some, such as the Belgian ‘Fonds Pour Le Journalisme’, offers grants for investigative 
projects.  
Similar to other parts of the media ecosystem, investigative journalism has been transformed in the new 
networked media environment. Under enormous economic pressure, the highly competitive single 
newsroom model has moved towards collaborations between independent news organisations and 
 
345 Under ‘normal’ circumstances, scientific papers are subject to the quality control of peer-reviewing. These reviewed articles 
form the basis of science journalism. This has not been the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to accelerate the 
dissemination of potentially life-saving scientific information, researchers have taken to publishing and sharing their papers before 
peer-review. Some of the papers have not stood up to scientific scrutiny. Yet, by the time these papers were retracted, their 
erroneous messages had gained traction on social media. 
346 Amy Koerber, ‘Is It Fake News or Is It Open Science? Science Communication in the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Journal of Business and 
Technical Communication, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1, 2021, pp. 22–27. 
347 The ease and rapidity of sharing on social media had an important practical benefit for health care workers on the front line, 
many of whom used these platforms to keep up with, analyse, and discuss, the evolving knowledge about COVID-19. See Michael 
Gottlieb and Sean Dyer, ‘Information and Disinformation: Social Media in the COVID-19 Crisis’, Academic Emergency Medicine, Vol. 
27, No. 7, 2020, pp. 640–641. 
348 José van Dijck and Donya Alinejad, ‘Social Media and Trust in Scientific Expertise: Debating the COVID-19 Pandemic in The 
Netherlands’, Social Media + Society, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 2020, p. 2056305120981057. 
349 van Dijck and Alineiad. 
350 Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, ‘The Many Crises of Western Journalism: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Crises, Professional Crises, 
and Crises of Confidence’, in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Elizabeth Butler Breese, and Maria Luengo (eds.), The Crisis of Journalism 
Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 77–97. Available at: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9781316050774A016/type/book_part.  
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journalists, often across borders, or even globally.351 This shift has been observed in the US and Australia, 
and it is clear in our data pool, too. There are examples of collaborations of a more institutional nature, such 
as the ‘European Investigative Network’, under which some of Europe’s well-established legacy media 
organisations have started cooperating.352 Equally important are the ‘bottom-up’ collaborative projects, 
where individual journalists initiate cross-border collaboration in the public interest.353 
From the perspective of fighting disinformation, and more generally, of fulfilling the media’s watchdog 
role, the shift towards collaborations is a welcome development. Collaboration gives access to specialist 
knowledge that not every newsroom has; it allows the ‘pooling [of] skills and resources’, enables higher 
profile investigations, facilitates addressing pan-national issues, and it offers legal protection in countries 
where the freedom of the press is not respected.354 It also makes overcoming local censorship possible.355 
This kind of cooperation makes stories like ‘Grand Theft Europe’ possible, which involved 63 journalists in 
30 countries, coordinated by the German ‘Correctiv’, to investigate a Europe-wide ‘VAT tax fraud carousel’ 
worth EUR 50 billion a year. 
Despite these positive developments, many observers are increasingly pessimistic. The COVID-19 
pandemic has had, and will continue to have, a ‘dramatic and unequal effect’ on independent news 
media.356 Many initiatives lacked long-term sustainable funding even before the pandemic, and financial 
insecurity has since greatly increased. Actual reporting work has also been affected. The health risks and 
the lockdowns introduced as a response to the pandemic have greatly reduced journalists’ access to news 
sources and events. Press freedom has come under pressure in many parts of the world. At a time when 
trustworthy information is needed more than ever, independent journalism in many places is struggling. 
6.1.5 Media literacy education 
Based on the mapping, many Member States in Europe have a lively, diverse, and well-established media 
literacy education landscape. Long-running organisations with traditional approaches and innovative new 
projects alike have been identified. Some initiatives focus on media literacy education exclusively, while 
many are engaged in other disinformation-related activities as well. An example of the first category is 
‘Digitalerkompass’, an NGO conducting media literacy workshops for secondary school classes in Austria 
and Germany, or the French group of volunteering journalists ‘Entre les lignes’, which teaches critical 
thinking skills to young people. These groups typically focus on in-person education in school classrooms 
or libraries, though the COVID-19 pandemic has forced them online. For the second group, media literacy 
activities are complementary to their main mission. For example, some fact-checking initiatives (such as 
the Finnish ‘Faktabaari’) also develop educational material, such as its ‘Infodemic Survival Kit’ or ‘Voter 
Literacy Handbook’, available on their website. Some think tanks involved in disinformation research and 
 
351 Carson, Andrea, and Kate Farhall, ‘Understanding Collaborative Investigative Journalism in a ‘Post-Truth’ Age’, Journalism 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 13, October 3, 2018, pp. 1899–1911. 
352 Heft, Annett, ‘Transnational Journalism Networks ‘From Below’: Cross-Border Journalistic Collaboration in Individualized 
Newswork’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, March 12, 2021, pp. 454–474. 
353 Heft. 
354 Sambrook, Richard, ‘Introduction’ in Richard Sambrook (ed.), Global Teamwork: The Rise of Collaboration in Investigative 
Journalism, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2018, pp. 1–4. 
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355 Palomo, Bella, and Jon Sedano, ‘Cross-Media Alliances to Stop Disinformation: A Real Solution?’, Media and Communication, Vol. 
9, No. 1, March 3, 2021, pp. 239–250. 
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policy development also create online educational material, such as the ‘Countering Disinformation 
Online’ toolkit, developed by Globsec in Slovakia. The Swedish ‘Källkritikbyrån’ complements its fact-
checking activities with online guides and in-person lectures. The fact-checking group ‘Verifica’ in 
Catalonia has a number of in-person workshops designed for different target groups, such as ‘Projecte Gen-
Z’, which aims to train a future generation of fact-checkers.  
The mapping exercise has also uncovered some initiatives that utilise games to teach critical thinking or 
media literacy skills.357 Since media literacy education often, though by no means always, targets children 
and young people, this is not surprising; these games, arguably, are part of a larger trend of gamifying 
education.358 Although the rich literature on gamification is rather inconclusive about the effectiveness of 
the use of games in educational settings359, as well as in online learning environments,360 this has not 
seemed to have dampened the enthusiasm towards educational games.  
In our pool of media literacy initiatives, the games identified range from simple quizzes to more complex, 
elaborate game experiences. Quizzes to test users’ knowledge about recent news and fake news stories 
are, for example, a recurrent, monthly feature of the Hungarian ‘Urbanlegends’ website. The Polish fact-
checker ‘Demagog’ also has its own (though static) version of a quiz. Researchers who have developed a 
similar game in Greece claim to have found that the quiz was successful in raising awareness about 
disinformation and educating the participants in ways to verify content.361 
The more elaborate games in the European context include ‘Bad News’, a collaborative project of the Dutch 
‘DROG’ media platform and the University of Cambridge, and its freshly upgraded version, the COVID-19 
focused ‘Go Viral!’. In both games the player aims to become a successful ‘fake news tycoon’, gaining as 
many followers and likes as possible, which, as game-players find out, is the easiest by spreading 
outrageous claims. Another example of this kind of games is ‘Fake It to Make It’. These games aim to 
‘inoculate’ players against disinformation by teaching them about the common techniques for spreading 
it. Research conducted by the game designers found evidence that the games were successful in 
improving the players’ ability to recognise disinformation irrespective of their ‘education, age, political 
ideology, and cognitive style’362, and that the effect may be long-lasting.363 The games also boosted players’ 
confidence in evaluating the veracity of information.364 
 
357 Scholars have been arguing that designing, or even playing, digital games can contribute to media literacy. However, the games 
included here have an explicit media literacy educational focus. 
358 For a critical review of this trend, see Christo Dichev and Darina Dicheva, ‘Gamifying Education: What Is Known, What Is Believed 
and What Remains Uncertain: A Critical Review’, International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher Education, Vol. 14, No. 1, 
2017, pp. 1–36.  
359 Dichev and Dicheva. Op. cit.  
360 Rob van Roy and Bieke Zaman, ‘Need-Supporting Gamification in Education: An Assessment of Motivational Effects over Time’, 
Computers & Education, Vol. 127, December 1, 2018, pp. 283–297. 
361 Anastasia Katsaounidou, Lazaros Vrysis, Rigas Kotsakis, Charalampos Dimoulas, and Andreas Veglis, ‘MAthE the Game: A Serious 
Game for Education and Training in News Verification’, Education Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2019, p. 155. 
362 Jon Roozenbeek and Sander van der Linden, ‘Fake News Game Confers Psychological Resistance against Online Misinformation’, 
Nature, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 25, 2019, pp. 1–10. 
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364 Melisa Basol, Jon Roozenbeek, and Sander van der Linden, ‘Good News about Bad News: Gamified Inoculation Boosts 
Confidence and Cognitive Immunity Against Fake News’, Journal of Cognition, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 10, 2020, p. 2. 
 Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law and  
democratic processes in the EU and its Member States: 2021 update 
69 
In addition to the game applications, the mapping uncovered two games that are not online but require 
physical presence.365  
Based on the mapping, it appears that the EU plays an important role in the media literacy field, by bringing 
together various actors in different Member States and by funding their initiatives. Some of the recent 
projects include the ‘European Media Coach‘ initiative, which replicates a successful Dutch programme in 
Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria; ‘Wires Crossed‘, which aims to develop local community 
media in order to mitigate disinformation in Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Poland, 
or the ‘YouthMythBusters’ initiative, which aims to improve the critical thinking skills of vulnerable youth 
in Czechia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Italy. The ‘YouCheck!’ project teaches students in France, 
Romania, Spain, and Sweden the use of the InVid-‘WeVerify‘ verification tool. The ‘YouCheck!’ project has 
also developed a fairly elaborate game that involves the use of the tool.  
Media literacy in the formal education system of Member States is discussed in Chapter 8.  
6.2 Overview of efforts to increase citizens’ resilience to disinformation 
6.2.1 Germany 
National policies and measures to increase citizens' resilience  
There are numerous initiatives to strengthen the resilience of the citizenry against disinformation. 
Significant measures include: 
Cosmo - COVID-19 Snapshot Monitoring  
‘Cosmo’ is a joint project of the University of Erfurt, the Robert Koch Institute, the German Federal 
Centre for Health Education, and others to monitor knowledge, risk perception, protective 
behaviour, and trust in the population during the current outbreak.366  In this way, continuous 
information is provided on the extent to which citizens consider government measures to be useful 
and, if necessary, support them. 
State Media Authority NRW 
For several years now, the state media authorities have been working to ensure media literacy, using 
considerable financial resources. One particular concern here is the fight against disinformation. The 
numerous studies published by the NRW State Media Authority on the methods of disinformation 
and their effects deserve special mention.367 The Handbook for the Examination of Disinformation 
and Media Manipulation presents techniques that can be used to identify and examine 
disinformation. 
ARD Fact Finder368  
‘Faktenfinder’ is a research department of ARD founded in spring 2017 and is assigned to the 
‘Tagesschau’. The department's goal is to search the Internet for false reports that have the potential 
 
365 Interestingly enough, both are based on the mechanism of popular escape room games. The Czech game ‘Fakescape’ is an in-
person activity for secondary school students, organised in the classroom. The Austrian ‘Escape Fake’ uses augmented reality 
technique to create an escape room anywhere, with players using their phone camera to see the riddles and game elements in 
their physical environment.  
366 Cosmo, ‘COVID-19 Snapshot Monitoring’, available at: https://projekte.uni-erfurt.de/cosmo2020/web/. Last accessed on 23 
February 2021. 
367 Landesanstalt für Medien NRW, ‘Desinformation’, available at: https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/themen/ 
desinformation.html. Last accessed on 23 February 2021. 
368 Goethe Institut, ‘Mit Fakten gegen Fake News’, June 2017, available at: https://www.goethe.de/ins/cl/de/kul/ 
mag/21006877.html. Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
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to influence public discourse. These are then researched, any false information found is corrected, 
and the results are then published on the website (https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/). 
Similar projects include ‘Social Listening and Verification’ by Bayrischer Rundfunk and the SWR 
‘Fakefinder.’ 369 
Federal Agency for Civic Education 
As an institution of the Federal Government, the 'bpb' has the task of promoting political education 
in the Federal Republic. The bpb's website provides an overview of civil society organisations that 
take action against misinformation on the Internet and work to strengthen media literacy.370 
Furthermore, specialist articles are published that examine related issues in depth, such as the 
impact of conspiracy narratives. 371 
Citizens’ initiatives 
Numerous civil society groups have set out to investigate or provide education against 
disinformation: 
New Responsibility Foundation372  
The New Responsibility Foundation (SNV) is a non-profit think tank organised as an 
association. It deals with current political and social issues of new technologies and 
digitalisation (i.e., dissemination of election advertising, IT security, data economics, digital 
fundamental rights, and AI, among others). 
Klickwinkel373  
The Klickwinkel initiative has set itself the goal of turning young people into opinionated 
creators of digital media and thus preserving and strengthening democracy in the digital 
world. With its video competition, the initiative wants to motivate young people to do 
responsible research and to search for possible solutions, as well as to give these young people 
a voice. Overall, the initiative aims to strengthen young people's media skills and awaken their 
interest in digital topics* (*author's personal assessment). 
Climate Lie Detector374  
The ‘Climate Lie Detector’ was founded in 2008 by two journalists to counteract disinformation 
in the field of environmental or energy policy. The network consists of several journalists who 
check for possible disinformation in order to correct misleading, propagandistic, or out-of-
context reports in an expert and fact-oriented manner. The results of the research are then 
published on the website. 
  
 
369 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, ‘Den Durchblick behalten. So lassen sich Fake News enttarnen’, February 2017. Available 
at: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/medien-und-sport/fake-news/246807/den-durchblick-behalten-so-lassen-sich-fake-news-
enttarnen. Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
370 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, ‚Den Durchblick behalten. So lassen sich Fake News enttarnen’, February 2017. Available 
at: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/medien-und-sport/fake-news/246807/den-durchblick-behalten-so-lassen-sich-fake-news-
enttarnen. Last accessed on 23 February 2021. 
371 Lamberty, ‘Verschwörungserzählungen‘, bpb Info aktuell 35/2020. 
372 Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, ‘Über uns’. Available at: https://www.stiftung-nv.de/de/ueber-uns. Last accessed on 23 February 
2021. 
373 Klickwinkel, ‘Über uns’. Available at: https://klickwinkel.de/initiative/ueber-uns/. Last accessed on 23 February 2021. 
374 Der Klima-Lügendetektor, ‘Über uns’. Available at: https://klima-luegendetektor.de/about/. Last accessed on 23 February 2021. 
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Klicksafe375  
‘Klicksafe’ is an EU initiative for more safety on the Internet that has been active in Germany 
since 2004. It aims to promote users' media skills and teach them how to use the Internet 
competently and critically. To this end, the initiative offers media education tips for parents 
and schools, provides an overview of current issues, and disseminates information about 
Internet complaint centres. Klicksafe aims to raise awareness of safety issues and provide 
information about developments, opportunities, and risks on the Internet. 
CORRECTIV376  
‘CORRECTIV’ is a donation-funded German research centre that focuses on investigative 
journalism. Its goal is to conduct clean and thorough research in order to uncover systematic 
malpractice, corruption, and unethical behaviour (in the past, for example, on the AfD 
donations affair or the CumEx tax scandal). CORRECTIV is committed to combating both 
disinformation and misinformation and aims to enrich and strengthen public discourse, and 
thus democratic society, through independent, fact-based journalism.  
Mimikama377  
‘Mimikama’ is an Austrian association for the protection of Internet users (particularly on social 
media) that was established in 2011. Its goal is to counteract Internet abuse, Internet fraud, 
and disinformation. The association works primarily as a fact checker that users can turn to if 
they discover false reports or similar in social media. The findings are then published as 
research or analysis reports on the association's website. 
Digital Education Monitor378  
Together with the MMB Institute for Media and Competence Research in Essen, the 
Bertelsmann Foundation's ‘Monitor Digitale Bildung’ (Digital Education Monitor) examines the 
opportunities, framework conditions, and challenges of digital education and education in 
times of digitisation in Germany. Since 2015, empirical data from various educational sectors 
has been collected and analysed to create a cross-sectoral database. The main aim is to discuss 
and develop good and useful concepts for digitised learning. 
6.2.2 Finland 
National policies and measures to increase citizens' resilience  
Finland has been one of the pioneers of media education, with roots going back to the 1950s379, and with 
the introduction of mass media education in the school curriculum as early as 1972.380 As for media literacy 
more specifically, various government initiatives to facilitate media literacy skills among citizens have been 
 
375 Klicksafe, ‘Die EU-Initiative klicksafe’. Available at: https://www.klicksafe.de/ueber-klicksafe/die-initiative/projektinfo/. Last 
accessed on 23 February 2021.  
376 Correctiv, ‘Über uns’. Available at https://correctiv.org/ueber-uns/. Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
377 Mimikama, ‘Über Mimikana’. Available at https://www.mimikama.at/ueber-uns/. Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
378 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘Monitor Digitale Bildung’. Available at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-
projekte/teilhabe-in-einer-digitalisierten-welt/projektthemen/projektthemen-monitor/. Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
379 Reijo Kupiainen, Sara Sintonen, and Juha Suoranta, ‘Decades of Finnish Media Education‘, September 27, 2008. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257116839_Decedes_of_Finnish_Media_Education. 
380 Lauri Palsa and Saara Salomaa, ‘Media Literacy as a Cross-Sectoral Phenomenon: Media Education in Finnish Ministerial-Level 
Policies‘, Central European Journal of Communication, Vol. 13, No. 2, May 18, 2020, pp. 162–182. 
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in place since 2004.381 A government body to promote media literacy was set up in 2012382, and re-
organised in 2014 as the current ‘National Audiovisual Institute’ (KAVI).383 The Finnish Ministry of Education 
and Culture developed guidelines for media literacy education in 2013, well before disinformation came 
to be seen as a central problem. The policies focus on providing children and young people with ‘the 
prerequisites for participating […] in the information society’. 384 Based on the 2018 new national media 
policy, the guidelines were updated in 2019385, now with an explicit emphasis on disinformation. The new 
policy names ‘supporting the agency and participation of children and adolescents in society and 
preventing the dissemination of misinformation’ as one of its goals (p.9). The new policy also targets all 
age groups in Finland, which is hailed as the most significant change from earlier efforts386. 
The Finnish national curriculum was reformed at all levels betwen 2012 and 2017.387 The changes 
introduced included a focus on critical thinking. Developing the concept of media literacy further, the new 
national core curriculum focuses on multiliteracy388, defined as the skills needed to ‘interpret, produce, and 
make a value judgement’ of different texts.389 Education has been generally recognised as a key 
component in Finland’s resilience against disinformation. A recent article in the British ‘Telegraph’ 
newspaper named kindergarten teachers ‘Finland’s secret weapon against fake news’.390 
State-supported media literacy programmes beyond the classrooms also abound. ‘In Finland, media 
education work is carried out wherever children and young people are: not only in schools, but also in 
different virtual communities and game worlds’, the NGO Finnish Society on Media Education claims.391 
The public service media ‘Yle’ runs a ‘news classroom’ project (‘Yle Uutisluokka’)392, helping pupils make 
their own news with professional journalists.393 Yle also operates a ‘lie detector’ (‘Valheenpaljastaja’), and 
produces accessible materials on disinformation, such as how to recognise manipulated photos or 
videos.394 Libraries and youth centres also run media literacy projects. Media Literacy Week has been 
celebrated every year since 2013 with a wealth of activities, and in cooperation with private businesses, 
public bodies, and NGOs.395 
 
381 Reijo Kupiainen, ‘Media Literacy in Finland’, The International Encyclopedia of Media Literacy, American Cancer Society, 2019, pp. 
1–6. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118978238.ieml0147.  
382 Palsa and Salomaa, 2020, p. 163. 
383 Kavi, ‘Our history’. Available at: https://kavi.fi/en/about-kavi/.  
384 Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland, ‘Good Media Literacy: National Policy Guidelines 2013–2016’, 2013. Available at: 
http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-263-222-7, p.3..  
385 Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland, ‘Media Literacy in Finland: National Media Education Policy’, 2019. 
386 Palsa and Salomaa, 2020, p.166. 
387 Irmeli Halinen and Michiel Matthes, ‘The New Educational Curriculum in Finland’, Improving the Quality of Childhood in Europe, 
Vol. 7, Alliance for Childhood European Network Foundation, Brussels, 2018, pp. 75–89. 
388 Kupiainen, 2019. 
389 Paivi Rasi, Marjaana Kangas and Heli Ruokamo, ‘Promoting Multiliteracy in the Finnish Educational System’, in Merja Paksuniemi 
and Pigga Keskitalo (eds.), Introduction to the Finnish Educational System, Brill Sense, 2019, pp. 96–157. Available at: 
https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004394278/BP000014.xml, p.98. 
390 Harriet Barber, ‘Finland’s Secret Weapon in the Fight against Fake News: Its Kindergarten Children’, The Telegraph, February 16, 
2021. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/finlands-secret-weapon-fight-against-fake-
news-kindergarten/.  
391 Finnish Society on Media Education, ‘About’. Available at: https://mediakasvatus.fi/english/. 
392 Yle, ‘Yle Newsletter’. Available at: https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/uutisluokka/ (in Finnish). 
393 Minna Horowitz, ‘Public Service Media and Information Disorder: Public Media Institutions at a Crossroads: Visions, Strategies, 
Tactics’, Center for Media, Data and Society, Central European University, Budapest, August 2018. p.18. 
394 Yle, ’Media – ja digitaidot’. Available at: https://yle.fi/aihe/kategoria/oppiminen/valheenpaljastaja (in Finnish). 
395 Mediataitoviikko. Available at: https://www.mediataitoviikko.fi/in-english/. 
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The Finnish government has also been a front-runner in engaging with social media influencers to spread 
correct information about the COVID-19 pandemic.396 Influencers were recognised as critical actors in 2018 
to ensure that the whole nation can be reached in the event of a crisis.397 In a joint project of the Finnish 
Prime Minister’s Office, a social media consultancy named ‘PING Helsinki’ and the ‘Mediapooli’ network398, 
influencers were quickly mobilised when the pandemic hit. Under the cooperation, ‘PING Helsinki’ turned 
the government’s COVID-19-related messages into easy-to-share formats, and sent them to 1 500 Finnish 
influencers who were free to use them as they saw fit.399  
Citizens’ initiative 
Finland has a lively civic scene when it comes to tackling disinformation. Interesting initiatives include the 
‘Faktana, Kiiot’ (‘Facts, please’) project 2017–18, in which a group of volunteer journalists visited schools to 
talk about their work and teach children about disinformation.400 The ‘Faktabaari’ fact-checking 
organisation started operating in 2014 and has conducted many interesting activities in addition to 
‘traditional’ fact-checking.401 In preparation for the 2019 elections, Faktabaari launched an ‘election project’ 
in May 2018, which included a seminar on electoral interference and devoted special attention to fighting 
election-related disinformation, focusing on the issue in the Faktabaari EDU project for teachers and 
pupils.402 Sponsored by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Parliament, Faktabaari also 
participated in the #VaadiFaktat (‘demand facts’) project, training fact-checkers, producing educational 
material and going on a five-town ‘tour’ to hold discussions to promote fact-based politics and increase 
voter turnout.403 
Before the 2019 elections, an NGO named ‘Open Knowledge Finland’ adapted a British software called 
‘Who Targets Me’404 to the Finnish elections. With the help of a browser extension called ‘Vaalvahti’, voters 
could see which party and candidate was targeting them, and whether the campaign messages were the 




396 Jon Henley, ‘Finland Enlists Social Influencers in Fight against COVID-19’, The Guardian, April 1, 2020, sec. World news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/finland-enlists-social-influencers-in-fight-against-covid-19. 
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National policies and measures to increase citizens' resilience  
Increasing citizens’ resilience against disinformation is a strong focus in Estonia. This focus is rooted in the 
country’s approach to security. According to the 2017 National Security Concept (which calls for integrated 
defence and comprehensive security), comprehensive defence is a whole-of-society approach, with 
psychological defence being one of the six pillars.406 Several ministries are tasked with promoting media 
literacy amongst the greater population, such as the Ministry of Culture, which is responsible for Estonia’s 
broadcasting policy, and the Ministry of Education and Research. 
Russian speakers in Estonia would get their information from television, the most popular Russian 
language channels being controlled by Moscow.407 Against this backdrop, in September 2015, the Estonian 
government launched a Russian language TV channel (‘ETV+’). The goal of the channel was to offer an 
alternative to the pro-Kremlin narratives, when it comes to TV programmes, for Russophones, and thus 
lower Russia’s influence on this audience.408 According to the Ministry of Culture, the channel is established 
on the principle that ‘all groups in society must have access to a high-quality, balanced TV programme that 
reflects Estonia's life and culture’.409 However, the channel struggled with attracting viewers from the 
better produced Russian channels.410 The reliance of the Russophone population on Russian media makes 
them especially vulnerable to disinformation campaigns targeted not only directly at Estonia, but also at 
the Russian population as a whole. As can be seen in the results of our mapping exercise, slightly more 
than 30% of the relevant disinformation actions identified form the EUvsDisinfo website were 
disseminated through Russian media channels.  
As part of its digital strategy, Estonia is also teaching its young population how to spot fake news.411 
According to the Ministry of Education, due to the increasing importance of technology in our daily lives, 
it is necessary to improve the digital competences of the entire population.412 Digital skills are taught to 
pupils from kindergarten to grade 12, with the goal of keeping them safe online. Pupils with digital 
competences should be able to communicate safely online, find the right information over the web, think 
critically about what they read online, and understand how to protect their personal data.413 The Ministry 
of Education and Research provides training and instructions for teachers and school administrators in 
order for them to understand the concept of digital competences. It is the responsibility of teachers to 
monitor the progress of their students, using comprehensive assessment measures developed by the 
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Ministry. In 2018, it was considered that 83% of the students aged 7–17 met the minimum requirements 
for digital competences.414 
The Ministry of Education and Research also compiled a mandatory course of 35 hours on ‘Media and 
Manipulation’ for high school students. The course addressed various kinds of media products, but also the 
difference between news and opinion, and clarified who is considered a ‘journalist’, what social media is, 
and what the various methods of influencing opinions are.415 
Citizens’ initiatives 
Estonia’s response to disinformation is shaped by its sizeable Russian-speaking population and its reliance 
on digitisation. According to ‘Statistics Estonia’, in 2021, the country boasts a population of 1 329 460 
inhabitants416, of which almost 25 % is of Russian ethnicity.417 In 2005, the country became the first in the 
world to offer the option to vote online, while in 2007, it became the target of the first coordinated, large 
scale cyber-attack.418  
The cyber-attack happened in the Spring of 2007, following relocation by the authorities of the ‘Bronze 
Soldier’ – a Soviet World War II memorial of great importance for the Russian-speaking population, which 
at that time represented 30 % of the total population.419 This decision increased already existing 
dissatisfaction, on the part of the Russian-speaking population, due to growing post-independence 
inequality, and this culminated in protests in Tallinn.420 The protests were followed by three weeks of 
denial-of-service attacks, a type of activity where the attacker ‘sends overwhelming amounts of data to the 
targeted internet servers, clogging them up with traffic and either slowing them down or knocking them 
offline entirely’.421 Although the source of the attacks was never identified with certainty, national and 
international observers mostly agreed that Russia was responsible for the attack.422 
Following the attack, Estonia established the ‘Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit’423, formed of 
volunteer specialists in information technology who focus on sharing threat information and preparing the 
population to respond to cyber incidents.424 Their aims include: 
• the development of cooperation among qualified volunteer IT specialists; 
• raising the level of cyber security for critical information infrastructure through the dissemination 
of knowledge and training; 
• creation of a network which facilitates public private partnership and enhances preparedness in 
operating during a crisis situation; 
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• education and training in information security.425 
In 2020, it participated in an international public-private cyberattack simulation.426 
The Cyber Unit is part of the greater Estonian Defence League (or ‘Kaitseliit’), which is a national defence 
organisation operating on a volunteer basis (16 000 members) in the area of government of the Ministry 
of Defence.427 It has a wide array of tasks; besides physical defence, it also has a role in educating the public 
about national defence and fighting disinformation.428 Related to the latter, the EDL runs the anti-
propaganda blog/website ‘Propastop’, which counters disinformation, highlights corporate practices 
related to social media, and advocates for media literacy.429 Propastop also cooperates with investigative 
journalists, collaborating with them on content creation, as well as with newspapers, where the results of 
the analyses produced by Propastop are published.430 
6.2.4 Taiwan 
National policies and measures to increase citizens' resilience  
Taiwan increases citizens’ resilience against disinformation mostly through an innovative system of 
debunking false news and education. One of the measures implemented by Taiwan to increase citizens’ 
resilience is a rapid response method designed in a way that ensures true information dominates the public 
space before falsehoods. The government strives to be always one step ahead of the fake news through 
constant monitoring of the information space, as well as setting a requirement of 2 hours’ time-limit to 
respond to fake news.431 This allows officials to give the public an information ’immunisation shot’ by pre-
empting fake news with accurate information, so that people are exposed to the truth before learning 
about a falsehood.432 This increases the chance of overcoming the so-called ‘familiarity bias trap’ (i.e. 
repeating a false claim strengthens the claim), because people hear the facts first. In other words, the rapid 
response weakens the power of fake news and strengthens the position of true information. In order for 
the clarification to propagate faster and farther than the fake news story, the response must meet the 
following criteria: fast, short, easily understandable, humorous, high-level, and easy to share. One of the 
most typical forms of response is a humorous meme. One of the reasons for this choice is that humour 
attracts young citizens, who can then share the meme with their less media-literate family members. 
This is particularly important due to the fact that, according to the trusted messenger theory, people tend 
to accept clarifications more from those they trust.433 
The second resilience-building tool is education. The government has been driving media literacy trucks 
to rural places to conduct workshops on how to identify fake news for citizens with less media experience 
(often older people).434 
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As a response to the COVID-19 ‘infodemic' in Taiwan, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) 
livestreamed press conferences every day from January to June 2020, and has continued to do so every 
week since July 2020, meaning that there is always one official source for public information. Citizens also 
receive LINE messages from the CECC. Key public health messages are available in seven languages, as 
currently there are 700 000 migrant workers in Taiwan.435 
Citizens’ initiatives 
Robust and healthy civil society in Taiwan plays an important role in fighting disinformation, as does good 
coordination between civil society and government. One of the most prominent examples is the group 
g0v (‘gov-zero’), a ‘decentralised civic tech community’ in Taiwan working to foster better information 
transparency and promote greater citizen participation in governance.436 Close links between Taiwan’s 
hacker community and the Taiwanese government have allowed g0v to rapidly respond to disinformation. 
For example, to prevent a run on medical-grade masks in the early days of the pandemic, technology-savvy 
individuals created algorithms that could locate and quantify the mask situation in the pharmacies, and 
update this inventory data in real time.437 Citizens could check live maps showing the actual availability of 
masks across the island. Taiwanese government utilised the potential of this bottom-rooted initiative, as 
Digital Minister Audrey Tang compiled all the digital maps onto one website for easy access, and also 
publicly informed citizens on the Face Mask Map tool.438 According to news reports, more than 10 million 
citizens439 have used the COVID-19 mask apps as of June 2020.440 
The Taiwan FactCheck Center (TFC) is another example of an engaged, actively working non-profit 
organisation dedicated to fighting disinformation. It was jointly founded in 2018 by the Association for 
Quality Journalism and Taiwan Media Watch.441 The objectives of the TFC are to conduct fact-checks on 
information relevant to public affairs, as well as to improve the information ecology and news quality in 
Taiwan. The TFC selects various items to fact-check and post online in the form of information 
accompanied by the overall review process, and references for each factual assertion.442 The TFC has been 
involved in numerous collaborations with social platforms, such as ‘LINE’ and Facebook, aimed at 
educating users on how to better identify fake news.443 One of these initiatives was LINE’s global anti-fake 
news campaign.444 
Another example of civic engagement is the ‘Doublethink Lab’. Founded in 2019 in Taipei, it operates at 
the intersection of the Internet, public discourse, civil society, and democratic governance, researching 
 
435 The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), ‘China’s Disinformation Campaign in Taiwan about COVID-19’. Available at: 
https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-disinformation-campaign-in-taiwan-about-covid-19/. 
436 g0v, available at: https://g0v.tw/.  
437 Kelsie Nabben, ‘Hacking the pandemic: How Taiwan’s digital democracy holds COVID-19 at bay’, The Conversation, 2020. 
Available at: https://theconversation.com/hacking-the-pandemic-how-taiwans-digital-democracy-holds-covid-19-at-bay-145023.  
438 See the National Health Insurance Administration’s website: National Health Insurance Administration, 口罩供需資訊平台
(Mouth cover supply and demand information platform). Available at: https://mask.pdis.nat.gov.tw/ 
?fbclid=IwAR0K7R4_14ztQ1bEY0UiQmwsfoA9e3iQhttowEkkMej647aOhIo_RfxvggA.   
439 Which makes almost half of the population in Taiwan, inhabited by 23.6 million people. 
440 Shiroma Silva, ‘Coronavirus: How map hacks and buttocks helped Taiwan fight COVID-19’, BBC, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52883838.  
441 Taiwan FactCheck Center, ‘About Us’. Available at: https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/about/purpose.  
442 Ibid. 
443 Chun Han Wong and Phillip Wen, ‘Taiwan Turns to Facebook and Viral Memes to Counter China’s Disinformation’, Wall Street 
Journal, January 3, 202. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-turns-to-facebook-and-viral-memes-to-counter-chinas-
disinformation-11578047403.  
444 LINE, Stop ‘Fake News’ Campaign. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RfHF_OkR9E.  
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modern threats to democracy and devising strategies to counter them.445 According to its web statement, 
it focuses mostly on mapping online information operation mechanisms, as well as surveillance technology 
exportation and digital authoritarianism. 
‘MyGoPen’, ‘Cofacts’, and ‘Rum Toast’ are further examples of grassroots initiatives. These are all civic in 
nature and, to avoid partisan censorship of political information, they use crowdfunding solutions which 
promise more equity and a diversity of voices. They have all been working with both social media platforms 
(i.e. Facebook and LINE) to identify, verify, and downrank dubious posts, and with the Taiwanese 
government to obtain accurate, up-to-date information, and quickly. Civic engagement is visible not only 
institutionally, but also on the streets, during events such as the Anti-‘Red Media March’ in June 2019, when 
20 000 people rallied against compromised Taiwanese media like the ‘China Times’ and ‘CTi TV’.446  It is also 
present in the digital sphere in forms such as the LINE group, ‘Have You Cared For Your Elders Today?’ – a 
‘debunking farm’ organised and created by a group of young people, where fake-news debunking memes 
are created so that young people can forward them to their more susceptible family members.447 
6.2.5 Australia 
National policies and measures to increase citizens' resilience  
In May 2017, the country established the Select Committee on the Future of Public Interest Journalism. The 
committee’s report recommended supporting public interest journalism, as well as review of current laws 
that impact journalism.448 Besides, it suggested strengthening of the national curriculum to raise 
awareness and improve digital media literacy.449 
In April 2019, before the federal elections, a significant media literacy campaign was started by AEC to 
boost citizens’ resilience. The ‘Stop and Consider’ initiative asked citizens to pay special attention and be 
critical with news sources.450 The campaign encouraged voters to ‘carefully check the source of electoral 
communication they see or hear’ throughout the 2019 federal election campaign.451 AEC does not check 
the truth of electoral communications, but it has provided a complaint form for people to report 
communications which have not been correctly authorised.452 A 2020 study suggests that the level of 
media literacy is still unsatisfactory among Australian people, and that media information literacy 
programs should be a compulsory part of the school curriculum.453 Strengthening media literacy is also 
highly recommended by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) in its 2020 position 
paper.454  
 
445 Doublethink Lab (台灣民主實驗室), ‘About us’. Available at: https://doublethinklab.org/.  
446 Aaron Huang, ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Luke Buckmaster, Tyson Wils, ‘Responding to fake news’, Parliament of Australia. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Funke, Flamini, 2018-2019. 
451 Buckmaster, Wils. 
452 Buchanan, 2019. 
453 Mathieu O’Neil, Michael J. Jensen, ‘Australian Perspectives on Misinformation’, Canberra, News & Media Research Centre, 
University of Canberra, 2020, p. 10. Available at: https://researchsystem.canberra.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/ 
42830744/apo_nid309148_0.pdf.  
454 Australian Communications and Media Authority, ‘Misinformation and news quality on digital platforms in Australia – A position 
paper to guide code development’, June 2020, pp. 33–37. Available at: https://www.acma.gov.au/sites/default/ 
files/2020-06/Misinformation%20and%20news%20quality%20position%20paper.pdf. 
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In December 2019, the Prime Minister of Australia announced the establishment of a ‘Counter Foreign 
Interference Taskforce’, which differentiates between foreign influence and interference. The former is a 
lawful action in which governments ‘try to influence discussions on issues of importance in an open and 
transparent manner’.455 The latter, however, is an action that is ‘carried out by, or on behalf of, a foreign 
actor, [is] coercive, corrupting, deceptive, clandestine, and contrary to Australia’s sovereignty, values and 
national interests’.456 The site invites citizens to report foreign interference via telephone and e-mail access 
points provided on the site. 
Citizens’ initiatives 
According to the Edelman’s 2021 Trust Barometer report457, which was published in February this year, 
there are no media sources that are perceived as trusted for news and information by Australians. 
According to the methodology of the report, ‘media sources are classified as ‘trusted’ if they score 60 points 
or higher, and the highest the media reached was 61 in 2018 and 2019, dropping to 56 and 53 in 2020 and 
2021 respectively (traditional media)’.458 68 % of respondents believe that news organisations are 
more concerned with supporting an ideology than with informing the public; moreover, 64 % held 
that journalists are ‘purposely trying to mislead people’ by publishing falsities. This signals that 
boosting media literacy, and raising awareness of critically assessing media sources, are high priority in 
Australia. 
There are several entities and organisations nowadays in Australia that are active in the field of boosting 
media literacy. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) launched an educational initiative through 
which it helps parents and teachers to better and more easily educate minors to make them more resilient 
in the world of social media and disinformation. ABC Education provides high-quality educational content 
to use at home and in the classroom, and all materials and information is free and in line with the national 
curriculum of Australia.459  
In April 2020, academics, cultural institutions, and peak bodies (including ABC Education) established the 
Australian Media Literacy Alliance (AMLA).460 The alliance pays special attention to content creation, 
information provision, education, and media and information usage.  
The Alannah & Madeline Foundation is a grassroots, civil, non-profit initiative, which started a Media 
Literacy Lab to empower young people ‘to think critically, create responsibly, [and] be effective voices and 
active citizens online’.461 
6.2.6 Other EU Member States’ national policies to increase citizens’ resilience 
Sweden 
In 2009, the state established the ‘Civil Contingency Agency’, responsible for issues concerning civil 
defence, public safety and emergency management. This body was entrusted with the task of raising 
awareness among Swedish citizens, improving their media literacy, and educating them on disinformation 
 
455 Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, ‘Countering foreign interference’. Last updated 27 February 2020. Last 
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in 2018. The most recent government action is the set-up of a new body, the ‘Psychological Defence 
Authority’. The authority’s main aim is to ‘discover, counter, and prevent influence campaigns, and 
disinformation, both nationally and internationally’. Currently, the foundation for this new body, the 
launch of which was originally set for 2019, is being laid, after it was initially postponed to mid-2020. 
The Swedish government wants the Psychological Defence Authority to be fully working by 2022, which is 
also the next national election year.462 
Slovakia 
The main governmental driving force in the fight against disinformation is the Slovakian Foreign Ministry. 
which has organised educational programs at universities and workshops for civil servants. The ministry 
developed a strategic communication and set up a new department to counter hybrid threats, and the 
main aim is to make this more systematic. This process is also about protecting democracy and 





462 Hofverberg, 2019 pp. 146-147. 
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7 The role of social media platforms in disseminating and 
tackling disinformation 
This chapter will contain a description and assessment of the role that social media has played since 2019, 
including their self-regulation actions and other decisions, as well as some tendencies that can be observed 
in the development of this role.  
Social media platforms have been the focus point of both action and of attention in recent years. Their 
responsibility has often been debated by policymakers, stakeholders, and academics. This discussion has 
not yet reached a settlement. The draft EU legislative actions (DSA, DMA), which are the focus of Chapter 5, 
give more direction and impetus to debates in coming years.  
This chapter will focus on the pro-active measures of social media platforms, in particular their self-
regulative initiatives and their prominent actions for moderation of discourse (e.g. in relation to Donald 
Trump).  
It will evaluate the effectiveness of the self-regulative initiatives, for example, discussing the reports on the 
implementation of the Code of Practice against Disinformation.464 
The analysis will identify the main tendencies and interests in this process.  
7.1 Social media platforms‘ self-regulation, actions and decisions since 
2019 
After the Code of Practice on Disinformation came into effect, the first and second annual reports were 
submitted by large platform providers in 2019 and 2020. Between the two, extraordinary reports have been 
requested in the framework of the ‘Fighting COVID-19 monitoring programme’, based on the Joint 
Communication against COVID-19.465 
The expectations under the Code of Practice have been:  
• providing policies and processes to disrupt advertising and monetisation incentives that 
contribute to the spread of disinformation; 
• ensuring transparency of political advertising and issue-based advertising; 
• protecting the integrity of platform services against manipulative and abusive conduct; 
• empowering consumers; 
• empowering the research community. 
Whereas, under the Joint Communication, platforms had to report on how they addressed their tasks:  
• to promote authoritative content; 
• to improve user awareness; 
• to report on social media manipulation and malign influence operations; 
 
464 Summary report on the implementation of the Code of Practice (January 2019), the Analysis Code of Practice annual reports 
(October 2019). 
465 JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, ‘Tackling COVID-19 disinformation – Getting the 
facts right’. 
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• to limit advertising linked to COVID-19 disinformation.  
The reported solutions and initiatives reflect a considerable innovation capacity, diversity, and real effort 
of the responding online platforms. Their actions offer a colourful pool of good practices. One of the clear 
benefits of the self-regulation approach lies in the flexibility it provides to platforms in designing these 
diverse solutions. In this subchapter, we provide a short summary and conclusions of the most meaningful 
policies of platforms, and offer a non-exhaustive standardised overview of the tools in Table 3, below. It 
should be noted that this collection relies on self-reporting by social media companies, and that no 
independent audit has been prepared about the self-regulatory practice.  
Self-regulatory efforts were criticised by the Commission and ERGA for the lack of Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI), transparency, clearer procedures, commonly shared definition, and structured cooperation 
with the researcher community.466 ERGA emphasised that the commitments have not been implemented 
consistently across all Member States, and stressed the insufficiency of the oversight mechanism.467 
Indeed, there would be great advantage in foreseeability, unified interpretation of platforms' roles, 
consistent application within all Member States, and an efficient oversight (or enforcement) mechanism. 
The current approach is one of 'trial and error', trying to balance between disproportionate interference in 
the public discourse, and cynically passive observation of automated market processes.  
Three main threads of self-regulative methods were identified:  
• Content moderation: This requires evaluation of content, which is always debatable. To alleviate 
the risks and accusations of bias and subjectivity, most platforms have outsourced fact-checking. 
Fact-checked content can get labelled, context and warning can be added, or it can be removed. 
Based on the credibility, authenticity, and other qualities of content, ranking is applied to influence 
the reach and reception of the content. Harmful content is demonetised – advertisements cannot 
be attached to them. Finally, more authentic content can be added. Within this category, many 
platforms have chosen to offer ‘curated content’; walled ‘gardens’ of content that is thought to be 
credible and useful. This is considered as the most precarious among the tools, as it overrides the 
neutral intermediary roles of platforms, and makes them curators, or even publishers, of content. 
Therefore, similarly to fact-checking, curated content should either be outsourced, or advanced 
into a new, media-like service, which is subject to extra supervision. These could also be regarded 
as seeds planted for an envisaged public service function of platforms (with the appropriate 
safeguards and supervision).  
• Improving the balance in the informational ecosystem: Through donations, grants, and 
technical support. We have also listed the awareness-raising programs, for example on cyber-
threats, deep fakes, or manipulated photos.468 
• As a combination of the previous two methods: Bringing structural interference into the 
informational landscape by prioritising certain speakers (as opposed to content), and verification 
of high-reach users. There is a fine line between this and curated content.  
  
 
466 European Commission Staff Working Document, ’Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation - Achievements and 
areas for further improvement’, SWD(2020) 180 final. 
467 European Commission Staff Working Document, ’Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation - Achievements and 
areas for further improvement’, SWD(2020) 180 final, p. 22. 
468 Roth, Y., Achuthan, A., ’Building rules in public: Our approach to synthetic & manipulated media’, 2020. 
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7.1.1 Political campaign rules 
The first large wave of self-regulative efforts was earmarked by the election campaign in the run-up to the 
European Parliamentary elections in 2019. Twitter completely banned all political advertising from its 
platform globally, while Facebook introduced a strict verification system for political advertisers. The 
Facebook guidelines do not only refer to political and election advertising, but also to socially relevant 
issue-based advertising, such as crime, healthcare, security and foreign policy.469 Besides, political ads may 
only be placed in the country in which the advertiser resides, in order to limit the influence of the country 
of origin on the domestic opinion-forming process. Ads in the advertising database are available for 
retrieval for seven years. 
The Google search engine allows political and election advertising only if the advertiser's identity has been 
verified before. It must also be possible for recipients of ads on Google to see who financed them. The 
locally applicable regulations must be observed in each case. Advertising may only be directed at clearly 
defined criteria, such as geographical location or age and gender, but may not be addressed to specific 
targets, like websites or apps, for example.470 
Previously, in 2019, Facebook used automated detection systems and user notifications to block the 
creation of fake profiles, and removed fake, bot-operated, or maliciously-behaving profiles. Facebook 
introduced a semi-verification system for all accounts by demanding mobile phone verification, and a 
photo-ID verification for accounts that reach large audiences.471 In 2020, Twitter also started to verify 
accounts that had an email address associated with an authoritative organisation or institution, with the 
goal of verifying expertise on COVID-19, or identifying expert accounts.  
Microsoft, with its Bing and LinkedIn services, was reported to have been relatively less affected by 
disinformation, however, it provided crucial cybersecurity services to election and campaign officials to 
protect their IT systems, and to respond to potential attacks (DART).472 This operated only in the United 
States, but Microsoft is ‘examining ways’ to bring the solutions to other democracies. They created a special 
security e-mail service for political campaigns (Microsoft 365 for Campaigns) at an affordable cost. 
Microsoft has also established partnership with a research project, exploring concrete questions relating 
to malicious foreign influence operations and developing new tools to tackle them.  
Fact-checking has been one of the policies that has been applied by many major platforms, such as 
Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft. Microsoft cooperates with the fact-checker service ‘NewsGuard’, 
which has a plug-in for Microsoft Edge to give information in major languages (FR, IT, DE, UK, US) and warn 
users against unreliable content. It sponsored the inclusion of NewsGuard in a number of public libraries 
within the EU. ‘Bing’, a search engine, also has a ‘Fact Chec’k feature.473  
Facebook have cooperated with external fact-checking services since 2016474, whereas Twitter started 
cooperation in January 2021.475 Most fact-checkers, however, operate only in the larger languages. At the 
 
469 Facebook, ‚Infos zu Wahlwerbung bzw. Werbung zu politisch oder gesellschaftlich relevanten Themen‘, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506?id=288762101909005, last accessed on 23 February 2021. 
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beginning of 2021, more than 80 organisations were cooperating with Facebook globally. In Europe, its 
most important partner is AFP, the Paris-based international news agency. AFP is a signatory of the 
International Fact-checking Network (IFCN)476 principles, a commitment to non-partisanship and fairness. 
Content rated ‘false’ by fact-checkers will be deprioritised by Facebook so that fewer people encounter 
it.477 Repeated disseminators of disinformation have their distribution, monetisation, and advertising 
capacity restricted, and their ability to register as a news page removed for a given time period.478 AFP has 
extended its activity to the CEE region, including Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary.479 
Politicians' posts are not subject to rating in the fact-checking program by Facebook. However, when they 
are reproduced by other parties based on the original post, they may be subject to fact-checking, and if 
found false, may be removed, de-prioritised, or labelled, and users informed with additional context.480 
Showing the ambiguity around self-regulation, Twitter was criticised for labelling Donald Trump's tweets, 
and later suspending and removing his account. Twitter made clear in 2019 that those tweets which 
violated its policy, but which came ‘from an elected or government official’, enjoyed the privilege of public 
interest and were not be removed from its site, but a label would be added to put the tweet in context. 
The label also prevented reactions to the tweet and prevented amplifications.481 Then, on 6 January 2021, 
Twitter suspended Donald Trump's Twitter account for 12 hours, and after a few new tweets the next day, 
permanently suspended his account on 8 January 2021. Twitter reasoned its decision with its policy to 
prevent 'glorification of violence', and the threat that Trump's attitude meant to American democratic 
process, namely that he ‘[did] not plan to facilitate an 'orderly transition', and that his words could be 
interpreted as a support and encouragement to those potentially considering violent acts at the 
Inauguration of the next US President, or at the US Capitol, and inspire others to replicate the violent acts 
that took place on 6 January 2021.482 Facebook's policy towards the posts of Donald Trump was reported 
to be less consistent than Twitter’s483, but after the Capitol Hill events, it reacted perhaps even sooner than 
Twitter and applied first a 24-hour, then, indefinite, blocking.484  
According to the US free speech doctrine, private companies are not obliged to respect free speech and 
are allowed to act as they like against the speech of others (with some exceptions, notably for malls in 
certain court decisions485). Interestingly, European commentators and heads of states challenged Twitter's 
decision by showing concern for freedom of political expression.486 Their reaction signals the danger of 
vagueness in self-regulation without the frameworks of responsibility of social media platforms being laid 
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down. No law has yet obliged social media platforms to carry content or to give floor to any opinion or 
actor; but there are laws (among others, the E-Commerce Directive487) which provide immunity only with 
the condition of not knowing of illegal content. Not knowing of the content of somebody like Donald 
Trump would not be a credible defence for the platform provider, thus removal would be expected based 
on the current legal framework. Even if the tweet was not illegal, per se488, overblocking of notified content 
has never been disapproved by authorities, and the DSA is the first EU-level regulation to address the 
remedies of users in such a case.489 What is more, a number of soft law instruments urge social media 
platforms to remove or disable access to disinformation and manipulative propaganda, and Trump's 
tweets regarding the election results were exhausting these concepts.  
Facebook submitted the issue to the Facebook Oversight Board490, which was set up in 2020 as an 
independent body of experts and civic leaders from around the world with a diversity of backgrounds. 
The purpose of the board is to promote free expression by making principled, independent decisions 
regarding content on Facebook and Instagram, and by issuing recommendations on the relevant Facebook 
Company Content Policy.491 
7.1.2 COVID-19 ‘infodemics’ 
The unprecedented global pandemic has caused a surge in interest in news and media consumption. 
This brought about a boost in the spreading of misinformation, disinformation, and rumours. This sudden 
wave was compared to the spreading of the virus, and therefore deemed an ‘infodemic’.492 During the past 
year, high-level representatives, such as Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World 
Health Organization493, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission494, and Dunja 
Mijatović, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights495, emphasised the danger of COVID-19-
related disinformation. European institutions addressed the infodemic with the Joint Communication on 
‘Tackling the COVID-19 infodemic – getting the facts right’.496 Platforms have reported that they adjusted 
their policies to address the infodemic. Their techniques are detailed below, together with anti-
disinformation techniques in other themes. However, creating specific curated sites to promote trusted 
content provided by authorities, for example, has been specific of the COVID-19 infodemic. 
The communication called on platforms to increase their efforts, and required them to report on their 
measures every month (see the requirements above). It also resolved to broaden the scope of signatories 
to the Code of Practice.  
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7.1.3 Platforms' moderation techniques 
Ranking 
Disinformation reported to have been deprioritised or labelled as such, if rated as false or harmful (Google, 
Facebook), now has links added to put it into context (Twitter, Facebook, TikTok). Among the more 
content-invasive measures are those policies which block and remove non-verifiable medical information 
(for example, denying COVID-19 or encouraging home remedies instead of medical treatment) (e.g. 
Google, Facebook, TikTok).  
Demonetising 
Advertising policies have also been adapted, and monetisation of harmful content has been prohibited by 
Google and TikTok.  
More content as a weapon  
All platforms have prioritised authoritative information, often in cooperation with health authorities, news 
organisations, or governmental authorities, to help decide what information is authentic.   
Google's 'medical topics policy'497 shows the difficulties of scientific accuracy. Whilst Google strive to 
feature information that reflects scientific consensus and evidence-based best practices, and correct or 
remove information which runs contrary to 'general scientific consensus', it is not clarified how they define 
what information reflects ‘scientific consensus’ in new topics; the effects of the various COVID-19 vaccines, 
for example. Nevertheless, there are several other topics where the scientific consensus is obvious, and yet 
'alternative' theories emerge (typically irrational conspiracy theories, such as 5G's supposed relatedness to 
the virus).   
Several platforms opted to offer curated content; an aggregation of authoritative, informative content on 
pandemic-related issues, including wellbeing tips, crisis helplines, or supporting investigative journalism 
and media literacy programs (Twitter, Facebook, ‘Mozilla’, TikTok). Facebook also launched Facebook News 
in January 2021 across the UK, an initiative to give more prominence to original journalism.498 Promoting 
direct access to authentic news is thought to fight disinformation and, at the same time, help publishers 
with advertising opportunities.499 Under the same logic, Mozilla500 introduced ‘Pocket’, a dynamic page 
featuring curated news, analysis, and long reads about the pandemic, and ‘Snippet’501 (both in its Firefox 
browser), to promote content from the World Health Organization. TikTok hosted an informational page 
within the app that conveyed information from the WHO on common questions and tips on staying safe, 
as well as debunked myths relating to COVID-19. Twitter created curated events pages to collect the latest 
tweets of authoritative and trustworthy sources in local languages, and also organised Q&A sessions with 
WHO experts or fact-checker organisations (in Spain). These were, in fact, not literally sessions, but rather 
Q&A threads, based on questions that were asked the most frequently among more than 300 million public 
tweets and 6 million pandemic-related questions. While aggregating content is what platforms normally 
do, creation of these 'magazines' autonomously by platforms themselves appears to be more than what 
should be expected of them. The exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis may explain the 
application of these media-like services, however. This is reflected in the DSA's requirement of a ‘crisis 
 
497 Google Knowledge Panel Help. 
498 Facebook News, ‘Introducing Facebook News’. 
499 Doub, J., ‘A New Destination for News in the UK,’, Facebook, 2021. 
500 Mozilla, Responding to COVID-19 Mozilla submission to the European Commission, August 2020. 
501 Snippets are part of the Firefox web browser. 
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protocol’, which gives access to the platform for public information providers. Such a ‘walled garden’ of 
public information should have appropriate safeguards (see above).  
Twitter also launched a 'search prompt' in cooperation with the UK government, which gave feedback to 
searches for 5G and COVID-19 that ‘the UK government has said that there is no evidence of a link between 
5G and COVID-19’. Again, this practice is another step beyond the role of a neutral, but expedient, 
intermediary. In particular, conveying the message of a government should be weighted carefully against 
its benefits and risks. On the one hand, the practice can be helpful for those users who trust the 
government and are looking for simple and ready answers that reflect the dominant social consensus. On 
the other hand, it may be counter-effective against those social groups whose trust in the government is 
already fragile. With slight modification, by conveying facts in which there is scientific consensus (on 5G 
and COVID-19), referencing an authoritative scientific body which is politically neutral, this practice might 
be retained.502 See the recommendation on the scientific information chain below. 
Using the tool of 'nudges', Twitter, in partnership with the WHO, launched emojis and slogans: 
#WashYourHands, #StayAtHome, #TogetherWeCan. These playful nudges do not interfere with the 
autonomy of users, but may mainstream a healthy practice, and aretherefore well-recommended. 
Financial tools 
Several large platforms chose to donate not only to fact-checkers and responsible journalism (Google, 
Microsoft, Mozilla, Facebook) but also to research projects (Microsoft). In 2019, Google spent 
USD 6.5 million on fact-checkers and non-profit journalism training and funding, workshops, as well as ad-
grants to the WHO (USD 250 million), EU governments, public authorities (USD 50 million), and EU non-
profits (USD 76 million). 
Ad grants have been provided by several platforms to grant free or low-cost advertising space to public 
interest organisations, including governments and authorities. 
Best practices for platforms to tackle ‘infodemic’ 
Table 3 - Best practices for platforms to tackle ‘infodemic’ 
 










Prioritising 'authoritative' information 
Google, Microsoft, 
Facebook, Mozilla 
Highlighting information that reflects scientific consensus Google 
Offering fact-checking/cooperating with fact-checking organisations 
Google, Microsoft, 
Twitter, Facebook 




Deprioritising harmful misinformation/rated as ‘false’ Google, Facebook 
Prior prohibition/preventing of misinformation or disinformation Google 
Removal of non-verifiable medical information TikTok, Facebook 
 
502 Even though for persons who have previously developed distrust against dominant social "elite" and who believe conspiracy 
theories, this practice may be unhelpful, but it can put to a halt the growth of this group and help hesitant or young persons to 
get easy access to evidence-based facts.    
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Demonetising of harmful content 
Google (YouTube), 
TikTok 
Highlighting of synthetic and manipulated media Twitter 
Emoji and slogan campaigns Twitter 












 Search prompt (e.g. push message by UK govt) 
 
Twitter 
Curated pages of authoritative content (e.g. Information Center, 

































 Donating to fact-checkers, journalism 
Google, Microsoft, 
Mozilla, Facebook 
Donating to research projects Microsoft 
Ad grant Twitter 






 Verification of influencers/high reach users Twitter, Facebook 
Prioritising trusted users - 
Source: Authors 
7.2 Social media platforms' self-regulatory initiatives and practices in 
selected Member States and third states 
7.2.1 Germany 
Fact-checking in Germany 
In Germany, the use of fact-checks is regularly called for to curb disinformation.503 Point 21 of Facebook's 
Community Standards states the following: ‘We take our responsibility to reduce the spread of false news 
on Facebook very seriously.’504 The company strives to ‘build a better-informed community and reduce the 
spread of false news using a variety of methods’.505 To do this, Facebook uses a partially-automated process 
to identify potential false news stories, which are then submitted to an external service provider for fact-
 
503 European Commission, On the European Democracy Action Plan, COM(2020) 790 final, 19, 22, 23. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0790&from=EN 
504 Facebook, ‘Falschmeldungen’, https://de-de.facebook.com/communitystandards/false_news. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
505 Ibid.  
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checking.506 These can then classify the truth content of the reporting at six levels, from ‘false’, through 
‘lacking context’, to ‘true’.507 Classification results in a significant range restriction by the algorithm. ‘False 
reports’ are only deleted if other community standards are violated at the same time, and these provide 
for deletion as a legal consequence (e.g. hate speech).  
Fact check measures have recently become the subject of competition law disputes.508 The information 
service ‘Tichys Einblick’ published an article on 26 September 2019, with the headline ‘500 scientists 
declare: 'There is no climate emergency.'’ Tichys Einblick promoted this article by publishing a teaser and 
a link to the post on Facebook. The fact-checker service provider Correctiv, which works for Facebook, 
linked this Facebook post inseparably with the note ‘Fact-Check’ and ‘Assertion partly false’. The reason 
given was that not all of the signatories were ‘scientists’. The OLG Karlsruhe court saw this as a wrong 
statement by Correctiv, because Tichy only reported on the declaration of the scientists. The court saw this 
as an inadmissible disparagement of a co-advertiser and thus, as a result, a violation of competition law. 
Even though Correctiv is a non-profit organisation, the judges did not consider this as a factor in its favour 
(see more on Correctiv under 8.6.2.). 
Credible health information in times of COVID-19 
Platforms in Germany have taken various measures in the wake of the pandemic, ranging from warning 
against disinformation to pointing people to reliable sources.509 The Google search engine plays a 
prominent role in finding health information. Its market share in Germany is around 98 %. Every 20 search 
query on Google is health-related. More than half of German Internet users search for information on 
diseases and treatments at least once a year.510 The situation is similar when searching for information on 
the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to provide reliable health information, the Robert Koch Institute and the 
Paul Ehrlich Institute, for example, make information available on their portals. To complement this, on 
1 September 2020, the German Federal Ministry of Health launched a national health portal under the 
name ‘gesund.bund.de.’. The portal provides information on the most common clinical pictures. In 
addition, articles on the topics of care and prevention are be posted on the website. This measure is 
considered necessary because much of the health information available on the Internet is ‘unreliable, 
incomplete, influenced by certain interests, or even false and misleading’.511 The Google search engine has 
committed itself to disseminating reliable health information. For this reason, the ministry's health 
information is placed in highlighted information boxes (so-called ‘knowledge panels’) in a prominent 
position at the top right of a keyword search. This is intended to attract increased attention among 
 
506 Facebook, ‘Facebook’s Approach to Misinformation: Partnering with Third-Party Fact-Checkers’. Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/selecting-partners. Last accessed 16 March 
2021. 
507 Facebook, ‘Bewertungsoptionen für Faktenprüfer’, https://de-de.facebook.com/business/help/341102040382165? 
recommended_by=2593586717571940. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
508 OLG Karlsruhe Urteil vom 27.5.2020, 6 U 36/20, ZUM-RD 2020, 446. 
509 For an overview see Jaursch, ‘Desinformation zu Covid-19 – Wie die Plattformen durchgreifen und welche Fragen das aufwirft’, 
March 2020, available at https://netzpolitik.org/2020/wie-die-plattformen-durchgreifen-und-welche-fragen-das-aufwirft/. Last 
accessed 16 March 2021. 
510 Uwe Hambrock, ‚Die Suche nach Gesundheitsinformationen - Patientenperspektiven und Marktüberblick‘,  
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, p. 5. Available at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/die-suche-
nach-gesundheitsinformationen. Last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
511 gesund.bund.de, ‚Über uns, #Immer mehr Menschen informieren sich im Internet über Gesundheitsthemen. Doch viele der 
verfügbaren Gesundheitsinformationen sind unzuverlässig, lückenhaft, von bestimmten Interessen beeinflusstoder sogar falsch 
und irreführend 2021‘. Available at: https://gesund.bund.de/ueber-uns/ueber-gesund-bund-de#ueber-gesundbundde. Last 
accessed 16 March 2021. 
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searchers. Further clicks then lead to the health information. These information boxes are available for 
around 160 diseases.  
For more than 20 years, a Munich-based publishing house has been operating netdoktor.de, an 
advertising-financed online portal on the subject of health. Here, scientific standards are followed, but the 
medical information is presented to laypersons in a way that is equally comprehensible.  
In January 2021, the regional court of Munich forbade Google from presenting health information from the 
ministry in the form of information boxes, with the reasoning that private-sector offerings were equal in 
quality. The ministry's health portal could draw attention away from this offering (for example, form the 
commercial netdoktor.de website), which results in a distortion of competition. Thus, the German court 
gave preference to the interest of market competition.  
7.2.2 Finland 
Before the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, Facebook reportedly said it would closely monitor the 
elections and do everything it could to prevent foreign electoral interference.512 The company’s 
communications manager Lukasz Lindell promised that Facebook would focus ‘on eliminating fake 
accounts, reducing fake news, increasing the transparency of advertising, and cooperating with the Finnish 
authorities’. Facebook and the government have also appointed liaison officers to enable direct 
communication. The media reported the government was also in talks with Twitter for similar cooperation, 
but no further information was publicly accessible. This model of cooperation with the government had 
been used before in Sweden and Latvia. Nonetheless, Finnish policymakers have expressed dissatisfaction 
with this collaborative approach, saying ‘attempts at reaching out and taking initiative from the 
government side had been met with indifference’ from at least one of the tech companies.513 These 
policymakers feel a sense of power imbalance between global tech giants and a small country, and would 
prefer EU-wide regulation.514 
7.2.3 Estonia 
On 3 March 2019, national Parliamentary elections took place in Estonia. The risk of misinformation during 
the election campaign was recognised early on and steps were taken to prevent this, through different 
cooperation mechanisms with social media and tech platforms. On the one hand, the country already had 
an election communication task force to rely on, which was established prior to the 2017 local elections, 
and which had the role of building a systematic and working-level relationship between the biggest tech 
platforms in the country, such as Facebook, Google, Twitter and Microsoft.515 On the other hand, the 
Estonian Supervisory Committee on Party Financing (ERJK) and the parliamentary political parties were all 
in touch directly with private social media companies, such as Facebook.516  
 
512 Strawberry, ’Suomi Haluaa Välttää Trump-Vaalien Kohtalon – Valtio Ja Facebook Sopivat Niistä Keinoista, Joilla Vaaleihin 
Varaudutaan’, Helsingin Sanomat, January 14, 2019, sec. Nyt.fi. Available at: https://www.hs.fi/nyt/art-2000005964858.html (in 
Finnish). Last accessed 23 February 2021. 
513 Niels Nagelhus Schia, Lars Gjesvik, ‘Hacking democracy: Managing influence campaigns and disinformation in the digital age’, 
Journal of Cyber Policy, July 2020. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23738871.2020.1820060? 
needAccess=true. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
514 Ibid.  
515 Tyler McBrien, ‘Defending the vote: Estonia creates a network to combat disinformation, 2016–2020’, Princeton University, p. 7. 
Available at: https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/TM_Estonia_Election_FINAL%20edited_ 
JG.pdf. Last accessed 12 March 2021. 
516 OSCE, ‘Estonia – Parliamentary elections 3 March 2019 – ODIHR needs assessment mission report’, November 2018. Available 
at: https://www.osce.org/files/EST%202019%20Parliamentary%20-%20NAM%20Report_16.01.2019_0.pdf. ERR, ‘Facebook 
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The election communication task force was composed of representatives of the Government Office, the 
Information System Authority, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior.517 It was set 
up at the initiative of the State Electoral Office, which consolidated its cooperation with the Information 
System Authority and the Government office through goodwill cooperation agreements. According to the 
Terms of Cooperation, the Government Office is the body whose role it is to build a working-level 
relationship with tech companies, but also to monitor Russian and Estonian media and social media and 
compile weekly reports on disinformation narratives.518 According to the initial agreement, the 
Government Office also has the task of compiling a hands-on guide for political parties and the general 
public on how to recognise and deal with information attacks, as well as brief journalists and editors on the 
risk of foreign informational interference.519  
A decision was taken to approach cooperation with social media and tech platforms at the operative, as 
opposed to a diplomatic, level. This meant that the companies’ regional representatives were contacted, 
with the goal of setting up ‘hotlines’ – direct communication lines with the platforms.520 Special emphasis 
was put on cooperation with Facebook, because the platform had the highest numbers of users that were 
Estonian voters. The relationship with the platform was tested in December 2018, when an investigation 
led by ‘Propastop’521 (an Estonian news debunking blog/website) and investigative journalist Holger 
Roonemaa showed that Facebook was hosting more than 100 suspicious accounts, as well as a group 
called ‘Estoners’, which was hosted by fake profiles. The report published in the media was analysed by the 
task force and subsequently sent to Facebook, which took down all of the accounts and closed the 
group.522 In January 2019, Facebook closed another 250 accounts and pages linked to a Russian state-
owned media company.523 
In December 2018, Facebook representatives also met with both the Estonian Supervisory Committee on 
Party Financing (ERJK) and representatives of all parliamentary political parties in the country, in order to 
discuss the ‘company's role and opportunities in reducing the dissemination of fake news’.524 According to 
Andre Hanimägi, spokesperson of the Centre Party, in January 2019, the ‘purpose of the meeting was 
actually very simple […] Facebook has said that they want to actively fight against fake accounts, and fight 
against the spread of fake information that may actually influence votes in various countries’.525  
Facebook proposed cooperation on political advertisement to the ERJK. Following this, the Supervisory 
Committee stated that it would be interested in accessing information regarding who had paid for 
advertisements on the platform.526 
When it comes to Facebook’s cooperation with the parties, the official pages of all parliamentary pages in 
Estonia received the now well-known blue verification badge as part of the platform’s efforts to actively 
 
interested in Estonian elections’. Available at: https://news.err.ee/902788/facebook-interested-in-estonian-elections. Last 
accessed 16 March 2021. 
517 Tyler McBrien, op. cit., p. 6. 
518 Ibid, p. 7.  
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid, pp. 11–12.  
521 Propastop. Available at: https://www.propastop.org/. Last accessed 12 March 2021. 
522 Tyler McBrien, op. cit., p. 12.  
523 Ibid.  
524 ERR news, ‘“Facebook interested in Estonian elections’.”, Aavailable at: https://news.err.ee/902788/facebook-interested-in-
estonian-elections. L, last accessed on 12 March 2021. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. 
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fight the spread of fake news that might influence votes in the country. Additionally, parliamentary 
representatives were encouraged to notify Facebook representatives if they noticed dysfunction.527  
7.2.4 Taiwan 
Social media platforms play an important role in Taiwan’s fight against disinformation. The two most 
popular social platforms in Taiwan, Facebook and LINE528, have both developed measures aimed at 
supporting Taiwan in combating disinformation. 
Facebook 
Although Facebook does not have regulations stating that all information published on its platform has to 
be true, it does implement numerous measures to remove content and accounts that violate community 
standards or the law, as well as measures to downgrade falsehoods. Firstly, the platform monitors the 
content published by applying machine learning to detect fraud and fake accounts. In the period October–
December 2019, as part of efforts to protect Taiwan’s election integrity, Facebook removed hundreds of 
accounts and content farms for breaking community standards by engaging in abusive audience-
building.529 On 13 December 2019 alone, Facebook removed 118 fan pages, 99 groups, and 51 duplicate 
accounts for ‘artificially inflating their posts’ reach’.530 Secondly, Facebook closely cooperates with fact-
checking bodies, such as the Taiwan Fact Check Center (TFCC), a non-profit organisation aimed at fighting 
disinformation. Facebook has partnered with the TFCC both in conducting disinformation education 
campaigns among its Taiwan users531, as well as in relation to fact-checking activities. Operating 
independently, the TFCC rates Facebook posts. When the TFCC’s fact-checkers rate a story as ‘false’, its 
distribution and visibility is reduced by Facebook, so that users will no longer see it on the News Feed, 
unless they actively searching for this particular post.532 In such cases, they will be able to find it, but the 
post will then have the correct information (provided by the TFCC) attached to it.533  
While cooperation with the TFCC is regular and constant, before Taiwan’s 2020 elections, Facebook 
increased its engagement in counter-disinformation efforts and cooperated with various actors. It also 
partnered with Taiwan’s Central Election Commission on activities aimed at hiding posts that broke 
Taiwanese electoral laws and removing voter suppression conten (i.e. false election information that could 
suppress votes). Its most significant contribution, however, was the establishment of an Election Operation 
 
527 Ibid. 
528 Next to YouTube, which is number 1, according to Hootsuite, ‘Digital 2020: Taiwan — DataReportal – Global Digital Insights’, 
2020. Available at: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-taiwan. Last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
529 Aaron Huang, ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’, 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Available at: 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Combatting%20Chinese%20Propaganda%20and%20Disinfor
mation%20-%20Huang.pdf. Last accessed 16 March 2021.  
530 Alice Su, ‘Can fact-checkers save Taiwan from a flood of Chinese fake news?’, LA Times, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-12-16/taiwan-the-new-frontier-of-disinformation-battles-chinese-fake-news-
as-elections-approach,. Last accessed 16 March 2021; Mirror Media, 吳妍, ‘韓粉15萬人臉書社團遭下架 網：國家機器動得很厲
害’, 2019. Available at: https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20191213edi015/. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
531 Blanchette, Livingston, Glaser, and Kennedy, ‘Protecting Democracy in an Age of Disinformation: Lessons from Taiwan’, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2021. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/protecting-democracy-age-
disinformation-lessons-taiwan. Last accessed n 16 March 2021. 
532 Facebook, Facebook Community Standards, ‘False News’. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
false_news. Last accessed 16 March 2021, European Commission, ‘Facebook Baseline Report on Implementation of the Code of 
Practice on Disinformation’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2019-
5/facebook_baseline_report_on_implementation_of_the_code_of_practice_on_disinformation_CF161D11-9A54-3E27-
65D58168CAC40050_56991.pdf. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
533 Aaron Huang, ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’. 
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Center, or so-called ‘war room’.534 Its objective was to ensure the elections’ integrity by rooting out 
disinformation, monitoring false news, and deleting fake accounts as quickly as possible.535 The war room 
operated 24/7, thanks to support from Facebook’s Dublin and Silicon Valley teams. It brought together 
various experts from different fields, including Facebook’s policy, legal, and security representatives, 
content moderators, and local experts on politics, elections and law, which significantly accelerated the 
decision-making process on the accounts to delete and the fake news to remove.536 In the opinion of Dr. 
Puma Shen (沈伯洋), assistant professor at the National Taipei University’s Graduate School of Criminology 
and Director of the DoubleThink Lab, Taiwan’s top disinformation expert, the war room was one of the key 
reasons why Chinese propaganda did not significantly impact Taiwan’s 2020 elections. According to Shen, 
the war room was able to block a significant amount of foreign-produced fake news, making the 
information environment much better than during 2018 elections.537 
LINE 
LINE, the most popular messaging app in Taiwan538, has introduced several measures to fight 
disinformation, even though the application’s end-to-end encryption makes it very difficult to track the 
spread of fake news. The app hosts a fact-checking bot called ‘Cofact’, developed by g0v, a decentralised 
Taiwanese civic tech community. Cofact serves as a place for users to report and check on spam and 
misinformation.539 LINE also collaborates with the ‘Taiwan FactCheck Center’ to verify information. 
Moreover, in March 2019, the platform published ‘LINE Digital Responsibility Plan’, and also initiated major 
cooperation with four Taiwanese NGOs to create the ‘LINE information checker’ portal in July 2019. Here, 
users can receive feedback regarding suspicious news they encounter (they can forward it to the ‘checker’ 
and receive a fact-checking report created by one of the partner-NGOs). As of 7 January 2020, four days 
before the elections, it had fact-checked over 30 000 suspicious news/stories sent by 140 000 users, and its 
debunking page had been viewed over four million times.540  
7.2.5 Australia 
The battle around newspaper compensation  
On 17 February 2021 Facebook restricted the availability of news on Facebook in Australia.541 International 
publishers could continue to publish news content on Facebook, but links and posts could not be viewed 
or shared by Australian audiences, and the international community could not view or share Australian 
news content on Facebook, nor content from Australian news Pages. 
 
534 Wu, Jeffrey, and Joseph Yeh, ‘Facebook to establish ‘war room’ in Taipei ahead of elections’, Focus Taiwan, 2019,. Available at: 
https://focustaiwan.tw/sci-tech/201912300015. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
535 Huang, Tzu-Ti, ‘Facebook to set up ‘war room’ in Taiwan ahead of elections’, Taiwan News, 2019. Available at:  
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3847551. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
536 Aaron Huang, ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’. 
537 Information from the interview with Dr. Puma Shen conducted by Aaron Huang during preparation of the case study 
‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’.  
538 The LINE app has 21 million monthly active users in Taiwan, a country with the population of 24 million people. Source: LINE 
Corporation, Global news, ‘LINE Converge 2019 Autumn Introduces ‘Life on LINE’ to Taiwan, Together With 11 New Partners’. 
Available at: https://linecorp.com/th/pr/news/global/2019/46#:~:text=With%2021%20million%20monthly%20active,for% 
20the%20people%20of%20Taiwan. Last accessed 16 March 2021.  
539 Blanchette, Livingston, Glaser, and Kennedy, ‘Protecting Democracy in an Age of Disinformation: Lessons from Taiwan’.  
540 Aaron Huang, ‘Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections’. 
541 Facebook, ‘Changes to Sharing and Viewing News on Facebook in Australia’, 17 August 2021. Updated February 22 2021. Last 
accessed 16 March 2021. 
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Facebook has chosen to introduce this restriction as a response to the planned Treasury Laws Amendment 
Bill 2021542 (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code), which was to establish a 
mandatory code of conduct that applied to news media businesses and digital platform corporations when 
bargaining in relation to news content made available by digital platform services. According to the rule, 
Facebook and other large social networking sites should pay an 'agreed compensation' to content 
providers.543 The code of conduct obliged companies to agree with the news publishers and editors, or 
face a significant penalty. The ultimatum came in a moment, when Facebook has already launched the 
‘Facebook News’ app in the US and in the UK544, a dedicated news feed which also provides compensation 
for contributing media companies. Facebook planned to launch a similar service in Australia.545  
Facebook’s decision to make news unavailable caused significant chaos, as dozens of key information sites, 
including those about the COVID-19 epidemic546, and the websites of NGOs547, trade unions548, politicians 
and the Australian Meteorological Service were made inaccessible through Facebook's portal. 
This controversy was enhanced by its effect on a regional election campaign, as the opposition leader's 
account was blocked, while the incumbent premier's remained unaffected.549 According to Facebook, ‘as 
the law does not provide clear guidance on the definition of news content, we have taken a broad 
definition in order to respect the law as drafted’, and promised to reverse any blocks put on pages 
inadvertently.550 
A compromise was reached between the Australian government and Facebook on 26 February 2021. Social 
media companies and content providers still have to agree and define jointly what qualifies as ‘news’, as 
 
542 The full text of the bill as passed by both Houses is available here: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Treasury Laws 
Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill 2021’, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/ 
parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6652_aspassed/toc_pdf/20177b01.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. Last accessed 16 March 
2021. 
543 Although Google was and is still opposed to the law and has walked back its threat to pull its search engine from the country, 
the company ‘chose to ink deals with media organisations to pay them for news content’. These include a major three-year 
agreement with Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. that will see Google make ‘significant payments’ to host content from publishers 
like ‘The Wall Street Journal’ and ‘The New York Post’ in its News Showcase product. According to ‘The Washington Post’, these 
deals are intended to allow it to sidestep paying for stories linked in regular search results. 
The Verge, ‘Australia passes law requiring Facebook and Google to pay for news content’. Available at https://www.theverge.com/ 
2021/2/24/22283777/australia-new-media-bargaining-code-facebook-google-paying-news. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
News Corp, ‘News Corp and Google Agree To Global Partnership On News’. Available at: https://newscorp.com/2021/02/17/ 
news-corp-and-google-agree-to-global-partnership-on-news/. Last accessed 16 March 2021.  
544 Facebook, ‘Introducing Facebook News’. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/news/learn-more/. Last accessed 16 March 
2021.  
545 AdNews, ‘Facebook's Will Easton on investing in Australia’s news ecosystem’, 23 July 2020. Last accessed 16 March 2021.  
546 St Vincent's Health, @StVHealthAust, ‘Extremely concerning to find this morning that @StVincentsMelb’s Facebook page has 
been blocked - this during a pandemic and on the eve of crucial COVID vaccine distribution. We hope this situation can be rectified 
very shortly’, 18 February 2021. Available at: https://twitter.com/StVHealthAust/status/1362185003635863553.  
547 Australian Wildlife Conservancy, @awconservancy, ‘So @Facebook has unfortunately disabled our page this morning. We are 
not a news outlet. We are a wildlife charity. We are working to resolve this issue. Please support us by opting to stay up to date via 
our eNews: http://australianwildlife.org/enews-subscribe/’. Available at: https://twitter.com/awconservancy/status/ 
1362178275754209284. 
548 Sally McManus, @sallymcmanus, ‘So @Facebook has blocked access to our website. We are not a news organisation. Australian 





549 ABC News,’Facebook Australian news ban hits WA election campaign as Opposition Leader Zak Kirkup's page wiped, Premier's 
untouched’, 17 February 2021, last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
550 Reuters, ‘Facebook says we've been forced to block media in Australia because of the law’. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-media-facebook-spokesman-idUSKBN2AI123. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
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well as the amount of payment. In case of dispute, the government decides. However, the government 
may not apply the code to Facebook if it can demonstrate a ‘significant contribution’ to local journalism. A 
two-month transition period is granted before government-enforced arbitration kicks in.551 
Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation 
At almost at the very same time, on 22 February 2021, the Australia Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) announced the adoption of the new ‘Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and 
Misinformation’552, released by the Digital Industry Group. Under the code, all signatories553 commit to 
developing and implementing measures to deal with misinformation and disinformation on their digital 
platforms, which ‘may include labelling false content, demoting the ranking of content, prioritising 
credible sources, suspension or disabling of accounts, and the removal of content’. In addition, the code 
contains a range of non-mandatory objectives, including disrupting advertising and monetisation 
incentives for disinformation, and empowering consumers to make more informed choices. 
All signatories commit to the core objective; to contribute to reducing ‘the risk of harms that may arise 
from the propagation of disinformation and misinformation on digital platforms and will provide an annual 
report on the implemented measures’. Not all objectives and outcomes will be applicable to all signatories, 
who may adopt one or more of the measures in a manner that is relevant and proportionate to their 
different services and products.554 
Preparation for the Australian federal election in 2019 
Before the Australian federal election in 2019, social media sites introduced numerous steps to combat 
misinformation and electoral interference: 
• Twitter announced that political ads are labelled, and advertisers must prove they are in 
Australia;555 
• The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) had a meeting with Facebook and Google 
representatives on how to deal with foreign interference and tackle fake news during the federal 
election campaign;556 
 
551 BBC, ‘Facebook reverses ban on news pages in Australia’, 23 February 2021. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
552 DIGI, ‘Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation. An industry code of practice developed by the Digital 
Industry Group Inc. (DIGI)’, 22 February 2021. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
553 The current signatories are Twitter, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, TikTok, and Redbubble. 
554 List of objectives under the Code: 
1. Providing safeguards against harm that may arise from disinformation and misinformation. 
2. Disrupting advertising and monetisation incentives for disinformation. 
3. Working to ensure the integrity and security of services and products delivered by digital platforms. 
4. Empowering consumers to make better informed choices of digital content. 
5. Improving public awareness of the source of political advertising carried on digital platforms. 
6. Strengthening public understanding of disinformation and misinformation through support of strategic research. 
7. Signatories publicising the measures they take to combat disinformation and misinformation. 
555 ABC News, ‘Twitter rolls out new advertising rules to fight political misinformation’, 19 February 2019. Last accessed 16 March 
2021.  
556 The West Australian, ‘ASIO meets with Facebook and Google over upcoming election’, 14 February 2019. Last accessed 16 March 
2021.  
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• In early April 2019, it was announced that from the day after the election is called, Facebook will 
temporarily not allow electoral ads purchased from outside Australia557 and introduce fact-
checking558 in the country to protect local voters from foreign interference559; 
• Facebook updated its ‘Ad Library’ to provide more advertising transparency, and committed to 
remove content that violates its 'Community Standards', helping to enforce the safety and security 
of the platform and the blocking of fake accounts. Facebook also employed more people to work 
on safety and security across the platform, and improved its machine learning capabilities around 
political content and inauthentic behaviour. 
7.2.6 USA 
Even before the elections, a number of measures were taken by social media platforms in order to prevent 
harmful events and interventions into the electoral system. Step by step, Twitter and Facebook announced 
their efforts to guarantee a fair electoral campaign and competition on their platforms. Among other 
platforms, Twitter announced the labelling or removing of false or misleading information intended to 
undermine public confidence in an election or other civic process. This includes, but is not limited to: 
• false or misleading information that causes confusion about the laws and regulations of a civic 
process, or officials and institutions executing those civic processes; 
• disputed claims that could undermine faith in the process itself, e.g. unverified information about 
election rigging, ballot tampering, vote tallying, or certification of election results; 
• misleading claims about the results or outcome of a civic process which calls for, or could lead to, 
interference with the implementation of the results of the process, e.g. claiming victory before 
election results have been certified, or inciting unlawful conduct to prevent a peaceful transfer of 
power or orderly succession560; 
  
 
557 In a blog post Facebook said: ‘The restriction will take effect the day after the election is called and will apply to ads we 
determine to be coming from foreign entities that are of an electoral nature, meaning they contain references to politicians, 
parties or election suppression. We also won’t allow foreign ads that include political slogans and party logos.’ 
Facebook, ‘Working to Safeguard Elections in Australia’. Available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/safeguard-elections-in-
australia/, last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
558 Facebook said: ‘Once a story is rated as false, we show it lower in News Feed, reducing its future views by more than 80 % on 
average’, https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/safeguard-elections-in-australia/. 
559 Reuters, ‘Facebook promises crackdown on fake news in Australia’, April 2019. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
560 Twitter, ‘Expanding our policies to further protect the civic conversation’, 10 September 2020. Last accessed: 16 March 2021. 
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Twitter removed thousands of accounts that spread messages about the conspiracy theories known as 
‘QAnon’561, saying their messages could lead to harm and violated Twitter policy.562 On 3 September 2020, 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced a series of measures563, including: 
• blocking new political and issue ads during the final week of the campaign;564 
• extending its work with election officials to remove misinformation about voting; 
• reducing the risk of misinformation and harmful content going viral by limiting forwarding on 
Messenger; 
• expanding Facebook's voter suppression policies; 
• putting in place rules against using COVID-19 related threats to discourage voting; 
• partnering with Reuters and the National Election Pool to provide authoritative information about 
election results; 
• strengthening its enforcement against militias, conspiracy networks like QAnon, and other groups 
that could be used to organise violence or civil unrest in the period after the elections. 
Twitter565 made a point of flagging several of then-President Trump’s tweets566 for containing 
unsubstantiated claims about mail-in voting and potentially abusive rhetoric toward protesters. After the 
attack on Capitol Hill, social media platforms implemented further measures: 
• Twitter permanently suspended more than 70 000 accounts which were engaged in sharing 
harmful QAnon-associated content at scale and that were primarily dedicated to the propagation 
of this conspiracy theory across the service567; 
• as misleading and false information has been the basis for incitement to violence, Twitter updated 
its ‘civic integrity policy' in order to increase its enforcement action on these claims. The updated 
policy provides details about how Twitter reacts against violations of its policy, including repeated 
sharing of tweets that receive warning labels. Twitter warned that repeated violations of this policy 
can result in permanent suspension568; 
 
561 The New York Times, ‘What Is QAnon, the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?’, 4 March 2021. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
562 Twitter, ‘Twitter Safety’. Available at: https://twitter.com/twittersafety/status/1285726277719199746?lang=en. Last accessed 16 
March 2021 
563 Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg: https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10112270823363411. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
564 ‘It's important that campaigns can run get out the vote campaigns, and I generally believe the best antidote to bad speech is 
more speech, but in the final days of an election there may not be enough time to contest new claims. So, in the week before the 
election, we won't accept new political or issue ads. Advertisers will be able to continue running ads they started running before 
the final week and adjust the targeting for those ads, but those ads will already be published transparently in our Ads Library so 
anyone, including fact-checkers and journalists, can scrutinise them.’ 
565 Twitter, ‘Updating our approach to misleading information’, 11 May 2020. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
566 See for example:  
The Verge, ‘Twitter labels Trump tweets as ‘potentially misleading’ for the first time’, 26 May 2020.  
The New York Times, ‘Twitter Refutes Inaccuracies in Trump’s Tweets About Mail-In Voting’, 26 May 2020. 
BBC, ‘Trump's postal-vote tweet misleading, says Twitter’, 24 August 2020. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
567 Twitter, ‘An update following the riots in Washington, DC’, 12 January 2021. 
568 Twitter, ‘Civic integrity policy’, January 2021. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
According to Twitter civic processes are events or procedures mandated, organised, and conducted by the governing and/or 
electoral body of a country, state, region, district, or municipality to address a matter of common concern through public 
participation, for example: political elections, censuses, major referenda and ballot initiatives. This 'civic integrity policy' addresses 
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• Twitter also updated its policy on 'coordinated harmful activity’569, which is an actor-level 
framework. In order to take action under this framework, Twitter must find evidence that 
individuals associated with a group, movement, or campaign are engaged in some form of 
coordination, and also that the results of that coordination cause harm to others; 
• Twitter570 and Facebook571 also banned President Trump from using their platforms for violating 
their terms of service which prohibits promotion of violent and criminal acts. Facebook referred 
this controversial decision to the independent Oversight Board.572 
  
 
four categories of misleading behaviour and content: misleading information about how to participate; suppression and 
intimidation; misleading information about outcomes; and false or misleading affiliation. 
569 Twitter, “Coordinated harmful activity”, January 2021, last accessed on 16 March 2021. 
570 Twitter, ‘Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump’, 8 January 2021. Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
571 Facebook, ‘Referring Former President Trump’s Suspension From Facebook to the Oversight Board’, 21 January 2021. Last 
accessed 16 March 2021. 
572 In 2020, Facebook‘s ‘Oversight Board’, an independent body of experts and civic leaders from around the world with a wide 
range of backgrounds, started operation. The purpose of the board is to promote free expression by making principled, 
independent decisions regarding content on Facebook and Instagram, and by issuing recommendations on the relevant Facebook 
Company Content Policy. Oversight Board, ‘Ensuring respect for free expression, through independent judgement’. Available at: 
https://oversightboard.com/, Last accessed 16 March 2021. 
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8 The mechanism of manipulation and the potential of 
education and narrative messages 
Disinformation exists in different shapes and contexts (e.g. conspiracy theories, deep fakes) and seem to 
be appealing for many people — especially on social media. However, research also indicates that only a 
small percentage of society knows a lot about disinformation, and many have not even heard anything 
about certain stories573 – and if they did, people mostly learn about them through mass media coverage574. 
To counter the distribution and acceptance of disinformation it seems necessary to understand: a) what 
makes disinformation attractive, b) why people believe in disinformation, and c) why they share it. This 
chapter aims to answer these questions based on recent literature from the field of communication 
research and psychology. It thereby lays important groundwork for the development of effective counter 
strategies. 
8.1 What makes disinformation attractive? 
Disinformation (e.g. as part of conspiracy theories) usually offers a comprehensible story with a clear and 
easy distinction of good and evil — providing sense and simple, plausible answers. Conspiracy theories, 
for example, share the premise that there is a secret collaboration of a small group of conspirators, whose 
goals (e.g. world domination) and destructive plans (e.g. anarchy) are aimed at manipulating events in their 
own favour. One objective among other disinformation efforts is to elicit fear among citizens of threats and 
crimes by clearly defined malevolent outgroups (e.g. ethnic or sexual minorities), favouring a 
homogeneous, virtuous ingroup at the same time.575 With that said, disinformation for many people 
‘satisfies the need to see the world as structured’.576 As a result, disinformation often crosses the line 
between facts and fiction577, leading to stories which may seem irrational or even surreal (e.g. stories 
related to QAnon). These aspects make disinformation appealing for many people in this fast-paced period 
of high complexity and potential perceived loss of control. The COVID-19-pandemic and its societal 
consequences, in particular, demand a lot of patience, stress resilience, and ambiguity tolerance from 
people.  
Narrative and well-structured stories are more likely to be less critically reflected, questioned, and 
contradicted.578 The more likely, bizarre, provocative, and entertaining a story is, the stronger emotional 
reactions (e.g. surprise, disgust) it generates in its recipients579, and the more recipients share the story. 
Visuals play an important role as they may lower peoples’ suspicion of being presented with manipulated 
information.580 The latter finding is especially relevant against the background of the rising amount of so-
called ‘deep fakes’. This shows that the advancing technological possibilities of manipulating pictures and 
audiovisual content nearly perfectly make the fight against disinformation even harder. Thus, it is even 
more necessary to encourage people to carefully double-check information by means of trustworthy, 
objective sources.581   
 
573 Schaffner, 2020.  
574 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2020; Tsfati et al., 2020. 
575 e.g., Schneider, Schmitt, Ernst, & Rieger, 2019. 
576 Axt, Landau, & Kay, 2020, p. 1. 
577 Harambam & Aupers, 2019. 
578 e.g. Frischlich, Rieger, Morten, Bente, 2018. 
579 Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018. 
580 Hameleers, Powell, Van Der Meer, & Bos, 2020. 
581 In Germany for example the public broadcasting services usually provide well researched objective information.  
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When shared by a trusted, credible source, people tend to believe and to share disinformation more 
readily.582 Once individuals have formed a conspiratorial mindset583 and the respective models of 
morality584, they selectively search for evidences to support their suspicions.585 The widely unregulated 
online environment, rich in both information and opinion, may facilitate this; everybody may select the 
sources he or she likes, which is a virtue and a challenge at the same, time from a democratic perspective. 
However, the influence of the stories and senders’ characteristics should not be overestimated. Even more 
important are individual differences in the recipients.  
8.2 Why do people believe disinformation? 
People tend to search for, interpret, and remember information more readily if it confirms their 
preconceptions. In this way, disinformation can trigger a so-called confirmation bias.586 Attempts to 
debunk disinformation, as such, can even have the effect of making people adhere to their beliefs more 
strongly587 – although, this so-called ‘backfire’ effect has been shown to appear quite rarely.588 Besides story 
and source characteristics – and apart from political ideology and conspiratorial mentality – various 
individual differences predict peoples’ susceptibility to disinformation.  
Cavillo and colleagues589 have shown that lower levels of agreeableness, conscientiousness, open-
mindedness, and higher levels of extraversion and more hours of news consumption were related to worse 
news discernment – meaning that people were less likely to identify disinformation as such. Individuals 
with elevated clinical psychopathology (e.g. delusion proneness, schizotypal cognitive-perceptual 
traits),590 right-wing authoritarianism,591 and those who feel ostracized592 are more likely to believe 
disinformation. Also, (a generalised) mistrust in political power and professional news media is positively 
correlated with acceptance of disinformation.593 The perceived truthfulness of disinformation is greater for 
people who are exposed to more disinformation and less ‘real’ news (hard news).594  
The COVID-19-pandemic, with its accompanying uncertainty and social and economic challenges, further 
provides fertile ground for the acceptance and dissemination of disinformation. Knowledge (e.g. about the 
virus) and political decisions are changing rapidly, and may differ significantly across country borders. 
Moreover, societal measures trying to fight the virus, such as the so-called ‘lockdown’ and social distancing 
 
582 Buchanan and Benson, 2019; Faragó, Kende, and Krekó, 2020. 
583 The conspiratorial mindset (or conspiracy mentality) can be understood as the general willing or proneness to endorse 
conspiracy theories. This may be due to certain cognitive patterns such as the need for cognitive closure, the need for making 
sense of high impact events, or the tendency to (over-)perceive causal connections between events and stimuli.  
584 A conspiracy theory is a specific judgment of immoral behaviour. So, a conspiracy theory may include the assumption that a 
certain actor develops evil schemes in secret and then carry them out to reach a certain aim (e.g. global dominance). According to 
the social intuitionist approach to moral judgment by Haidt (2001) people form moral judgments intuitively, based on their 
subjective feelings of right or wrong. Then people are motivated to make sense of such feelings (models of morality). Against the 
background of the complexity and diversity of available information and perspectives (e.g. regarding a pandemic) people may 
occasionally be challenged to explain and justify their moral judgments. Thus, they search for information which legitimate the 
way they think, feel, and believe. 
585 Van Prooijen, Klein, & Milošević Đorđević, 2020. 
586 Kahne and Bowyer 2017. 
587 Nyhan and Reifler, 2010. 
588 e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, and Chadwick, 2020; Wood and Porter, 2019; for an overview, see also Swire-Thompson, DeGutis and 
Lazer, 2020. 
589 Calvillo, Garcia, Bertrand, & Mayers, 2021. 
590 Anthony and Moulding, 2019; Georgiou, Delfabbro, & Balzan, 2019. 
591 Klebba, and Winter, 2021; Wood and Gray, 2019. 
592 Poon, Chen, and Wong, 2020. 
593 e.g. Imhoff and Lamberty, 2018; Klebba, and Winter, 2021; Pierre, 2020. 
594 Amazeen and Bucy, 2019; Balmas, 201. 
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measures, put many people in social and financial distress. People perceiving more life stress595 and a lack 
of control596 more strongly tend to believe in disinformation about COVID-19, as disinformation provides 
simply structured answers and supposed security considering the complexity of events – a finding which 
is supported by earlier research indicating that people tend to feel attracted to conspiracy theories while 
experiencing an existential crisis.597 Individuals that more strongly believing in disinformation related to 
COVID-19 are less likely to follow rules to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (e.g. social distancing).598 
Likewise, perceived national narcissism (the belief in the greatness of the own national ingroup) — 
including during the COVID-19-pandemic — seem to play an important role in belief and sharing of 
disinformation599, indicating that (dis)information favouring the ingroup (here, a country) may help people 
to deal with the perceived potential existential threat (the pandemic). 
Furthermore, low trust in (traditional) news media, politics, or in scientific experts has been shown to be 
positively related to a low believability of disinformation.600 To build, or to restore,  trust in relevant societal 
institutions, knowledge about their functioning and positive attitudes towards their work must be 
encouraged. This requires clear strategic communication by media, politics, experts, and institutions free 
of contradictions. Moreover, it has been shown that people who rely more on emotions601 and are less 
engaged in analytical thinking tend to believe more readily in disinformation.602 Regarding educational 
levels, the study results are inconsistent. While some studies find no correlation at all, others find that a 
lower education level predicts susceptibility to disinformation.603   
To summarise, the just-discussed findings indicate that susceptibility to disinformation is predicted by 
many individual factors, which are, for the most part, acquired and cultivated over a person’s lifespan, 
starting in early childhood. Moreover, societal events (e.g. the COVID-19-pandemic) and, respectively, their 
social and individual consequences may facilitate the acceptance of disinformation among citizens. Thus, 
all efforts to build resilience against disinformation should be planned and implemented in the long run 
across all societal areas (e.g. politics, economy, schools, the media system) — ideally, efforts should be 
preventive instead of curative.   
8.3 Why do people share disinformation? 
While only a very small percentage of (social) media users share disinformation604, an even larger amount 
of people are exposed to it.605 Sometimes, disinformation is intentionally shared by people to manipulate 
and mobilise crowds.606 Nonetheless, people also share disinformation not knowing that it is false. Many 
individuals do not even recognise information as manipulated or misleading. It has been shown that 
younger607 and more online-experienced users608 are more likely to recognise and verify disinformation 
 
595 e.g. Constantinou, Kagialis, and Karekla, 2020; Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan, 2020). 
596 Alper, Bayrak, and Yilmaz,, 2020; Oleksy, Wnuk, Maison, & Łyś, 2020; Šrol, Ballová Mikušková, and Čavojová, 2021. 
597 Van Prooijen, and Douglas, 2017. 
598 Oleksy, Wnuk, Maison, & Łyś, 2020. 
599 Stoica & Umbreș, 2020. 
600 e.g., Humprecht, Esser, and Van Aelst, 2020; Zimmermann and Kohring, 2020. 
601 Martel, Pennycook, and Rand, 2020. 
602 (lper, et al. 2020; Bago, Rand and Pennycook, 2020; Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, and Cannon, 2019; Georgiou et al., 2019; 
Pennycook and Rand, 2018; Stoica and Umbreș, 2020). 
603 e.g. Alper et al., 2020; Constantinou et al., 2020; Duplaga, 2020; Georgiou et al., 2019. 
604 Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-Thompson, and Lazer, 2019; Guess, Nagler, and Tucker, 2019. 
605 Ognyanova, Forthcoming. 
606 Petersen, 2020. 
607 Borges-Tiago, Tiago, Silva, Guaita Martínez, and Botella-Carrubi, 2020. 
608 Borges-Tiago et al., 2020; Khan and Idris, 2019. 
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before sharing. Also, general knowledge of how news media operates enables users to identify 
disinformation and makes them more likely to counter-argue.609  
Manipulated messages that support peoples’ worldviews are more likely to be shared610 – this is even more 
probable for older and more politically right-leaning people611, and those who perceive society to be more 
polarised.612 Moreover, social media users with high trust in online information are likely to share 
information without checking its correctness.613 In addition, encountering certain disinformation more 
often (e.g. via social media) increases the likelihood of sharing it — even independent of a disclaimer that 
it is disinformation — as the repeated contact may reduce peoples’ moral condemnation.614 Islam and 
colleagues also showed that people who are driven by self-promotion and entertainment tend to be more 
likely to share disinformation.615 
Studies have also identified factors that discourage sharing of disinformation. Colliander616, for example, 
showed in a series of experiments that people who were exposed to critical comments to fake news articles 
were more hesitant to share the fake news, compared to those who saw comments supporting the article. 
A disclaimer (e.g. from a social media company) alerting individuals that the news might be manipulated, 
in turn, did not lower peoples’ intentions to share disinformation as much as critical comments from other 
users. People feel uncertain and insecure when warnings are misdirected and imprecise.617  
8.4 Critical media literacy against disinformation 
But what does it take for recipients to identify news to be ‘true’, ‘false’, or purposefully scattered 
disinformation? How can we prevent disinformation, which is spread by a few actors, from taking up a large 
space in the digital public sphere or even influencing discourse in society as a whole? It seems that raising 
awareness about the mere existence of disinformation (e.g. with a disclaimer on social media) is not 
enough.618 In addition, legislative and regulating attempts (e.g., ‘Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz’ in 
Germany, or respective policies by the European Commission619) do not seem to prevent the dissemination 
of disinformation completely.  
The above-mentioned research results indicate a complex picture of the individual predictors of believing 
in and sharing disinformation. It seems necessary to raise peoples’ awareness regarding the characteristics 
of disinformation and potential sources. Furthermore, various individual and social factors must be 
addressed; this is particularly evident in disinformation studies on COVID-19. Research has shown that 
foresightful, adaptive, and sustainable responses are needed. One answer could be critical media literacy.  
As a central dimension of media competence, critical media literacy is both a skill and a ‘learning task’.620 
People who engage with media content critically, i.e. in an analytically reflective and ethically judgmental 
 
609 Amazeen and Buchy, 2019. 
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618 Colliander, 2019; Effron and Raj, 2020. 
619 See for example European Commission, ’Tackling online disinformation’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/tackling-online-disinformation or European Commission, ’Code of Practice on Disinformation’. Available at: 
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way, can see through many manipulation attempts and, if necessary, counter them. Critical media literacy 
can be promoted within the framework of measures of (in-school and out-of-school) media education.621 
Yet, at least until 2018, media education was not a mandatory school subject in any EU country — instead, 
in cases where it exists, it is predominantly cross-curricular or implemented as small-scale projects.622 
Nevertheless, even teachers underline the necessity of teaching critical media literacy in school.623 The 
largest number of media literacy stakeholders stem from civil society, followed by public authorities and 
academic actors — mostly addressing ‘critical thinking’ as specific skill.624 Moreover, the general level of 
media literacy seems to vary significantly across European countries625 — being highly interconnected with 
each country’s historical, social, and cultural context.626 
The research cited above gives further valuable insights into the potential content and aims of anti-
disinformation media education. A central requirement for critical media literacy against disinformation is 
having a concept of disinformation, and — based on this — the assessment of information as manipulated 
or ‘fake’ Thus, an active, analytical, and reflexive examination of media content by its users is required.627 
Critical media literacy interventions about the content and techniques of disinformation or media in 
general have been shown to foster peoples’ susceptibility to disinformation628 and seem, thus, to be worthy 
of support in the context of media education. These interventions can increase analytic and actively open-
minded thinking, which might help reduce beliefs in fake news.629 People who understand how the media 
operates are even more likely to counter-argue.630  
Also, the tendency to engage in fact-checking behaviour information may foster (perceived) resilience 
against disinformation.631 To motivate individuals to fact-check, they must recognise disinformation first, 
and need to know measures for finding trustworthy information through online research. Tandoc et al.632 
even showed that people would only correct disinformation when the issue is strongly relevant to them. 
Moreover, the relationship to people in their social network is important. They share corrections primarily 
to people they feel strongly and closely connected to. Witterlin and colleagues633 findings indicate a rather 
self-centred perspective. They found that people who assumed a higher influence of user-generated 
content on their own attitudes engaged more in corrective actions. People are more motivated by 
preventing themselves — or their loved ones — from negative influences than other, foreign people.  
Having that said, social media users do not necessarily benefit from other peoples’ corrections. Research 
results regarding the effectiveness of presenting corrective information before or after disinformation are 
inconsistent. While some studies show that presenting corrective information before disinformation may 
reduce its credibility634, others indicate that displaying fact-checks after disinformation can enhance their 
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believability.635 Moreover, even after corrections, the problematic information is often still visible online 
and might further influence potential recipients. Once disinformation is established, it might be difficult to 
delete or correct it. 
Hence, media literacy education needs to address several aspects in this regard in order to be effective. It 
should foster knowledge of the negative individual and societal impact of disinformation to convince 
people to engage in the correction of disinformation independently from the individual relevance of the 
issue and their relationship to the people they communicate with. Moreover, people should learn about 
psychological processes of attitude formation, memory, and comprehension processes636, and how 
mechanisms of social media platforms (e.g. comments, social networks, algorithms, bots) might influence 
these.637 Regarding literacy measures in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems further necessary 
to strengthen evidence-based knowledge about the virus, the disease, and the value of vaccination – finally 
leading to more domain-specific confidence and self-efficacy, as well as trust in the effectiveness and safety 
of the vaccinations. These aspects could be combined with media education about health-related 
disinformation in social media.638  
Extremist-motivated disinformation and its implementation with fragments of inhuman ideology further 
offers concrete markers that critical recipients can use for analysis and reflection. The combination of 
intercultural educational work, which sensitises people to constructions of ‘others’, and media education 
programs, which make it possible to recognise these construction processes in media offers, appear to 
be a significant basis for educational work and the promotion of critical media literacy in the context of 
disinformation.639 
To be effective in fighting the spread and acceptance of disinformation, media literacy education has to be 
a transnational,640 cross-cutting theme. Moreover, there must be target-group specific offers for people 
of all ages and living environments considering the respective societal and political systems that people 
are a part of. Thus, apart from its promotion in formal educational settings (e.g. schools) for younger 
citizens – ideally not only in small-scale, short term interventions and workshops – there should also be 
interventions fostering critical media literacy outside of school for other age groups. The latter could take 
place, for example, as workshops (e.g. in the context of advanced vocational training), online freely 
available (information) materials641, games642, or as part of an objective, professional press coverage.  
 
635 Hameleers et al., 2020. 
636 Britt, Rouet, Blaum and Millis, 2019. 
637 Ernst and Schmitt, 2020. 
638 Puri, Coomes, Haghbayan, and Gunaratne, 2020. 
639 Schmitt, Ernst, and Rieger, 2020; For a German-speaking audience, there are many materials and tools freely available online 
that are intended to sensitize media users of all age groups to the presence and functioning of disinformation and to help them 
uncover and possibly even oppose it. The number and kind of these materials—and relevant actors/publishers. in this field—are 
manifold.  As important actor from the public sector the Federal Agency of Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung/bpb) must be named. It provides a high diversity of materials (e.g., texts, (YouTube-)videos), workshops, conferences and 
trainings addressing different aspects and topics of civic education and, thereby also, media education. The JFF-Institut für 
Medienpädagogik, a non-governmental institution for research on media education and materials for practitioners, similarly 
provides materials and trainings for various age groups and educational settings concerning different aspects of media education. 
640 One major challenge for a comparable and effective transnational media literacy education is the difference in factors such as 
media systems, disinformation, and the understanding of democracy. It can be assumed that those differ significantly between 
EU-countries, for instance, Hungary and Germany or France and Poland. 
641 For example, the German platform Digital Kompass (https://www.digital-kompass.de/) provides information materials and 
workshops especially for the elderly related to various questions concerning digital media.  
642 For example: Go Viral! Available at https://www.goviralgame.com/en.  
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A vast amount and diversity of relevant content is also spread via social media; YouTube, for example, 
which is mostly used in the context of self-directed learning settings. However, sometimes the quality 
content-wise is questionable643, and user comments may influence the perception of content644. There can 
also be connection of useful content with problematic content645 via automated algorithms, which can 
have negative effects on recipients. Thus, critical media literacy seems to be necessary for a selection of 
helpful, high-quality counter messages.  
Although the production and spread of so-called counter messages has been widely discussed as a useful 
measure against manipulative attempts646, systematic studies and those broad in scope regarding the 
effectiveness (e.g. knowledge acquisition, attitude change) of content which people use in self-directed 
learning settings are scarce. Nevertheless, especially regarding the prevention of the negative effects of 
COVID-19 and vaccine-related disinformation, we can learn lessons from research on narrative persuasion 
and health communication.  
8.5 Effectiveness of strategic communication – lessons from research on 
narrative persuasion and health communication 
Narrative persuasion approaches posit that using narrative elements in messages with a persuasive goal 
can circumvent resistance to attitude change through processes that make the audience unaware of the 
persuasive attempt.647 The importance of good storytelling is even bigger regarding the communication 
of scientific knowledge; people do not usually base their decisions or process information only on objective 
scientific evidence, ignoring their personal beliefs and emotional understanding of the world.648 There are 
different lines of research analysing and discussing psychological mechanisms which facilitate 
engagement with messages, making narratives effective tools for attitude change and behavioural 
intentions.649  
Two of these central mechanisms are identification with main characters and transportation into a 
narrative. When identifying with a protagonist, readers may understand a narrative by taking the 
character’s perspective, adopting her or his goals and developing empathy650, or even corresponding 
behaviours.651 Research shows that the approachability of a character is enhanced by the narrative 
perspective (e.g. first-person narrator)652 or by portrayal of the protagonist as virtuous, successful, or 
caring.653 Similarities between the audience and characters (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity) and longer 
exposition to the character are further reinforcing factors for identification.654 Reactance and counter-
arguing can be reduced655, which is particularly important in the case of controversial topics. Research on 
transportation focusses on how people pay attention to and have a sense of being within the narrative 
 
643 Briones, Nan, Madden, and Waks, 2012; Donzelli et al., 2018). 
644 For an overview, see for example Ernst et al., 2017. 
645 Schmitt, Rieger, Rutkowski, and Ernst, 2018; Tang et al., 2021. 
646 RAN, 2018. 
647 Moyer-Gusé, 2008. 
648 Jones, Anderson, and Crow, 2017. 
649 Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Cohen, Tal-Or, and Mazor-Tregerman, 2015; Liu, Yang, and Chu, 2019; Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Slater 
and Rouner, 2002. 
650 Cohen, 2001. 
651 Braddock, & Dillard, 2016; Murphy, Frank, Moran, and Patnoe-Woodley, 2011. 
652 de Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders, and Beentjes, 2012. 
653 Cohen et al., 2015. 
654 Hoeken, Kolthoff, & Sanders, 2016. 
655 e.g., Slater & Rouner, 2002; Moyer-Gusé, 2008. 
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world.656 The more people are transported into a story, the more they endorse story-consistent beliefs, 
which indicates an association between transportation and persuasion that has been replicated and 
extended for a multitude of topics, ranging from health disparities to advertising messages.  
Moreover, research in various fields of prevention (e.g. radicalisation prevention, health communication) 
emphasises further advantageous aspects, such as the use of authentic and personal stories, credible and 
trustworthy protagonists, an attractive, target group-specific presentation, and providing positive 
emotions and feelings of hope.657  
Research has further highlighted that satirical offers are negatively evaluated by users and can generate 
reactions that lead to a lower acceptance, or even rejection, of the message. Schmitt and colleagues658 
found that presenting different (political) positions within a narrative can reduce opposition on the 
part of recipients and lead to more positive attitudes. The presentation of a single political perspective 
(here, for refugees) increased the reactance of recipients. Reactance can further be reduced by avoiding 
freedom-threatening language (e.g. explicit persuasive messages) and instead using less direct, implicit 
communication, which leaves more room for interpretation, encouraging the feeling of choice.659 In the 
context of health-related communication especially, evoking empathy leads to better effects of (narrative) 
messages, and has been shown to diminish anger in message processing.660 Fostering peoples’ 
perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) may further reduce opposition and foster persuasive outcomes 
(e.g. attitudes, perceived effectiveness).661 
The way a message is communicated also seems to be important. Compared to text, audio-visual content 
offers the opportunity to learn on a model and try things out immediately.662 In addition, videos can appeal 
to users not only cognitively, but also emotionally, for example, through music or the facial expressions of 
a speaker.  
Regarding strategic messages in the context of vaccination, it has been shown that source expertise leads 
to increased trustworthiness of a message and reduced vaccine hesitancy, especially among those who are 
more vaccine hesitant at baseline.663 Moreover, a clear, official evidence-based communication free of 
contradictions (e.g. regarding COVID-19) seems necessary to build social trust664 and foster attitude and 
behavioural change.665 Thereby, the perception of conflation of expertise666 and information overload must 
be avoided for recipients, as this may result in ineffective information processing, confusion, loss of control, 
and psychological stress667 — again underlining the necessity of teaching people how to do efficiently 
research online and select trustworthy, objective sources.  
In sum, previous research gives various helpful insights into the way strategic communication should be 
designed to impact attitude change and behavioural intentions.668 Having said that, it has to be considered 
 
656 Green and Brock, 2000. 
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664 Pennings and Symons, 2021. 
665 Noar and Austin, 2020. 
666 Rodriguez, 2016. 
667 Eppler and Mengis, 2004. 
668 Very helpful policy recommendations are given for example in Michael D. Jones and Deserai Anderson Crow, ‘How can we use 
the ‘science of stories’ to produce persuasive scientific stories’, Palgrave communications. Available at: 
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that many research results stem from small-scale experiments, which often provide information on the 
short-term effects of persuasive messages. Moreover, these studies usually take place in rather secured, 
idealised settings, presenting the respective stimuli (messages) isolated from a certain (social/media) 
context. Thus, it is conceivable that the potential effects of such messages integrated in a real world (media) 
setting, such as TV or social media, may be distorted by the characteristics of a specific situation (e.g. social 
context, user comments). Kim et al., for example, showed that a higher number of unfavourable user 
comments in a Facebook thread about flu vaccination led to more unfavourable attitudes towards flu 
vaccination.669 Therefore, characteristics of the specific situations and the ways people might stumble over 
these messages must be carefully considered. Questions such as the following should be discussed before 
designing and publishing the messages: When/in which settings do people receive the message? Which 
aspects could distort the idea/information which is supposed to be delivered? Who might comment on the 
message (online) that might frame the message unfavourably? How should the respective community 
management in an online environment look? How do recommendation algorithms deal with strategic 
content distributed online? Which content is the original content connected to and with what potential 
effect?  
In sum, regardless of the characteristics of a story, which can promote or hinder involvement and 
processing, personal and situational characteristics on the part of the recipients are important. Thus, 
strategic communication must understand its audience to build credibility – and finally, be persuasive. 
Thereby, knowledge about personal aspects, such as individual interest in a topic, motivation, attention, 
and users’ cognitive prerequisites, are of decisive importance.670 Consequently, there cannot be a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution. Strategic messages must be target-group specific, for example: a) the parents of 
young children need different kind of messages than the elderly; b) people who are less tech-/online-savvy 
need different ways to be addressed; c) children further need a different approach; d) different 
cultural/historical/political backgrounds of different European countries could need distinctive responses, 
and so on.    
8.6 Further recommendations and future directions 
Public efforts and investments are needed to promote a positive perception of democratic values and 
public awareness to disinformation, and to provide incentives and resources for media education for all 
age groups.671 In this regard, media education in general – and fostering critical media literacy, in 
particular, as prevention rather than reaction – should be officially recognised as a (trans-)national task, 
for example, as a clear objective of education over the lifespan. This does not only include appropriate 
political attitudes and intentions, but also investments and structural changes in the training of educators 
in every European country. Consequently, media education should be part of the education and training 
of teachers at university. It should not be voluntary to occupy oneself with media education and media 
literacy training.   
Conceptual frameworks, materials and documentations of best practices are needed to build a system for 
an effective media education to make people resilient against disinformation. To achieve this, NGOs or 
 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-017-0047-7.pdf. A systematic review of message framing in vaccine communication can 
be found here: Marcela Penta, Adriana Baban, ‘Message Framing in Vaccine Communication: A Systematic Review of Published 
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public institutions could share experiences with different approaches to how to foster resilience against 
disinformation in various educational settings. It would be, for example, conceivable to implement a 
European platform which provides systematically evaluated measures,  including a specific description of 
methods, target-groups, and addressed skill (e.g. critical thinking). Specific materials could also be shared 
in various European languages. However, more sustainable measures are needed. When taught in schools 
as a mandatory and dynamic literacy education, media education would be even more effective than 
reactive and small-scale projects.672 Thus, there needs to be a common European-wide understanding 
about what disinformation is, what (critical) media literacy means, and how to teach it (in schools). 
Furthermore, there must be more emphasis on media education as a crosscutting subject.  
Finally, the creation, distribution and acceptance of disinformation should also be understood as 
symptoms of certain general political and societal developments. Consequently, disinformation should not 
only be addressed by selected, short-term measures. Rather, it should be analysed by means of a systemic 
perspective in which events, societal trends, and developments lay fertile ground for disinformation.  
  
 
672 (McDougall, 2019). 
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9 Impact on democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of 
law: new developments and trends 
One of the findings regarding new trends in disinformation actions has been that they are better disguised 
than before. In fact, they are disguised so well, that they often melt into organic content. The developing 
technological features are increasingly made use of. Due to the 'Potemkin personas', information 
laundering, private messaging and deep fakes, the appearance of influence operations is hardly 
distinguishable from ordinary user-generated content. Besides, actors focus much less on creating 
false ‘stories’ and thereby risk debunking, but they tend to amplify existing ideas to exacerbate lines of 
division. What may seem as simply taking part in a divisive social discussion673 might prove malicious 
provocation when both sides of the discussion are provoked simultaneously.674 One benefit for the 
adversaries is weakening the target society through further polarisation. Another is growing distrust in 
general in all media information.  
Initiatives by the European Union, its Member States, the platforms, and civil society increased user 
awareness and resilience against disinformation. However, the entirely new global crisis of COVID-19 
caused even higher stress, anxiety, and insecurity. The existential uncertainties which characterise the 
postmodern risk societies675 reached new heights and offered the opportunity to exploit fear and 
insecurity. The risk of infection and death has been reasonable, yet at the same time incalculable.  The 
intricacy of statistics and yet unknown facts about dispersion rate, treatment, and lasting effects turned 
into a ‘liquid fear’676 with no simple responses to alleviate the risk. The fundamental rights of people 
were restricted for a longer period of time. Whether such limitations were reasonable or not, they induced 
understandable tensions which fuelled conspiracy theories, hostility, and scapegoating. 
The numerous efforts and initiatives effectively contributed to keep the infodemic within limits, and to 
avoid mass-scale societal failures or panic reactions to the extreme situation. The 2019 EP elections and 
other national elections were not disturbed by major or effective disinformation events. In this respect, the 
self-regulation of social media platforms has been reasonably successful, albeit there remains scope for 
improvement, in particular in setting limits on intervention in freedom of expression, structuring 
accountability, and harmonising policies, especially across Member States (see Chapter 5). 
It should be noted that the three values (democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights) are inherently 
interdependent, partly overlap, and ‘cannot be separated without inflicting profound damage to the 
whole’.677 Therefore, below, we will jointly discuss two of them; democracy and the rule of law, followed by 
the fundamental rights impact.  
In the chapter below, the concrete impacts of disinformation in the period 2019-2020 on democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights will be discussed, building on the theoretical background described in 
the 2019 Study on disinformation and propaganda.678  
 
673 BBC News, ‘Russian trolls' chief target was 'black US voters' in 2016’, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/techology-
49987657.  
674 Julian E. Bernes, Goldman, A., ‘Russia Trying to Stoke U.S. Racial Tensions Before Election’, The New York Times, 10 March 2020.  
675 See in more detail: Bayer et al., ‘Disinformation and propaganda’, European Parliament, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf.  
676 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Fear, Cambridge Polity Press, 2006. 
677 Carrera, S, Guild, E & Hernanz, N., ‘The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in 
the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism’, Study, CEPS, Brussels, 2013. 
678 Bayer et al., ‘Disinformation and propaganda’, 2019.  
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9.1 COVID-19 effects 
The pandemic entailed several legal, political and social consequences which harmed the functioning of 
democracy, threatened the rule of law, and directly or indirectly impacted human rights, the right to free 
movement, freedom of assembly, and the right to education. Many states passed emergency measures 
within and outside the European Union. Thirteen EU Member States invoked a “state of emergency” or 
similar emergency framework, while fourteen Member States imposed legal restrictions without such a 
framework.679 Significant or high restrictions were reported from Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
France, Germany (varying regimes in the 16 federal states), Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain, and The Netherlands. Some states were reported to have passed legislative amendment during the 
emergency state which had no relation to the pandemics but reinforced the power or the policy of the 
executive680 as the EP pointed it out repeatedly.681  
A few Member States imposed the emergency measures without a time limit, adding that such measures 
cannot be considered as lawful if there is no regular review of the situation.682 Lasting legal changes were 
brought under the pretext of emergency legislation in a few Member States.683  
Judicial procedures have also been adversely affected by the pandemics. A large number of MSs have 
suspended judicial procedures or postponed deadlines. Resorting to written procedures or video-
conferences was among the flexible adaptations to the situation, whereas not excusing absence from the 
procedure, when freedom of movement restrictions prevented parties to the case to appear in court, could 
amount to a violation of procedural fairness.  
Parliaments had to re-organise their activities, including postponing, reducing or suspending work.684 
Elections were postponed in 13 Member States due to the pandemic685, and others had to take adaptive 
measures to ensure safety. Not postponing the elections in the middle of a pandemic might also have had 
political purposes (as in Poland, signalled by prior amendment to the electoral code going against the 
judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal686). Political campaigns also had to endure restriction of offline 
campaign events and gatherings687, as freedom of assembly has been restricted in all Member States, 
except in Sweden.688 
 
679 Briefing Requested by the LIBE committee, Marzocchi, Ottavio, ‘The Impact of Covid-19 Measures on Democracy, the Rule of 
Law and Fundamental Rights in the EU’, European Parliament, April 2020; see also: Democracy Reporting International, ‘Phase Two 
Of Covid-19 Responses Across The EU – The Rule Of Law Stress Test Continued’, Stiftung Mercador, 2020. 
680 Ibid.  
681 European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
consequences (2020/2616(RSP)). 
682 Venice Commission, ‘Interim report on the measures taken in the EU Member States as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and their 
impact on democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights’, 8 October 2020 (CDL-AD(2020)018), Croatia, Hungary; paragraph 
47. Available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2020)018-e.  
683 Democracy Reporting International, ‘Phase Two Of Covid-19 Responses Across The EU – The Rule Of Law Stress Test Continued’. 
684 Briefing Requested by the LIBE committee, ‘The Impact of Covid-19 Measures on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
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686 Briefing Requested by the LIBE committee, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 Measures on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights in the EU’, p. 5.; and T’he impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’, European 
Parliament resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights (2020/2790(RSP)).  
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These hindrances to democratic values were, however, not in direct connection with disinformation, 
therefore they are not discussed further here.  
9.2 Impacts on democracy and the rule of law 
While the focus of this study is disinformation originating from foreign sources, it should be noted that the 
highest risk to democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights is presented by those disinformation 
campaigns which have originated and stayed within the EU or even within a Member State. This scenario 
was highlighted in 2019, and the phenomenon has grown since then in both size and effect. It massively 
contributed to the global infodemic and the political crisis in effected nation states. Government-
originated (domestic) disinformation is reported to be prevalent around the globe: in a Freedom House 
survey, 62 % of respondents (and 77 % among 'Not Free' states) said they distrust government information 
on the pandemic. 52 % of respondents, representing 66 states, claimed a ’proliferation of disinformation 
coming from the government’.689  
When individuals with official authority are primary sources or disseminators of disinformation, it makes 
defence strategies against disinformation futile. First, because the trust in such authoritative persons is a 
value choice which cannot be changed by rational arguments. The authority of the person extends to the 
expressed ideas, even if they represent disinformation and conspiracy theories, and boost their persuasive 
effect. Supporters believe with great confidence in these fallacies, and even engage in action to follow their 
beliefs, from resistance against health-protecting measures, to a violent attack against the Capitol.690 Every 
attempt to convince them about the contrary is perceived as yet another proof of the conspiracy theory. 
While a growing number of the population is thought to be resilient against disinformation, the gap 
between these two groups is widening. 
Secondly, national policies against disinformation become inverted and turn against truth itself. A tool 
designed against disinformation becomes a weapon against facts. Moreover, these belief structures are 
often combined with hostility against various social groups, scapegoating and discrimination.  
Domestic disinformation campaigns have the utmost impact on the local and national audience, and 
building resilience against them is a complex challenge. The domestic networks of identities and interests, 
as well as symbolism and narratives of the national languages, may seem obscure from the outside. The 
logic of conspiracy theories which build on local, traditional fears and vulnerabilities cannot be challenged 
by reason and argument.  
The past four years of American politics have demonstrated the power of disinformation and propaganda 
even in a state where the democratic system of checks and balances, and division of powers, enjoy the 
oldest tradition and stability. Although the 2020 elections have brought a change in the presidency, the 
closeness of the results and the number of people believing in the conspiracy theories (18 % of American 
adults believe in Qanon691) shows that the problem is still present. The number of Republican politicians 
who approved Donald Trump's political attitude is a cause for alert and calls for a comprehensive strategy 
 
689 Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on the Global Struggle for Freedom’, Freedom House, 2020. 
690 The Pizzagate conspiracy theory which led to a violent attack against the Comet Ping Pong Pizzeria is believed to be a 
predecessor of the Qanon conspiracy theory; Adrienne LaFrance, ‘The Prophecies of Q – American conspiracy theories are entering 
a dangerous new phase’, The Atlantic, 2020.  
691 Qanon is a complex, unfounded conspiracy theory that says that President Trump is waging a secret war against elite Satan-
worshipping paedophiles in government, business and the media. Mike Wendling, ‘QAnon: What is it and where did it come from?’, 
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to build an even more resistant political structure. Internal confrontations within the Republican party are 
an inevitable part of this process.692  
National political disinformation, conspiracy theories, and propaganda can also be traced within the 
European Union. Even if eliminating such domestic disinformation nodes is not successful by supranational 
means, their spreading out across the nation and formation of networks across borders should be 
prevented.  
For this, the European Union should develop new, and apply existing, tools of self-defence in order to 
defend and protect European democracy and respect for the rule of law, as well as fundamental rights. For 
example, the rule of law ‘conditionality procedure’ has been designed to serve this goal. Under this rule, 
EU budget payments can be withheld from countries in which breaches of the rule of law have been 
established.693 Another milestone in the rule of law domain has been the Commission's Annual Rule of Law 
Report, of which the first was published on 30 September 2020.694 These reports will provide a regular 
overview of the rule of law situation in the European Union and all Member States. The four pillars of the 
report include media pluralism, the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, and other institutional 
issues related to checks and balances.  
The rule of law conditionality procedure itself has also been the subject of disinformation campaigns in 
some Member States, even in the public service media. The organised disinformation campaign 
disseminated a conspiracy theory, as well as manipulated information about the objectives of the rule of 
law conditionality, in an attempt to discredit the EU's attempt to protect the rule of law and the EU 
budget.695 
The systematic dissemination of disinformation by active politicians, parties or authorities is a clear and 
immediate threat to democracy, and is disrespectful of the values of the European Union according to 
Article 2 TEU, as it is supported by solid academic arguments.696 To increase the resilience of European 
democracy, we recommend safeguards for political advertising and election monitoring, and 
parliamentary rules on the financing of political parties and the privileges of parties and party groups 
within the EP.  
Beyond this systemic threat to democracies globally and within Member States, concrete foreign 
disinformation actions have left the European political processes and public opinion fairly unaffected. Even 
though the number of disinformation cases attributed to Russian sources and documented by the East 
Strategic Communication Task Force was reported to grow in 2019 and 2020 as well, and the 
disinformation actions seeking to undermine the credibility of the EU in the Western Balkans and the 
Eastern Partnership states is reported to be increasingly aggressive697, the EP elections have been relatively 
undisturbed by these, their impact has remained limited, and the most impactful disinformation actions 
 
692 The analogy with the European People's Party's long hesitation to confront with Orbán Viktor's Fidesz is conspicuous.  
693 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2020 on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, the InterInstitutional 
Agreement, the EU Recovery Instrument and the Rule of Law Regulation 2020/2923(RSP). 
694 European Commission, ‘2020 Rule of law report - Communication and country chapters’. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en.   
695 About Hungary, ‘Government: Brussels only sees pro-migration countries as adhering to rule of law’, 2020. Hungary Today, 
‘Orbán: Soros Working in Brussels “to Harm Hungarians Wherever He Can’, 2020. Hirado, ‘Zsarnoki módszerekkel támad Brüsszel’, 
2020; Hirado, ‘Brüsszelben csak az lehet jogállam, amely beengedi a bevándorlókat’, 2020.  
696 John Morijn, ‘Responding to “populist” politics at EU level: Regulation 1141/2014 and beyond’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Volume 17, Issue 2, April 2019, pp. 617–640.   
697 European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and 
European democratic processes (2019/2810(RSP)), point 9-10. January 2019 (998 cases) is more than double that for the same 
period in 2018 (434 cases). 
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originated from within the EU.698 Surveys do not show that the disinformation actions have impacted 
people's trust in democracy, nor the European Union. The trust and opinion appear relatively stable.699 
It must be noted, however, that a missing link between the disinformation events and the impact on public 
opinion or political events can hardly ever be proven. Even if the surveys showed a drop in people's trust 
in democracy or the EU, it could also be attributable to other circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 crisis.  
Domestically produced disinformation has primarily originated from far-right extremist groups and anti-
EU activists. Uncovering a potential link between these groups and foreign political actors would 
need other instruments besides those used by social science. Even if a link can be shown between 
external powers and domestic groups, for example showing connection in communication, projects, or 
even financing, it would not prove whether the extreme group is an agent or a genuine representative 
of the ideology.  
The global internet allows everyone to interfere into other states' political movements or civil initiatives 
(through signature, financing, and all sorts of online participation) even without using illegal methods.  
9.3 Impacts on fundamental rights 
While until 2019 the direct impact on fundamental rights was hard to identify, since 2020 the effect has 
become more obvious. The infodemic directly impacted the health and life of individuals, who caught or 
spread the disease because they relied on disinformation which denied facts about its nature, such as its 
seriousness, ease of spread, and treatment.  
Conspiracy theories showed their teeth: the attack of the Capitol building took the life of five people and 
caused several injuries. Disinformation has caused discrimination and hostility against Asians700, 
migrants701, refugees702, and elderly people703. 
The fear from disinformation generated backlash effects: over restrictive measures by some Member States 
that disproportionately restricted freedom of expression.704 One of the first measures of the Hungarian 
government during the emergency was to amend the Criminal Code so as to criminalise scaremongering: 
‘Whoever, during an extraordinary legal order, publicly states or disseminates a false fact or manipulatively 
states or disseminates true facts, in a way which is capable to frustrate or hinder the defence, shall be 
punished with imprisonment between 1 and 5 years’ (§337(2) Criminal Code of Hungary). In spite of the 
bill being immediately contested by civil society and academia705, as well as oppositional politicians, it has 
been passed and abused during the following months706.  Although a petition was submitted at the 
 
698 Democracy Reporting International, ‘Findings about disinformation in the European Parliament (EP) elections’, 2019. 
699 EU Open Data Portal, Directorate-general for Communication, ‘Standard Eurobarometer 93: Summer 2020’; See also: Laura 
Silver, Moira Fagan and Nicholas Kent, ‘Majorities in the European Union Have Favourable Views of the Bloc’, Pew Research Center, 
2020.  
700 Human Rights Watch, ‘COVID-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide’, 2020; see also: BBC News, ‘COVID “hate 
crimes” against Asian Americans on rise’, 2021. 
701 Gábor Medvegy, ‘Hungary Deports Iranian Student Without Evidence, Based on a Single Claim”’, Liberties, 2020. 
702 United Nations, Department of Global Communications, ‘COVID-19: UN counters pandemic-related hate and xenophobia’, 2020. 
703 Petra Bárd, Erik Uszkiewicz, ‘Hate Crimes in Hungary During the Coronavirus Outbreak’, Eötvös Loránd Research Network, jtiblog, 
2020. 
704 The pandemic has brought the severe restriction of liberties such as freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and the 
exercise of several fundamental rights, including the right to education. However, these are in most of the cases regarded as 
unfortunate, but justified restrictions to avoid spreading of the disease, and are not related to disinformation. 
705 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Section 337. See criticism: Csaba Győry., ‘Fighting Fake News or Fighting Inconvenient 
Truths?’, Verfassungsblog, 2020. 
706 Alasdair Sandford, ‘Hungary: “Critics silenced” in social media arrests as EU debates Orban’s powers’, euronews, 2020. 
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Constitutional Court, the captured judicial body707 found that ‘criminalisation of scaremongering is not 
anti-constitutional, if disseminated knowingly (maliciously) and capable of preventing or frustrating 
defence against pandemics.’708 
Besides legislative restrictions, social media platforms also applied strict measures to tackle disinformation 
(see in Chapter 7). These included, among others, verification of personal identity for 'high reach' users 
through photo ID, and everyone else through mobile phone authentication. These verification measures 
clearly meant a restriction of data privacy, whereas removal of false content interferes with the right to 
freedom of expression. Of course, these interferences are, on the one hand, employed by private entities, 
and on the other hand, may be justified and proportionate in the interest of safeguarding democratic 
public discourse from the harms of disinformation and propaganda. Neither of these aspects have been 
clarified; whether online platforms have authority to restrict these rights709, and where the limits of 
restriction are in cases of disinformation. Nevertheless, constant efforts by stakeholders to reach and 
maintain a balanced approach, among others, earmarked by the establishment of the Facebook Oversight 
Board and provisions in the draft Digital Services Act meant to protect the rights of users (Articles 15,17,18 
and 20), give hope that such restrictions pose a smaller threat compared to unlimited disinformation 
campaigns. The limits of platforms' rights and duties, as well as the threshold of restriction of 
fundamental rights with the goal of eliminating disinformation, needs to be clarified by legal theory 
and court practice.  
9.4 Future potential impacts of disinformation 
As the table shows, in the current situation, more threat is attached to non-regulation than to over-
regulation. This has two key reasons: one of them is the activistic self-regulation of platforms. In an attempt 
to stop adverse effects of an uncontrolled information market, where strong strategic actors abused the 
market processes for their advantage, platforms applied several regulatory measures without human rights 
safeguards. States' obligation extends to the protection of human rights both at the individual and 
the collective level. Platforms' intentions aim to optimise consumer satisfaction and their own legal 
compliance.  
The other, more important, reason is that disinformation and influence operations are becoming less 
detectable. Not merely because of the perfectionising falsification of content or AI personalities, but 
because of the strategy to directly infiltrate into the public discourse of the adversary state and influence 
discourse with amplification, as well as applying information laundering.710  
The internet can bring about an accelerated globalisation of communicative processes, including political 
ones. International movements, advocacy and donations have been known before, but – in contrast to 
malicious influencing operations – they have been transparent and usually institutionalised. Covert 
interventions which use the same channels but through ‘patriotic’ citizens or trolls, as well as money-
laundering networks, are barely separable from genuine discourse. Consequently, even less results can be 
expected from fact-checking, debunking and content removal or labelling, as well as the removal of fake 
profiles. The informational ecosystem as a whole should be developed.  
We argue that a new structure should be given to the still relatively disorganised internet 
communication, a design which aims at creating networks of trust.  To the analogue of blockchain's 
 
707 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, ‘Hungary’s Government Has Taken Control Of The Constitutional Court’, 2015. 
708 15/2020. (VII. 8.) Consitutional Court decision. 
709 Tarlach, McGonagle, CoE and internet intermediaries, in Human rights in the age of platforms, by Jørgensen, R. F. (ed)., MIT Press, 
2019. 
710 Belen Carrasco Rodriguez, “Information Laundering in Germany”, NATO Stratcom CoE, 2020. 
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Disinformation campaigns may be stopped, but at a high price 
of over-restricting human rights. 
Platforms' obligation to respect human rights 
should be laid down.  
Due to uneven application of the platform standards, national 
islands of disinformation and propaganda remain. 
Platforms should tackle disinformation and hate 
speech in less commonly spoken languages as 
well. 
Media capture allows disinformation and populistic 
propaganda to thrive among national and regional 
boundaries. 
Media freedom and pluralism should be pursued 
as part of the supranational rule of law mechanism. 
Supranational journalism networks, news 
collaborations should be created.  
The network of populistic leaders becomes stronger and 
builds alliances with Chinese, Russian, and Trumpist political 
forces.  
Applying the rule of law mechanism and 
safeguards against abuse of parliamentary 
institutions. 
Manipulation of election, cyber-attacks, especially in the post-
soviet zone.   
The protection of election processes should be 
strengthened. 
Microtargeted political ads polarise societies and reduce 
democratic public discourse. 
Microtargeted political ads should be prohibited.  
Algorithms dominate users' choices. Users cannot develop 
critical thinking.  
Algorithmic recommendations and ranking 
systems should be made transparent, and should 
allow options for users.  
The European common public information space does not 
develop and does not help EU democracy and integration.  
A concept on how to create and distribute 
common European public service media content 
should be developed. 
Social media platforms offer an increasing amount of self-
edited 'curated content', create more and more 'walled 
gardens', and transform into 'quasi-media service providers' 
without the responsibilities and safeguards of those, such as 
journalistic professional oversight or editorial accountability. 
Social media companies should be prevented from 
engaging in publishing or editing as an anti-
competitive behaviour. Social platforms should 
ensure neutrality towards content and non-
discrimination of users.  
Changes in the management of online platforms result 
changes in the value choices of platforms, which get 
represented in their content moderation decisions.  
Standards and values for social media platforms 
should be laid down, separating content policy 










Captured national public service media boards let 
disinformation and propaganda infiltrate into a new common 
EU PSM operation, frustrate investigative reporting. Political 
pluralism and diversity is abused to represent illiberal views 
and discrimination of vulnerable minorities.  
Carefully designed common public service media 
should be introduced, and standards for diversity 
and commitment to democratic values laid. Media 
capture should be tackled.  
Platforms engage in censorship. A platform’s accountability should not amount to 
bearing liability for content.  
 
  




Several good practices have developed in the past two years which together form a considerable barrier 
against foreign influence operations. The existing practices developed by online platforms and civil society 
should be polished to be less ad hoc, more calculable, and with adequate clarification of respect paid to 
human rights, as well as their limits.  
New challenges have emerged in the fields of anti-scientific misinformation and disinformation, as well as 
disinformation and propaganda within national boundaries. Both of these new phenomena pose threats 
to European democracy, European integration, and the wellbeing of European citizens.  
10.1 Laws and self-regulation 
The European Commission's legislative programme, as described among others in the ‘European 
Democracy Action Plan’, as well as the ‘Media Pluralism Action Plan’, provides hopeful auspices. The Digital 
Services Act and the Digital Markets Act proposals are two promising milestones in regulation of the online 
information environment. Long negotiations can be expected with stakeholders, and it is important that 
the European Commission firmly stands for the citizens of Europe and keeps in sight the protection of the 
European information scene, which is so essential for democracy.  
The DMA and DSA proposals, for example, could have been more ambitious at some points. Regulation on 
how to handle illegal content did not solve the long-standing dilemma of how ‘lay’ platforms should be in 
a situation when trying to decide promptly about issues that often take months, even for judges. And if the 
decision is ad hoc, why do they remove the content? Shouldn't they only label it, or notify the content 
provider (notice-and-notice711)? But more importantly, the proposals do not touch the current, anarchic 
logic of the information ecosystem (see below).  
The regulatory scheme is to combine the regulative approach for illegal content with the duty of care 
approach for other content (assessment and mitigation of systemic risks, Articles 26 and 27). The systemic 
risks are thus referred into the scope of co-regulation, which has the advantage of flexibility, provides 
some level of transparency, but lacks coercive elements. Despite the draconian sanctioning power of the 
Member States and the Commission, the scope of the sanctionable compulsory legal obligations by 
platforms is quite narrow.  
The content of co-regulatory codes is left open, with reference to cooperation between the Commission, 
Digital Services Coordinators, and platforms. The potential to adapt to changing technology is key, 
however, some basic guiding principles could have been laid down in the Act to protect users and their 
fundamental rights. Some reference is made to these in Article 27, paragraph 3 of the DSA: ‘The 
Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators, may issue general guidelines on the 
application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks, in particular to present best practices and 
recommend possible measures, having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of all parties involved.’ However, even if these fundamental 
principles finally find their place in the Code of Conduct (which is not secured at the moment), their 
violation will not be subject to the sanctioning system of the Act. This could be remedied if the 
independent audit712 had the potential to channel into the sanctioning process. Currently, it appears from 
the Act that the independent audit can be closed with an excuse of the platform, explaining why it failed 
to apply the Code: ‘Where they do not implement the operational recommendations, they shall justify in 
 
711 As in the UK Defamation Act, see more in Bayer et al. 2019.  
712 Article 28 DSA provides for an audit by an independent, professional firm, yearly or every 6 months for very large online platform 
providers. However, no sanctions apply to the negative result of the audit.   
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the audit implementation report the reasons for not doing so and set out any alternative measures they 
may have taken to address any instances of non-compliance identified’ (Article 4. 28. DSA). The DSA does 
not instruct whether such a report needs accepting, or whether an order can be issued by the Digital 
Services Coordinator in such cases.  
While the horizontal effect of human rights have already been discussed in academia713 and by the OECD 
in its ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’714, it is generally not accepted in all Member States yet715 
that corporations are also obliged to respect fundamental rights. Incorporating the obligation into the 
regulation can bridge the existing gap.  
Moreover, for a framework legislation like DSA, it would be very desirable to also formulate and spell out 
principles like the requirement of neutrality (which has been provided in the commercial services sphere 
in the DMA), the prohibition of discrimination in the context of user and content policy, and other 
fundamental rights. A minimal reference to these can now be found in Article 12 of the DSA.  
Platforms often claim that the content of algorithms is unknown, as they are self-learning, and are 'black 
boxes'. Innovations are an important force in today's communication technology. Painstakingly 
unravelling what an algorithm does would deprive that algorithm of the potential that a continuous 
innovation can bring. Still, when the fate of billions is impacted by certain processes, slowing down the 
innovation and development of algorithms is not a price too high to pay for security, safety, and 
foreseeability. This expectation has already been formulated by some legal policies within the EU.716 
Platforms should be allowed to experiment with algorithms, but in applications like games, virtual 
sandstones, or hobby-related themes, and not within the realm of democratic discourse on matters of 
public interest. 
10.1.1 Laws and self-regulation in the various Member States 
Various Member States of the EU have given very different responses to the disinformation crisis.  
Germany has addressed this in its federal media law, and has extended journalistic duties to online media. 
Political, ideological, and religious advertising (including micro-targeted advertising) in telemedia must be 
clearly marked, and advertisers or clients must be clearly indicated. Content or messages created 
automatically by means of a computer program (social bots) must also be marked.717 Platform operators 
have a duty of care to encourage providers of social blogs to comply with this regulation. 
 
713 Ana Paula Barbosa-Fohrmann, ‘Horizontal or Third-Party Effect Of Human Rights: International Decisions And National 
Tendencies In Retrospective’, Revista Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia Núm. 17, January 2015. 
714 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 21 July 1976 
(OECD Code)’.  
715 The German jurisprudence knows this as the ‘third party effect’, Drittwirkung. See for example: Eric Engle, ‘Third Party Effect of 
Fundamental Rights’, European Law, 2009; and several lower court decisions; Matthias C. Kettemann and Anna Sophia Tiedeke, 
‘Back up: can users sue platforms to reinstate deleted content?’, Internet Policy Review, 9(2), 2020. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.2.1484.  
716 Adrien Bibal, Michael Lognoul, Alexandre de Streel, et al. ‘Legal requirements on explainability in machine learning’, Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, 2020. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10506-020-09270-4. See also: Alexandre de 
Streel, Adrien Bibal, Benoit Frenay, Michael Lognoul, ‘Explaining the black box when law controls AI’, Centre on Regulation in 
Europe (CERRE), 2020. Available at http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/8578.pdf. 
717 Sections 18 (3), 22 (1) sentence 3 MStV. The use of social bots through state election has been analysed by Neudert, 
´Computational Propaganda in Germany: A Cautionary Tale´, in Samuel Woolley/Philip N. Howard (Eds.), Working Paper 2017.1, 
Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda. 
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Germany also has a robust system of public service media providers, and the media law obliges platforms 
to prioritise them and to have privileged apps pre-installed on smart TVs, streaming sticks and voice 
assistance, such as Alexa.  
Finland, although heavily hit by Russian disinformation campaigns, reacted with only training and 
awareness raising activities. Estonia created a Defence League (EDL) within its Ministry of Defence, which 
aims to increase civil resilience, and which, among others, runs an anti-propaganda blog. France opted for 
judicial decision about disinformation within 48 hours of notification – but only in campaign periods. 
Sweden has criminalised the dissemination of disinformation, but did not intervene in the activity of 
platforms. Spain empowered its government to issue counter-narratives.718 Hungary shows interiorisation 
of the Russian strategic communication into its captured media landscape, and governmental 
disinformation is strategically used to further domestic political aims.  
Australia developed relatively heavy weaponry against foreign-originating disinformation, requiring 
authorisation of political advertising; a ‘Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act’ has provided for 
supervision of foreign 'agents' since 2018, and an ‘Electoral Integrity Assurance Task Force’ operates under 
the guidance of the Department of Home Affairs. 
10.2 Design of the ecosystem 
We are living in the 'post-truth era'. The previously-known hierarchies and entry-barriers to content 
production and publishing have vanished with the arrival of the unstructured internet. Those barriers had 
granted some order, even if it had been disputed previously whether that order was fair. Now, it is time to 
develop a new structure of constraints and hierarchies on content, so as to create an information 
environment that serves people and democracies well.  
When efforts are concentrated at the content level to spot and debunk disinformation, the bigger picture, 
where disinformation is a symptom of the media infrastructure as a whole, is missed.  
Instead of individual actors, regulation should think in terms of communication networks, value chains, 
and technology-neutral, as well as content-neutral, solutions.  
The lucrative value chain of generating disinformation should be interrupted, and already-known practices 
for demonetisation should be better developed. For example, the public relation firms that have begun 
specialising in disinformation campaigns should face legal restrictions, and even sanctions.  
At the same time, the struggling quality media should be better organised and funded. Trusted content 
production and distribution chains and collaboration networks should be created, and cross-verification 
of facts between network members established, as well as a block-chain-like protocol which verifies 
authenticity of the content throughout its distribution chain, including sharing.  
New solutions for public service content creation should be sought, in particular supranational media 
that represents the common issues of Member States and is governed by their commonly accepted 
values. New communication patterns should be elaborated based on cognitive and communication 
sciences, reaching beyond reporting on facts by incorporating scientific facts into stories (narratives) to 
make them accessible for ordinary audiences.  
  
 
718 Miguel González, Natalia Junquera, ‘Spain to monitor online fake news and give a ‘political response’ to disinformation 
campaigns’, El País, 9 November 2020.  
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10.2.1 Platforms' responsibility 
Online platforms have become conveyors of information in all aspects of life. The attitude of the largest 
online social media platforms has become activist in recent years, upon having been entrusted with tasks 
and expectations from the European Institutions, but little clear guidance. Thanks to the match of cultural 
values between the EU and the largest platform leaders, these largest platforms by and large respect 
fundamental rights, especially if these coincide with their financial interests, creating a pleasant 
environment for their users.  
However, there are a few problems with this situation. First, the behaviours of platforms now depend on 
the decisions of their leaders, which are subject to change. Other platforms may emerge which adhere 
to different value systems (e.g. Chinese) and reach sweeping popularity among young people. Second, 
decisions on content moderation are often complex, and require the balancing of conflicting human rights. 
The process of deciding about illegal or harmful content is opaque, and platforms do not ensure expertise 
in decisions made about the illegal nature of content. Remedies against the decision are inconsequently 
granted (this deficiency is to be cured by the DSA).  
Safeguards for suspending user accounts are now set out in the draft DSA; platforms would be allowed to 
suspend accounts only respecting certain safeguards to protect users.  
However, it is not yet clarified whether content enjoys similar protection: is there a certain threshold, 
beyond which all content must be carried by platforms? Can platforms have policies that rule out 
certain types of speech that are neither harmful, nor illegal? This would lead to a discussion about 
platforms' public utility nature, in particular for very large online platforms. Even though they are entirely 
private enterprises, their service is becoming closer to public (e.g. gas or water pipelines); it is still possible 
to live without, but less comfortable.  
Currently, platforms face only one pressure; if they do not remove illegal content, they risk consequences. 
Therefore, they often overreact and recklessly remove content that is perfectly lawful, in fear of perceived 
legal expectations.719  
If an online discursive space is envisaged where fundamental rights are securely safeguarded, the limits 
of platforms' interference should be identified. Whether it is their terms that should adequately respect 
fundamental rights, or regulation that would oblige them to respect these, is to be decided. Currently, most 
of these questions are referred to self- and co-regulation by EU policy (see above). 
10.2.2 Counter-speech 
Taiwanese good practice does not tackle disinformation through platform regulation. Instead, it applies 
the same weapon by pushing out true and relevant information, preceding the dissemination of 
disinformation (an ‘immunization shot’). The dissemination of accurate information takes place through a 
well-designed network of channels; in a style accessible to a wider range of ordinary audiences, in 
particular using memes and ‘humour over rumour’, which engages young people who virally spread these 
across filter bubbles.  
This communicative process consists of two parts: first, disinformation actions are identified, ideally before 
they spread. This task appears to be fulfilled by the EEAS, which collects and processes foreign 
disinformation against the EU. In the second phase, media message should be created on the subject 
matter of the disinformation, without repeating the content of the disinformation itself (to avoid 
 
719 As the E-Commerce Directive is not applicable to online platforms (which have not been legally defined until today) the 
expectations are only perceived and not definite.   
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amplification of the falsity). Ideally, different media items are generated to target different audiences. The 
media items are disseminated through various channels, including social media, and reach wide segments 
of the population.  
For the sake of clarity, we call this type of information ‘affirmative information’.  
The recommended elements of affirmative information are:  
• early response to disinformation that seems impactful;  
• addressing the subject matter with accurate and engaging details;  
• using humour and memes to boost dissemination; 
• creating 2-4 various levels of content (meme, video, intellectual, etc.) and distributing them via the 
appropriate channels.  
Taiwan installed ‘meme engineering’ teams in each government department. Note that governmental 
ministries as the central source of information might be less accepted by some European states, as shown 
for example by the outcry against a Spanish law with similar content.720 This activity might be outsourced 
to trustworthy public institutions, primarily public service media and sectoral professional bodies, such as 
health authorities (CDCs for COVID-19), academic institutions (for climate change, 5G) human rights 
organisations or authorities, the police (for racist allegations especially relating to crimes), electoral 
authorities (election-related disinformation), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomatic affairs), or even 
trusted NGOs. The appropriate institutions are those which bear the trust of the population within the 
national or local environment. However, it is questionable whether or how these institutions are equipped 
to give a rapid response (within two hours). A further consideration is that the same tools can be abused 
by authoritarian governments to perfect their spreading of disinformation and propaganda. There is no 
way to prevent this, although humour is not typically cultivated by authoritarianism. 
10.3 Political speech 
Popularity and reach should entail more responsibility; political speech in the online environment should 
be re-regulated. On the one hand, it should enjoy enhanced privilege, in accordance with the principle 
of freedom of expression, and because it forms the necessary basis of democratic public discourse. But at 
the same time, if a politician takes advantage of false or polarising content, that causes imminent harm to 
a country’s cohesion, democratic process, and even individual human rights.  
It is known that falsities have always been part of political campaigns. However, digital technology has 
escalated the speed and the effect of communication. The informational ecosystem in our age – with 
regard to rapid spreading, informational overload, and the potential of targeting and reach – makes lies 
and falsities more effective, and harm more imminent. Mass media has been more strictly regulated from 
early on with regard to its reach and pervasive effect. 
Political speech enjoys the highest privilege of freedom of expression. Obviously, political advertisements 
express subjective opinions, and are often symbolic and value-laden. Differences should be highlighted 
between exaggerations, framing, biased language, and outright disinformation721 or manipulation. It 
remains a question to decide whether platforms are the appropriate fora to decide in this. Ideally, 
courts or at least authorities should make this decision, just as in the case of illegal content. Despite 
 
720 Miguel González, Natalia Junquera, ‘Spain to monitor online fake news and give a ‘political response’ to disinformation 
campaigns’, El País, 9 November 2020.  
721 The widely accepted definition of ‘disinformation’ is intentionally disseminated, false or manipulative information that is socially 
harmful.  
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calls from freedom of expression advocates, judicial processes are rarely used to decide on content issues. 
An exception to this is the French regulation for election campaign periods, in which court must decide on 
content within 48 hours (see above). As an alternative, platforms should employ special legal experts 
who are responsible for making decisions on tougher cases. Similar to the Facebook Oversight Board 
(which, in contrast, does not decide individual cases on a daily basis), it only gives rulings on more 
principled issues.  
In sum, it is recommended that influencers are labelled as such, and that platforms actively monitor 
political and issue-based advertising for disinformation and manipulation at least in special periods, 
such as election campaigns or crisis situations. 
There are more alternatives in terms of who should decide on labelling or removal of political advertising:  
• Courts, at least in campaign periods (see the French law). It should be noted that, in order to 
impose such an obligation on judges, they need to be specifically trained on the topic. Even 
knowledgeable judges may experience difficulties in speedily delivering decisions with regard to 
questions where fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of political expression) collide with a legitimate 
public interest (e.g. the right to access true information and to protect healthy democratic public 
discourse).  
• Election authorities. In political campaigns, election authorities could routinely decide about the 
truthfulness of political advertising. Authorities, especially media and telecommunication 
authorities, may in some states be considered as potential fora, however, in other states these may 
be captured, or not have enough capacity for special periods.   
• International fact-checking networks. International fact-checking networks, working in 
cooperation with independent local fact-checkers, should be required to approve flagging and 
decide about removal or labelling of political ads. This would simplify the rule’s exportation to 
transitional democracies or illiberal regimes/autocracies as well, where local authorities may be 
less cooperative. 
• A special ‘Freedom of Expression Officer’ should be employed by all very large online platforms 
(VLOPs)722. Similarly to the Compliance Officers which have been proposed by the DSA (Article 32), 
and to the Data Protection Officers required by the GDPR, the DSA could also provide that all 
VLOPs are obliged to employ a ‘Freedom of Expression Officer’, who is trained in issues of freedom 
of expression and content regulation, and knows the regional standards and jurisprudence. 
However, all jurisdictions and language areas should get a separate officer, and decisions should 
be subject to court review like all other decisions about illegal content. 
• With the intention to keep regulations flexible enough to adapt to the latest challenges, but also 
robustly defending fundamental rights, a combination of the civil and official decisions is 
recommended. As an optimal solution, the introduction of a Freedom of Expression Officer 
should be combined with judicial oversight.  
10.3.1 Micro-targeting 
Micro-targeted advertising has revolutionised the advertising market. The advantages are also well 
received by political actors; micro-targeting promises better effects, because it sends ads to a pre-selected 
 
722 As defined by Article 25 DSA. 
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audience only, based on their assumed susceptibility. Academic literature has extensively discussed 
privacy-related objections against this technology, as well as arguments that this practice splinters public 
discourse, and robs non-targeted users of important public information.723 Besides, it is also questionable 
whether this persuasion technique is ethical for issue-based advertising. Whereas in their commercial 
decisions people rely to some extent on their rational mind, considering their needs and their budget, 
this is not the case in political, ideological, and other value-based decisions.724 Finally, micro-targeting 
distorts the fairness of political competition. Applying this technique for issue-based and political 
advertising should be ruled out. Exploiting the effectiveness of micro-targeting for educational content 
(positive nudging) would be recommended, but only under strict safeguards to avoid intrusion. Even if 
used for beneficial purposes, and for purposes where fragmentation would not be a problem, it should be 
remembered how easily this powerful tool can be abused.725    
10.3.2 Captured state, captured media 
Specific problems arise when disinformation is not foreign originated, but takes the form of a domestic 
political propaganda within the boundaries of a Member State. This can be the case with extremist groups 
or mainstream media. In the first case, security operations may reveal whether there are links to foreign 
adversaries and help plan adequate actions. In the latter case, the public service media or even the 
mainstream media may be captured, and remaining independent journalists are vulnerable and have weak 
capacities for fact-checking.726 Captured state authorities turn the fight against disinformation into its 
reverse; they may accuse their political opponents and independent journalists of spreading 
disinformation. Hard legal instruments to tackle disinformation would transform into yet another 
oppressive tool in the hands of an illiberal government, especially if the judiciary is also captured.  
It has been found that such disinformation has substantially increased in the past two years, both within 
and outside the EU (USA, Brazil, India).  
In this situation, international efforts to support media pluralism and investigative reporting, and protect 
journalists against strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP) and violence, as well as the 
operation of platforms along European standards, may have some stabilising effect.  
Beyond the media system, the bigger picture of the entire rule of law situation in these states should be 
addressed efficiently.  
10.3.3 Psychological mechanism of disinformation and the fight against it 
Research results provide some helpful insights into the way strategic communication should be designed 
to impact attitude and behaviour. However, more research is still needed to test the hypotheses in larger 
experiments and a diversity of contexts.  
Strategic messages are also target-group specific. Targeting (perhaps even micro-targeting) could well be 
used for well-meant ‘nudging’, providing educational information where it seems necessary in various 
 
723 Judit Bayer, ‘Double harm to voters: data-driven micro-targeting and democratic public discourse’, Internet Policy Review, 9(1), 
2020. Available at: https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.1.1460.  
724 This also explains why micro-targeting is not as successful as initially believed; see Tim Hwang, ‘The Subprime Attention Crisis’, 
Fsg Originals. 2020. 
725 As it was expressed at a WHO Infodemics Conference: ‘if advertising is a weapon, micro-targeting is a nuclear weapon’.   
726 Broadband Commission for sustainable development, “Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting 
Freedom of Expression”, p. 54, available at https://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-
groups/FoE_Disinfo_Report.pdf, last accessed on 12.03.2021. 
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fields, whether on disinformation literacy, healthcare, or other issues727, with appropriate safeguards (see 
above).   
Democratic values and public awareness of disinformation, i.e. critical media literacy, should be recognised 
as a transnational task, and supported through media education over the lifespan. This should be started 
with investment into the training of educators of all age groups in all EU Member States. Such a large 
EU-wide training project would benefit from a European platform which provides methods structured 
according to target-group and addressed skill. Also, specific materials could be shared in various 
European languages. Specific guidelines analogous to those published by the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network (RAN) concerning counter narratives and alternative narratives for extremist prevention728 could 
be useful in the fight against disinformation, too.  
  
 
727 Karen Yeung, ‘‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design’, Information, Communication & Society, 
2016, 20:1, 118-136, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2016.1186713. 
728 RANm 'ISSUE PAPER Developing counter- and alternative narratives together with local communities.' ,15 October 2018.  




11.1 Platform regulation 
11.1.1 The relationship of hard and soft regulations 
The DSA provides for drawing up of a Code of Conduct, facilitated by the Commission and the European 
Board of Digital Services, for the proper application of the regulation. In addition to the general Code, 
another Code of Conduct on online advertising and Crisis Protocols are to be created. Compliance with the 
codes is to be supervised by regular independent audit, but a negative audit result does not appear to 
entail sanctions.  
We recommend that codes of co-regulation are channelled into the sanctioning system.  
If the independent audit finds that a platform did not fulfil its commitment under the Code of Conduct, the 
Digital Services Coordinator should decide whether the attempt of the platform to justify the departure 
from the code should be acceptable or not. In the latter case, it should have the right to impose an order.  
Reasoning: The current structure leaves many issues for co-regulation, whereas the sanctioning system 
applies only to the narrow set of obligations between Articles 14–33 of the DSA. All the detailed 
undertakings under the prospected Codes of Conduct (Articles 35, 36 and 37) are not enforceable at any 
level. The scope of issues referred to in the Codes is too wide to leave as it is. Either more principles should 
be defined in the Act, or enforcement power by the DSC and the Commission should be granted in relation 
to violations of the Codes.  
Article 41 paragraph 2.c. of the DSA provides for such a power of the DSC, with reference to paragraph 1; 
however, paragraph 1 does not mention the power to issue an order.  
11.1.2 Proposals on further hard regulations 
1. Neutrality is a key element for intermediaries  
The DSA should oblige online platforms to maintain ideologically neutral services. This should include:   
• ensuring their algorithms do not systematically favour any political, ideological, or religious 
opinion, or give preference to content that is their own or by an affiliated company; 
• avoid discriminating among users or users' content based on protected characteristics such as race, 
gender, or political opinion.  
Reasoning: Platforms should be differentiated from publishers (content providers). While content 
providers enjoy freedom of expression, and are entitled to represent various opinions and views, platforms 
are intermediaries of content. Their activities, however, have extreme potential to influence users' 
perception of content. This responsibility should be more adequately reflected among the hard obligations 
of the Act. In light of the growing trend of providing curated content, this obligation is not superfluous. 
2. Nail down the human rights principle  
The DSA should oblige online platforms to act expediently in order to respect fundamental rights, in 
particular the right to freedom of expression, freedom of information, equality and non-discrimination, 
privacy, and dignity. When removing content, platforms' decision should be informed by international 
standards of freedom of expression; the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality, privilege for 
matters of public interest, etc. 
Reasoning: Currently, this expectation is partly referred to be included in the Code of Conduct as the 
Commission and the DSCs ‘may issue general guidelines [...] having due regard to the possible 
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consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of all parties involved’. A 
significantly more robust call for respecting fundamental rights should be incorporated into the Act, 
among those obligations which are sanctionable. The frame of the general rule can be filled with details in 
the Code of Conduct.  
While the current owners of the largest online platforms undoubtedly show a deep commitment to the 
protection of human rights, this responsible attitude should not be taken for granted. New platform 
services may emerge in the future which do not show the same commitment, for example originating in 
other cultures such as China, but might become quickly popular due to their innovative (consumer-
friendly) features.  
3. Offer diversity and trustworthiness 
Article 29 DSA should be completed in the sense that content recommendation algorithms ought to offer:  
• at least one option which is aimed at increasing diversity; 
• at least one further option to prioritise content that is found to be trustworthy by independent 
news organisations. 
Reasoning: The first option aims at increasing exposure diversity and awareness, whereas the second 
explicitly aims at the minimisation of exposure to disinformation. 
4. Know your algorithm 
Only transparent and tested algorithms should be applied by very large online platforms (VLOPs) for 
platform manoeuvres that affect a large number of users, even if that means a slower pace of innovations.  
Reasoning: Software developers often argue that algorithmic transparency is a challenge because even 
they do not know what the algorithm is up to. After the designing phase, algorithms start to learn and 
develop by themselves. This is certainly a fascinating way to develop new services and explore new 
potentials of the technology. At the same time, this is an act of experimenting on large numbers of 
unknowing human individuals. When algorithms influence the informational experience of users (what 
they get to know about the world) or other significant issues, like decisions about health, security, or 
politics, then this experimental attitude is not acceptable. Ample spaces should be left for experimenting 
and innovation outside of the core recommending and other algorithmic services of the very large online 
platform providers.   
Drawbacks: This obligation will slow down technological innovation and cost more to companies in terms 
of investment, workforce, and time. This is the price for the safety of democracies, and respect for human 
rights.  
11.1.3 Proposals on issues to be included into the code of conduct 
1. The Freedom of Expression Officer 
Online platforms whose core activity is to mediate opinions or content which falls under the realm of 
freedom of expression of users, beyond a certain size, should employ a ‘Freedom of Expression Officer’.  
Reasoning: The task of the Freedom of Expression Officer is to ensure that appropriate decisions are taken 
on the removal and labelling of illegal and harmful content. This task is more specific than that of the 
Compliance Officer (Article 32 DSA). It should be up to the platforms whether they combine the two tasks 
or appoint a separate person to fulfil the tasks of the Freedom of Expression Officer.  
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2. No Replicas729 
Bots and virtual personalities should be prohibited from running accounts on platforms, or at least they 
should be identified as such.  
Reasoning: Identifying bots should be a basic expectation in order to protect the human dignity of users. 
Even if the current technology does not allow a 100 % identification of artificial actors, all efforts should be 
made to develop the technology that is needed to comply with this expectation.  
3. Friendly nudges  
Positive nudges should be given for users to enhance conscious information consumption and media 
literacy, such as: 
Public service content and fact-checked, trustworthy content should be prioritised; 
A friendly warning should be given to users when they are too locked in their filter bubbles; 
The options for selecting the content recommendation algorithms should be offered to users at 
regular intervals. 
4. Demonetisation 
Commitments to demonetise disinformation should be more concrete, and should extend to websites 
which contain disinformation, including health- and vaccination-related content. 
5. Algorithmic transparency 
Changes and experimenting with content recommending and ranking algorithms should be transparent, 
providing easily accessible information to users (see other obligations regarding algorithms above in 
11.1.2. points 1, 3, and 4). 
6. Private messaging fact-checking 
Online platforms should develop the technological and human potential of fact-checking in private 
messaging services (WhatsApp, Messenger, etc.), without the violation of privacy. In particular, services like 
news and newsletters which take the platform of messaging services should not remain without scrutiny, 
especially during election and crisis periods.  
11.2 Strengthening democratic resilience 
11.2.1 Political and issue-based advertising 
An EU level legislative instrument should address political and public issue advertising with the following 
specific rules, among others: 
1. Applying micro-targeting for political and public issue advertising should be prohibited, except for 
educational use and public purposes (e.g. healthcare, crisis situations); 
Should targeting not, or not entirely, be prohibited for political and public issue advertising, each 
advertiser should maintain an easily accessible and searchable database about those 
advertisements which were published through micro-targeting, which is searchable for anybody 
without restrictions; 
The European Court of Auditors and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) should pursue the 
investigation of campaign finances, including sponsorship of social media advertisements; 
 
729 Reference to films like Blade Runner (1982) or Replicas (2018) where robots are mistaken for humans.   
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All actors in the value chain of disinformation should bear accountability for collaborating in 
disinformation or manipulative advertising, including providers of personal data, creative 
designers, PR companies, and political consultants.  
11.2.2 Platform regulation related to political and issue based advertising 
1. Social media platforms should actively monitor political and issue-based advertising in special 
periods, such as election campaigns or crisis situations. During these periods, creation of an 
‘Election Operation Center’, an emergency response team (24/7 ‘war room’) with a team of 
interdisciplinary experts, should be considered; 
2. The current practices of platforms, including identification of advertisers and collecting 
information on advertisements' content, amount spent, targeting criteria, visibility and reach, 
should be maintained and further polished; 
3. The repository which shows this information should be easily accessible for researchers and an 
‘ordinary’ audience; it should be easily searchable; 
4. Each user should have access to an individual repository providing information about what 
political and issue-based ads that user was or is being targeted with, including the information 
listed above; 
5. To decide on the removal and labelling, a combination of civil and authoritative actors is 
recommended, e.g. a ‘Freedom of Expression Officer’ (see above) with immediate judicial oversight 
(48 hours). Alternatively, an international fact-checking network, or an election authority, could 
decide. Note that the Digital Service Coordinator is not assumed to have the appropriate 
competence and independence to decide in this case; 
6. Political parties and party politicians should be subject to verification of identity and their status 
should be signalled on their profile; 
7. Users which regularly reach large audiences with public issue content (including NGOs, media 
actors, politicians) should be labelled with an ‘influencer’ tag; 
8. Political speech and speech by ‘influencers’ should enjoy a specific privilege – a higher threshold 
for removal of their content – for example, minor violation of terms and conditions such as 
occasional vulgarity, etc. should be tolerated. However, in cases of incitement to hatred, 
violence, or repeated events of imparting disinformation, a prompt removal of the content, 
and if the conditions are given, suspension of the account should be applied. 
11.2.3 Measures to protect the rule of law and democracy from disinformation 
1. The systematic dissemination of disinformation and propaganda by politicians or state authorities 
should be regarded as explicitly anti-democratic behaviour, which violates the rule of law;  
2. The EP Rules of Procedure should deny the right to form factions, coalitions, and provide for 
withdrawal of funding to political parties who, or whose members repeatedly act disrespectful of 
the values of the European Union and democracy, among others if repeatedly disseminated 
disinformation, or views that are irreconcilable with the values of the European Union, in particular 
views which reach the threshold of hate speech, incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence, 
provided that the party fails to sanction this.  
Reasoning: When people in political authority, or government authorities, impart disinformation, other 
policy measures are impractical. All measures to develop the informational environment, in the hands of 
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disinformation actors, would become another weapon of manipulation and propaganda. Democracy 
should be self-defensive and resist pressure to acknowledge disinformation as legitimate political 
communication; it undermines democracy, therefore, it should be acted against with the tools of self-
defensive democracy. 
11.3 Design a better informational ecosystem 
11.3.1 Public service media 
Public service media should be recognised as a key pillar of trust in the post-truth age, provided that it is 
not captured by the ruling political class and economic groups, as is the case in so many states around the 
globe.  
1. The Communication of the Commission on ‘state aid to public service broadcasting’ (2009) should 
be transformed into hard law.  
2. It should be clarified that a captured public service media is an abuse of public financial resources, 
and a violation of media freedom and pluralism, and also of the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol’s 
assertion that public service broadcasting serves the democratic, social, and cultural needs of 
society and preserves media pluralism. 730 
3. New models to generate public service content with the help of information technology should be 
actively sought; including mobile phone applications and video channels with short videos to 
inform and educate citizens of all ages.  
4. Supranational, European public service media content should be generated to address citizens 
across all Member States, and to provide information about the operation of the common Europe: 
a. One way to create this is to fund a transnational, European Online News Agency which 
generates a pool of public service content in all languages of the EU (or in the languages which 
are relevant for the news item, when not all states are affected).  
b. Another way is to join public service broadcasters from all Member States under the umbrella 
of a new public service media provider. It should be examined how much can be benefited 
from the experience of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU).  
5. To further promote European content, a certain quota of news related to supranational European 
issues could be required from audiovisual media service providers which provide news.  
11.3.2 Create a multi-layered affirmative information system 
The EU and the Member States should organise the multi-level dissemination of 'affirmative information'731. 
Affirmative information should be imparted  
• rapidly;  
• through various channels; 
• in a style designed to serve various audiences, e.g. memes, videos, intellectual content, etc.  
 
730 Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0109. 
731 Affirmative information is information addressing a public matter which might be subject to disinformation. Affirmative 
information should precede and cover the story with accurate, relevant, and engaging information.  
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The EEAS should feed the latest information on disinformation actions as raw materials into the network. 
The local nodes should digest and disseminate the affirmative information through their local social media 
circles in the national languages.     
Local network nodes should be designated responsible organisations, such as election authorities, 
academic institutions, police, trusted NGOs, etc. (See more in Conclusions).  
Reasoning: Rather than debunking and thereby repeating disinformation, affirmative information 
‘inoculates’ the audience against disinformation and educates them about the true facts. This organisation 
should be sufficiently centralised to bear legitimacy and responsibility, but also decentralised, to increase 
the relevance and accessibility for wider, ‘ordinary’ audiences. The decentralised nodes can be non-
governmental, but the central node needs insider information on the planned or latest disinformation 
actions, and therefore an organisation which is professional in such information-collection is 
recommended; for example, the EEAS. 
11.3.3 Organise networks of trustworthy information 
Quality media should consider organising itself to tackle the information disorder; funding opportunities 
need to be invented and elaborated. 
Media organisations should be encouraged and supported to form (professional) transnational networks 
to support reporting in both the horizontal and vertical routes of articles (while retaining their competitive 
independence and the diversity of content). Networks combining the hierarchical and horizontal 
structures may provide cross-verification of facts between network members. Networks should develop 
protocols of trust (based on both technological and professional methods) to verify the authenticity and 
trustworthiness of content throughout the product distribution chain, including sharing.  
Reasoning: Building trust in the information system is a critical precondition for getting the upper hand in 
the disinformation war. Disseminating authentic information in secured value chains down to the end user 
is the central element of generating credence.  
Drawback: One ‘bad apple’ in a network can harm the whole network. Competition and diversity may 
become precarious.  
11.3.4 Science communication 
New policy strategies should be developed to further science communication.  
Reasoning: The current communication channels do not adequately inform ordinary audiences 
about the scientific results of the past decades. Scientific knowledge previously taught in schools 
provides insufficient background knowledge for citizens in the information age.  
The researcher and academic community is not equipped to communicate their results in a 
language accessible for all.  
1. Specific EU agencies should be established/supported where visual and narrated 
information pieces, e.g. short videos are prepared through the cooperation of scientists and 
communication experts.732 These should be disseminated in the national languages of the 
Member States through social media and other appropriate channels, which should be massively 
built out with public investment and donations from platforms. Hubs of scientific communicators 
should be featured as trusted sources, which have regular representation in the news and in social 
 
732 Scientific truths need to be simplified without losing authenticity. 
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media. The information chain should work both ways (be interactive); these hubs should have 
the capacity to respond to inquiries and questions related to rumours and disinformation. 
The addressed topics should extend to as many scientific fields as possible, but in particular, 
those which are relevant for the democratic values and to fight disinformation. It should not be 
advocating issues, but should provide scientific evidence in polarising questions, such as racial 
equality, the climate crisis, health issues, and vaccination; not avoiding topics like homosexuality 
as a disease, economic information on differences between democracies and autocracies, the 
social cost of corruption and off-shore companies, and the paradoxes of xenophobia. As the topic 
of science is not Member State-specific, a transnational approach is recommended. This 
project can belong entirely to the scientific arm of EU, although it should be completed with 
expertise in communication or even cognitive psychology.   
 
2. Interdisciplinary education models should be developed, and students should be 
supported to pursue interdisciplinary curricula. Information science or computer science 
should be combined with one of the social sciences (communication with psychology, economy 
with human rights, etc.). Scientific communicators who are able to bridge the gap between the 
language of academia and that of journalism should be educated. 
 
3. The skill to search for scientific evidence should become part of media literacy. References 
on the unproven quality of the allegations (e.g. pre-print materials733) should be a clear sign to 
literate users of its dubious credibility. This should also be a reason to deprioritise and demonetise 
the latter. 
11.4 Increasing critical media literacy 
1. More research should be supported to clarify what type of strategic communication can impact 
attitude change and behavioural intent.   
2. Media literacy should be made part of school curriculum in all Member States, at every level of 
education; it should include knowledge of responsibility of sharing and paid-trolling. Education 
programmes may be sponsored for third countries with the same aim.   
3. Bring education to the door; media literacy travelling buses should visit rural places to conduct 
workshops on how to identify disinformation for citizens with less media experience (the elderly, 
people in poverty). 
4. Education on critical media literacy, as well as democratic values should be recognised as a 
transnational task within the EU, and be harmonised. Therefore, a European platform should 
provide methods and materials, translated into all EU languages. Investment shall be made to 
develop these training materials. 
5. Teachers, trainers, and other educators should be trained at university, and possibly other 
educational settings. Educators for all age groups across the lifespan should be trained.  
6. Media literacy trainings via ‘nudges’ or other pushing methods for superspreaders of information, 
including teachers, influencers, priests, etc. (with particular attention to the elderly generations 
 
733 Nicholas Fraser, Liam Brierley, Gautam Dey, Jessica K Polka, Máté Pálfy, Jonathon Alexis Coates, ‘Preprinting a pandemic: the 
role of preprints in the COVID-19 pandemic’, bioRxiv, 2020. 2020.05.22.111294; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.22.111294; or 
see: Caitlyn Vlasschaert, Joel M. Topf, Swapnil Hiremath, ‘Proliferation of Papers and Preprints During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 
Pandemic: Progress or Problems With Peer Review?’, Advances in Chronic Kidney Disease, Volume 27, Issue 5, 2020.  
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who are active voters and typical targets of disinformation). Specific guidelines relating to counter 
narratives should be developed, similarly to the Radicalisation Awareness Network's (RAN) activity.  
7. Targeted social purpose advertisements should be applied as 'nudges' to provide educational 
information for people who, based on their social media activity, appear to need it. These 
advertisements should also be accordingly labelled, and shown in the ad repository.  
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exercises 
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